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ABSTRACT
Jero, Samuel C. PhD, Purdue University, May 2018. Analysis and Automated Discovery of Attacks in Transport Protocols. Major Professors: Cristina Nita-Rotaru
and Sonia Fahmy.
Transport protocols like TCP and QUIC are a crucial component of today’s Internet, underlying services as diverse as email, ﬁle transfer, web browsing, video
conferencing, and instant messaging as well as infrastructure protocols like BGP and
secure network protocols like TLS. Transport protocols provide a variety of important
guarantees like reliability, in-order delivery, and congestion control to applications.
As a result, the design and implementation of transport protocols is complex, with
many components, special cases, interacting features, and eﬃciency considerations,
leading to a high probability of bugs. Unfortunately, today the testing of transport
protocols is mainly a manual, ad-hoc process. This lack of systematic testing has
resulted in a steady stream of attacks compromising the availability, performance, or
security of transport protocols, as seen in the literature.
Given the importance of these protocols, we believe that there is a need for the
development of automated systems to identify complex attacks in implementations
of these protocols and for a better understanding of the types of attacks that will be
faced by next generation transport protocols. In this dissertation, we focus on improving this situation, and the security of transport protocols, in three ways. First,
we develop a system to automatically search for attacks that target the availability
or performance of protocol connections on real transport protocol implementations.
Second, we implement a model-based system to search for attacks against implementations of TCP congestion control. Finally, we examine QUIC, Google’s next generation
encrypted transport protocol, and identify attacks on availability and performance.

1

1 INTRODUCTION
Transport protocols are an essential component of today’s Internet, providing end-toend delivery of data between applications and implementing guarantees like reliability,
in-order delivery, and congestion control. They provide this service not only for
end applications but also for other elements of the network infrastructure like BGP.
Many of our secure network protocols, like TLS, rely on the guarantees provided
by transport protocols, while other transport protocols, like QUIC, provide security
guarantees directly.
The essential function of transport protocols is to provide end-to-end delivery of
data; however, they also usually provide a variety of guarantees to ease development
of applications and protect the network. These include reliable delivery via retransmissions, ﬂow control, in-order delivery, and congestion control. As a result, the design and implementation of transport protocols is complex, with many components,
special cases, error conditions, and interacting features. Further, transport protocol
implementations often sacriﬁce simplicity and ease of understanding for improved
performance. Hence, implementations are usually written in low level languages like
C and make use of error-prone, but highly eﬃcient, constructs, like pointer manipulation and type casting. This leads to a high probability of bugs.
Although there are few transport protocols in common use, there are many different implementations and variants of these transport protocols because of their
ubiquitous role in network communication. For example, the nmap security scanner is
able to detect 5,336 distinct TCP/IP network stack conﬁgurations in its most recent
version [1]. This includes printers, VoIP phones, routers, and embedded systems,
along with general purpose operating systems.
Despite the importance of these protocols and the complexity and number of their
implementations, the testing of transport protocol implementations has been mainly
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a manual and ad-hoc process [2–4]. This lack of systematic testing for transport
protocols and their implementations has resulted in a stream of attacks [2, 3, 5, 6].
Consider TCP, one of the most well studied and well tested network protocols; the list
of discovered attacks extends from the mid-1980’s to the present day [7–13]. Many
of these attacks have been discovered repeatedly or rediscovered again in slightly
diﬀerent contexts.
Prior work has focused on easing the development of manual tests [2, 14] or on
enabling deeper testing for implementation crashes by using stateful fuzzing techniques [15–17]. Another line of work has sought to apply model checking techniques
to implementations by leveraging techniques like symbolic execution [5, 18] and dynamic interface reduction [19] in combination with concrete attack execution. These
works, however, require source code in particular languages and struggle to handle
certainly frequently used low-level constructs like type casting, pointer casting, and
function pointers. Some require source code annotation.

1.1 Focus and Motivation
We argue that there is a need for the development of automated systems to identify complex attacks in unmodiﬁed implementations of transport protocols and for
a better understanding of the types of attacks that will be faced by next generation transport protocols. In this dissertation, we focus on improving this situation
in three ways. First, we develop a system to automatically search for attacks that
target the availability or performance of protocol connections on real transport protocol implementations. Second, we implement a model-based system to search for
attacks against implementations of TCP congestion control. Finally, we examine
QUIC, Google’s next generation encrypted transport protocol, and identify attacks
on its availability and performance.
Finding attacks against transport protocol connections. At the core of
a transport protocol’s utility is its ability to open a connection between two hosts
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and exchange the desired data in a reasonable amount of time. Hence, we begin by
focusing broadly on attacks targeting the availability or performance of a transport
protocol and particularly the ability to establish or maintain a connection with the
target implementation. For example, it is possible to blindly inject TCP reset packets
and successfully terminate a target TCP connection by using a series of widely spaced
acknowledgement numbers. This is known as the TCP Reset attack [13].
Unlike simple implementation crashes, attacks on performance or availability can
be complicated to detect. Attacks may cause a degradation in performance, an improvement in performance at the expense of competing ﬂows, the connection to stall
completely, or even an incomplete close of the connection that fails to release all
resources, eventually leading to resource exhaustion. We focus on being able to automatically discover attacks without modifying the transport protocol implementation
under test. Additionally, we model malicious activity by modifying or injecting packets into the network. Thus, we need some algorithm to generate test cases and inject
them into each test.
To completely automate testing, we also need to automatically create a description
of the protocol’s grammar (i.e., its packet ﬁelds and the properties of and relations between these ﬁelds). Since transport protocols are extensively documented in natural
language speciﬁcation documents, typically RFCs, we believe that Natural Language
Processing (NLP) holds signiﬁcant promise for automatically extracting this information. Unfortunately, most NLP methods are sensitive to the data used at training
time and do not adapt easily if applied on data from a diﬀerent domain. Applying
“oﬀ-the-shelf” implementations of NLP tools, typically trained on newswire data, or
combining them in an ad-hoc way, often results in reduced performance and brittle
applications.
We investigate these challenges and identify attack detection techniques based on
expected competition and fairness. We also identify a key search space reduction technique that leverages the protocol’s connection-level state machine, and then design
and implement SNAKE to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of this approach. Finally,
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we create a custom NLP document processing pipeline to automatically extract a
transport protocol’s grammar from the protocol’s speciﬁcation based on a lightweight
zero-shot learning [20] framework.
Finding attacks against TCP congestion control. Congestion control is an
essential component of TCP, the transport protocol that underlies the vast majority of Internet services today. Congestion control serves to protect the network from
complete congestion collapse, and associated catastrophic throughput drops, and provides fairness between competing applications. This makes it is a prime target for
attackers looking to impact the throughput of a ﬂow.
Congestion control attacks can have severe implications for Internet services, including ﬁnancial loss. Consider an attacker who wishes to degrade video quality and
streaming experience for a subset of Netﬂix users. While Netﬂix recently began to
encrypt all of its video traﬃc with TLS [21], TLS relies on TCP to transfer data
across the network. As a result, an attacker can simply launch an attack misleading
TCP into believing that the network is congested. This will cause TCP to repeatedly
slow down its sending rate, causing rebuﬀering events and reduced video quality for
any Netﬂix user subjected to this attack. Due to poor streaming experience, the users
may consider turning to other video providers.
Unfortunately, techniques focusing broadly on transport protocol performance,
like our work in SNAKE, are unable to eﬀectively ﬁnd attacks on congestion control
due to its complex and highly dynamic nature. While a typical attack found by
SNAKE might consist of one malicious action, attacks against congestion control
typically require a a potentially long sequence of malicious actions spanning several
states and transitions, where each action might trigger a new state, which in turn
might require a diﬀerent attack action. Attempting to use SNAKE to ﬁnd these
types of attacks in TCP would require the generation of 1.2 × 1024 test cases, which
is impractical for testing in real networks. This search space explosion resulting from
the dynamic and iterative nature of congestion control attacks is the key challenge
to any automated attack ﬁnding system. Additionally, there are a huge variety of
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variations and optimizations to congestion control that TCP implementations may
include.
We investigate these challenges and develop a state machine model of TCP congestion control. Using this model, we develop a model-based attack search strategy,
and then design and implement TCPwn to demonstrate its eﬀectiveness.
Attacks on next-generation, encrypted transport protocols. Google has
recently developed QUIC, a next generation transport protocol that provides encryption of all data and most headers as well as the ability to perform 0-RTT connections
and dramatically improved acknowledgement information. Further, this protocol is
widely deployed in the Internet via Google’s Chrome browser, with Google reporting
that 85% of all requests from Chrome to Google properties use QUIC, totaling about
7% of Internet traﬃc [22]. Additionally, there is a very active IETF standardization
eﬀort ongoing [23].
Existing work studying QUIC has examined the security guarantees it provides [24,
25] or considered its performance in benign environments [26–30]. Instead, we focus
on the performance and availability attacks that an adversary could launch against
QUIC since QUIC presents a distinctly diﬀerent attack surface compared to traditional transport protocols. Thanks to most of the protocol headers being encrypted,
attacks on congestion control and connection tear down, which can be used against
traditional transport protocols like TCP, are ineﬀective against QUIC. However,
QUIC also introduces 0-RTT connection establishment, which makes heavy use of
caching, thereby exposing a host of new information to the attacker.
We manually investigate QUIC and its implementation in Chrome and discover
three classes of attacks against its availability, resulting from design choices made
to allow enhanced performance. We demonstrate ﬁve attacks against QUIC that
completely prevent connection establishment.
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1.2 Dissertation Contributions
In this dissertation, we improve the state of transport protocol implementation security by developing methods for automatic attack discovery in real implementations
and examining attacks against next generation transport protocols. We summarize
our key contributions as follows:
• Attack discovery for transport protocol connections. We present a system, SNAKE, to automatically identify attacks on transport protocol connection availability and performance in unmodiﬁed implementations. We develop
a method for identifying attacks on performance based on expected competition and fairness and a novel attack injection technique based on leveraging the
protocol’s connection-level state machine. We demonstrate the practicality of
this approach on ﬁve implementations of two transport protocols in four diﬀerent operating systems, ﬁnding 9 attacks, 5 of which were previously unknown.
We then develop an NLP document processing pipeline to extract a transport
protocol’s grammar from its natural language protocol speciﬁcation document
by leveraging the structure and linguistic regularities of the protocol speciﬁcation document and a zero-shot learning framework which adapts to the speciﬁc
properties of our domain. This approach allows us to adapt to new protocols
easily and eﬀectively. We ﬁnd this pipeline capable of extracting protocol packet
ﬁelds with an F-score of 0.74 and ﬁnding and linking properties with a success
rate of 66%. We further demonstrate that this pipeline enables a reduction in
testing eﬀort (from 901 to 819 test cases) over a manually created grammar for
TCP, while identifying the same set of attacks.
• Attack discovery for congestion control. We model congestion control as
a ﬁnite state machine and develop a model-based attack strategy generation algorithm that generates possible congestion control attacks by identifying their
key characteristics. This algorithm ﬁrst generates abstract attack strategies
from state machine cycles with desirable transitions. These are then converted
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into concrete attack strategies by identifying attacker actions that cause the
desired state machine transitions. To apply these attack strategies, we develop
an algorithm to infer the current congestion control state of a sender by monitoring network packets. We demonstrate the practicality of this approach for
ﬁnding attacks on real implementations of TCP by creating TCPwn. We test
5 TCP implementations from 4 Linux distributions and Windows 8.1 and ﬁnd
11 classes of attacks, 8 of which were previously unknown.
• Performance and availability attacks on QUIC. We investigate performance and availability attacks against QUIC, Google’s new encrypted,
performance-optimized transport protocol. Due to the encryption of most protocol headers and the heavy reliance on caching for 0-RTT, QUIC has a very
diﬀerent attack surface than traditional transport protocols like TCP. We discover three classes of availability attacks based on design choices made to optimize performance. We identify and demonstrate 5 attacks against QUIC that
completely prevent connection establishment.

1.3 Software Released
We have released both the SNAKE and TCPwn automated testing systems developed over the course of this work under the open-source BSD license. SNAKE can
be found at https://github.com/samueljero/snake while TCPwn is available at
https://github.com/samueljero/TCPwn.

1.4 Dissertation Roadmap
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. We provide additional background on transport protocols in Chapter 2 and discuss the attacker and attack models we consider in the rest of this work in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents SNAKE,
our system for automatically ﬁnding attacks against transport protocol connections.
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Chapter 5 presents TCPwn, our system for automatically ﬁnding attacks on TCP
congestion control. Our investigation of performance and availability attacks against
QUIC is presented in Chapter 6. We then discuss related work in Chapter 7 and
conclude this dissertation in Chapter 8.

9

2 TRANSPORT PROTOCOLS
Transport protocols provide end-to-end communication between two applications running on diﬀerent hosts. They enable multiple applications to use the same host by
introducing the concept of a port and provide protection from data corruption using a
checksum. Most transport protocols, with the exception of UDP [31] which provides
only unreliable data delivery, provide additional services such as: (1) reliability, (2)
ordered delivery, (3) ﬂow control, and (4) congestion control. Providing these services
requires the end-hosts to maintain state, which usually requires a connection-oriented
protocol. In this work we focus solely on connection-oriented transport protocols due
to the fact that they are used for the majority of Internet services and make up
the majority of Internet traﬃc. These protocols consist of three phases: connection
establishment, data transfer, and connection tear-down.
Connection establishment. Connection establishment, typically in the form of
a handshake, takes place before any data is exchanged between end-hosts and serves
to synchronize the state of both parties. During this phase, both hosts exchange
sequence numbers, set sequence windows, and allocate buﬀers.
Data transfer. Once a connection is established, data ﬂows between the two
parties. During this phase, the transport protocol may provide a number of additional
services.
Reliability is a common service that usually implemented using acknowledgments
and retransmissions. The sender uses a buﬀer to store data that has been sent and
includes a sequence number on each packet. Periodically, the receiver sends an acknowledgment to the sender. When the sender receives this acknowledgment, it determines what data has been lost and retransmits this data. Data acknowledged as
received correctly is also removed from the sender’s buﬀer. Since there is the possibility of acknowledgments being dropped by the network, the sender includes a timer
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to retransmit data if no acknowledgment of sent data has been received after some
lengthy time interval.
Ordered delivery is another commonly provided service that guarantees that data
sent by one application is received at the other in the same order that it was sent. This
is related to reliability and the two are usually implemented together. Implementing
ordered delivery also requires a packet sequence number, allowing the receiver to
determine the sending order. Packets received out of order are buﬀered at the receiver
until the missing packets are received. The packets can then be delivered to the
application in order.
Flow control ensures that a sender does not overwhelm a slow receiver with more
data than it can buﬀer. The goal is for the sender to send at the same rate that the
receiver is receiving. Flow control is speciﬁed as a sliding window indicating the data
that the receiver can currently buﬀer. The sender is then limited to sending that
window of data before receiving an acknowledgment indicating that the window has
either slid forward or increased in size.
Congestion control is another common service which serves both to protect against
congestion collapse in the network and to provide fairness between competing ﬂows.
Congestion collapse occurs when severe network congestion, or over-utilization, results
in the network spending the majority of its time sending data that will eventually
be dropped. This results in a persistent drop in throughput. Fairness ensures that
if two ﬂows are competing over the bandwidth on a bottleneck link, they share that
bandwidth roughly equally. The networking community has generally understood this
to mean that the ﬂows achieve throughput within a factor of two of each other [32,33].
Some transport protocols, like QUIC, may provide security guarantees like conﬁdentiality and authentication for exchanged data.
Connection tear down. After all data has been transferred, the end-hosts
need a way to signal this and agree to release all state about the connection. Like
connection establishment, connection tear down takes place through a handshake in
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Figure 2.1.: TCP header ﬁelds. Each tick represents a bit position [34]

which the two hosts indicate that they are done sending data and are ready to close
the connection.
In the following sections we describe in detail the three transport protocols that
we will focus on in this work: TCP, DCCP, and QUIC.

2.1 TCP
TCP [34] is the most common transport protocol in use today, underlying the vast
majority of Internet traﬃc, including web, email, instant messaging, and ﬁle transfer
applications. It provides a reliable byte-stream between end hosts and implements
reliability, in-order delivery, and ﬂow control in order to achieve this. It also provides
congestion control and attempts to ensure fairness.
A TCP connection is started by a handshake between two end-hosts [34]. This
allows both end-hosts to inform each other of their initial sequence numbers and any
important options. A similar handshake is performed at the end of the connection to
make sure that all data has been delivered before the connection terminates. The full
connection state machine is shown in Figure 2.2. Reliability is achieved by having
the sender assign a sequence number to each byte of data and having the receiver
acknowledge the highest consecutive byte of data it has received [34]. Retransmissions
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Figure 2.2.: TCP Connection-level State Machine

are triggered either by a retransmission timeout (RTO) or by receiving three duplicate
acknowledgments, indicating the reception of packets above some missing bytes [35].
All TCP packets contain a single, common header. (shown in Figure 2.1). This
header contains source and destination ports, a sequence number, an acknowledgment
number, a set of control bits, a checksum, and options. TCP uses the set of control
bits, or ﬂags, in its header to indicate certain types of packets. The packets in the
initial handshake are marked with the SYN ﬂag; those in the ﬁnal handshake with the
FIN ﬂag. Reset packets use the RST ﬂag to abruptly terminate a connection after an
error. An ACK ﬂag indicates a valid acknowledgment ﬁeld and is set on every packet
after the initial SYN.
In most TCP connections, only one side of the connection is sending data at any
given time. In order to provide feedback to the sender, TCP requires that receivers
that are quiescent, that is, not currently sending data themselves, must periodically
send an empty TCP packet to supply the sender with a current acknowledgement.
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These empty TCP packets are simply TCP packets with no data and are usually
called pure acknowledgements, or simply acknowledgements.

2.1.1 TCP Congestion Control
TCP provides congestion control to protect the network from congestion collapse
and provide fairness between competing ﬂows. We ﬁrst describe classic TCP New
Reno [35,36], and then brieﬂy discuss then discuss optional improvements and variants
like SACK [37], DSACK [38], TLP [39], PRR [40], FRTO [41], and others [42, 43].
At a high level, the congestion control of TCP New Reno consists of four phases:
(1) slow start, (2) congestion avoidance, (3) fast recovery, and (4) exponential backoﬀ.
During the slow start phase the sender is probing the network to quickly ﬁnd the
available bandwidth without overloading the network; once such bandwidth is found,
the sender enters a congestion avoidance phase in which the sender can send without
causing congestion; in case of congestion and data loss, fast recovery or exponential
backoﬀ reduce the rate at which data is sent. The fast recovery phase is intended
for less signiﬁcant events where the beginning of congestion is detected through lost
packets and acknowledgments, while the exponential backoﬀ phase deals with more
signiﬁcant events where congestion is detected by the expiration of a large timeout.
We present the ﬁnite state machine (FSM) model assumed for congestion control in
Figure 2.3. Below we describe the associated events, variables, and states.
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Figure 2.3.: TCP New Reno Congestion Control State Machine
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(1) Events. TCP congestion control relies on two events for its operation, the reception of an acknowledgement (ACK) and the occurrence of a timeout (RTO Timeout):
ACK. This event denotes that an acknowledgement packet was received by the
sender. TCP acknowledgements are byte-based and cumulative, i.e. the receiver
acknowledges the highest byte of data at which all prior data has been received. A
duplicate acknowledgment, and particularly three duplicate acknowledgments, are
used to signal timely information about the network conditions.
RTO Timeout. This event denotes that a timeout occurred when data was
outstanding and no acknowledgements were received for several Round-Trip-Times
(RTTs). This indicates more severe conditions in the network since the last acknowledgement. This timer is started when new data packets are sent, reset on every
acknowledgement, and stopped if all data has been acknowledged.
(2) Variables. The variables capturing the main functionality of congestion control
can be grouped into three categorizes: variables related to the amount of data to be
sent (cwnd and ssthresh), variables keeping track of acknowledged data (dupACKctr
and high water), and variables controlling timeouts (rto timeout).
Congestion window – cwnd. This variable represents the number of bytes of
data that TCP is allowed to have in the network at any given time. It is modiﬁed
by TCP congestion control to increase or decrease the sending rate in response to
network conditions.
Slow start threshold – ssthresh. This variable indicates the value of the congestion window cwnd at which TCP switches from slow start to congestion avoidance.
TCP uses this information later in the connection by growing the window exponentially up to ssthresh after a timeout or idle period.
Duplicate ACK – dupACKctr. This variable tracks the number of duplicate
acknowledgements received in slow start and congestion avoidance. Receiving three
duplicate acknowledgements triggers a transition to fast recovery.
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Highest sequence sent – high water. This variable records the highest sequence number sent prior to entering fast recovery. Only once this sequence number
has been acknowledged (or a timeout occurred) will fast recovery be exited.
RTO Timeout – rto timeout. This variable indicates the current length of the
RTO Timeout. It is usually set to max(200ms, 2 ∗ RT T + 4 ∗ RT T V ariance). If the
RTO timer expires, this value is doubled, resulting in an exponential backoﬀ.
(3) States. We can now describe the state machine from Figure 2.3. The states
capture the four high-level phases described before.
Slow Start. In this state TCP rapidly increases its sending rate, as indicated by
the congestion window cwnd, in order to quickly utilize the available bandwidth of the
path while not overloading the network with a huge initial burst of packets. For each
acknowledgement acknowledging new data, cwnd is incremented by MSS (Maximum
Segment Size), which results in a doubling of the sending rate every RTT. TCP
exits slow start on the RTO Timeout, after three duplicate acknowledgements—which
indicate a lost packet—, or when the congestion window cwnd becomes bigger than the
slow start threshold ssthresh. This last condition indicates that TCP is approaching
a prior estimate of the fair-share connection bandwidth. TCP connections start in
the slow start state with ssthresh set to MAX INT, such that slow start is only
exited on timeout or packet loss, and cwnd set to 10, allowing a burst of ten packets
to be sent initially.1
Congestion Avoidance. In this state TCP is sending close to its estimate of the
available bandwidth while also slowly probing for additional bandwidth. Every RTT
cwnd is increased by one MSS sized packet. In practice, this is done by increasing cwnd
by a small amount((M SS ∗ cwnd)/M SS) for every new ACK received. TCP exits
congestion avoidance either on an RTO Timeout or after receiving three duplicate
acknowledgments, indicating a lost packet.
Fast Recovery. In this state, TCP is recovering from a lost packet indicated
by three duplicate acknowledgements. TCP assumes that packet loss signals network
1

This initial window was originally 2-4 packets [35], but has been increased to 10 packets in more
recent standards [44] and implementations.
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congestion, so it cuts its sending rate in half by halving cwnd, and retransmits the
last unacknowledged packet. ssthresh is set to this new value of cwnd, providing an
approximate bandwidth estimate in case of a timeout. TCP remains in fast recovery
until all data outstanding at the time it entered fast recovery has been acknowledged or an RTO timeout occurs. This is achieved by saving the last packet sent in
high water upon entry and exiting once this packet has been acknowledged.
In fast recovery, acknowledgement handling is optimized to recover from the loss,
avoid expensive RTO timeouts, and return to congestion avoidance as quickly as
possible. As a result, duplicate acknowledgements received in fast recovery cause cwnd
to be increased by one MSS, under the assumption that a duplicate acknowledgement
means that a packet was received. This enables TCP to more accurately keep cwnd
bytes of data in the network, which in turn reduces the likelihood of an RTO timeout.
Additionally, an acknowledgement that acknowledges new data but not high water
immediately causes retransmission of the last unacked packet, under the assumption
that this packet, too, was lost. Once high water is acknowledged, TCP resets cwnd
to ssthresh, undoing the increases resulting from duplicate acknowledgements, and
transitions to congestion avoidance.
Exponential Backoﬀ. In this state, TCP is retransmitting a lost packet each
time the RTO timer expires. With each timer expiration, rto timeout is doubled,
resulting in an exponential backoﬀ between retransmissions. This state is entered from
any other state when the RTO timer expires, indicating that data is outstanding in
the network but no acknowledgements have been received in rto timeout seconds
(at least 2 RTTs). This situation indicates the loss of a large number of packets and,
likely, signiﬁcant changes in network conditions. As a result, ssthresh is set to half of
cwnd, cwnd is set to 1 MSS, and the last unacknowledged packet is retransmitted. TCP
remains in this state, retransmitting this packet each time the RTO timer expires,
until an acknowledgement is received, at which point it transitions to slow start.
Variations and Optimizations. The classic TCP New Reno congestion control
algorithm we described above has seen a number of variations and optimizations over
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Figure 2.4.: DCCP generic header ﬁelds. Each tick represents a bit position [45]

the years. These include SACK [37], DSACK [38], TLP [39], PRR [40], CUBIC [42],
and RACK [43]. These variations and optimizations consist of fairly minor changes
to the basic New Reno algorithm. SACK [37], for example, provides the sender with
additional information about received packets and uses this information to determine
when to enter fast recovery. The logic of the decision does not change: fast recovery
is entered when three packets above a loss have been received. SACK simply uses
a more accurate method to detect this condition. Similarly, PRR [40] modiﬁes New
Reno by adopting paced packet sending during the self-loop in fast recovery. TLP [39]
introduces a new, faster timeout state before exponential backoﬀ. CUBIC TCP [42]
changes precisely how cwnd is increased in congestion avoidance and decreased during
fast recovery. While these changes aﬀect the performance of TCP in certain network
conditions, they follow the same phases of TCP congestion control as New Reno.

2.2 DCCP
The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [45] was designed for applications that wanted congestion control, but did not want the retransmissions and
head-of-line-blocking associated with TCP. Examples of such applications are applications that are highly latency sensitive, such as VoIP, realtime streaming video, and
video gaming.
Like TCP, DCCP requires a handshake to setup a connection and another one
to tear the connection down. The connection state machine is shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5.: DCCP Connection-level State Machine

However, unlike TCP, DCCP uses diﬀerent types of packets for these handshakes [45].
Hence, the initial handshake consists of a REQUEST and a RESPONSE packet while the
ﬁnal handshake consists of a CLOSE and a RESET packet. The ﬁrst several ﬁelds of all
packet types are ﬁxed and are shown in Figure 2.4 while later ﬁelds vary according
to packet type.
DCCP assigns sequence numbers to packets instead of bytes. Further, every packet
increments the sequence number; even pure acknowledgments carrying no data [45].
The receiver acknowledges the highest sequence number received; since DCCP does
not retransmit data, a TCP-like cumulative acknowledgment does not make sense.
However, this design means that DCCP endpoints can get out of sync after extended
bursts of loss and reject valid packets as not within the current sequence window.
To mitigate this issue, a third handshake—of SYNC and SYNCACK packets—is used
to exchange the current sequence numbers of both parties and resynchronize the
connection [45].
DCCP also features pluggable congestion control modules, known as CCIDs.
Two are currently standardized: CCID 2 [46], TCP-like Congestion Control, and
CCID 3 [47], TCP-Friendly Rate Control (TRFC). We focus on CCID 2 in this work.
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It follows TCP’s New Reno with SACK congestion control algorithm as closely as possible, although there are several minor changes due to DCCP’s packet-based sequence
numbers [46].

2.3 QUIC
Quick UDP Internet Connections, or QUIC, is a new transport protocol that
was developed by Google, implemented in Chrome in 2013 [48], and now provides
service for the majority of requests by Chrome to Google services [22]. QUIC’s
goal is to provide secure communication comparable to TLS [49] while achieving
minimal connection setup latency. In particular, QUIC provides 0-RTT connections,
enabling useful data to be sent in the ﬁrst round trip. In contrast, the equivalent
connection using TCP+TLS would require two or three RTT’s, depending on whether
TLS session resumption [50] was in use. This results in signiﬁcant and noticeable
latency savings that are of signiﬁcant interest to today’s online services and businesses.
To achieve this, QUIC provides much of the functionality provided by TCP and TLS
in a single protocol and runs on top of UDP, as shown in Figure 2.6. Combining
this functionality in a single protocol enables optimizations like 0-RTT connections.
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Figure 2.7.: QUIC public header ﬁelds. Each tick represents a byte [52]

QUIC also provides encryption of most transport protocol headers, to protect against
manipulation attacks, and signiﬁcantly improved acknowledgement information.
In this work, we focus on QUIC as speciﬁed and implemented by Google [51–53].2
Note that QUIC is currently under active standardization by the IETF [23], and while
IETF-QUIC has the same design goals and signiﬁcant similarity to Google’s original
QUIC, there are a number of technical diﬀerences, including a big-endian packet
format and the use of TLS 1.3 [54] instead of a custom cryptographic handshake [51,
53, 55]. The rest of our discussion focuses on Google’s original QUIC.
QUIC packets contain a small public header and then a set of frames that are
encrypted and authenticated after initial connection setup. The initial public header
(shown in Figure 2.7) contains a set of public ﬂags, a unique 64bit identiﬁer for
a connection referred to as a connection id or cid, a variable length packet number, and optionally a 32bit QUIC version number or a diversiﬁcation nonce. All
2

Speciﬁcally, QUIC version Q021, from October 2014.

22
CLOSED
onnect()
No cached SCFG
1-RTT

Listen for connections

Send: Inchoate CHLOi'--------,
SCFG_REQUEST
Recieved: REJ
Send:CHLO
connect()
Cached SCFG

Received: Full CHLO

0-RTT

Recieved: REJ
Send: CHLO

Send: CHLO

SHLO_SENT

SHLO_RCVD

May receive Initial Data

Send: forward secret
encrypted packets
ESTABLISHED

Received: CONNECTION_CLOSE

Send: CONNECTION_CLOSE

Opt~nal
Silent Close
. - - - - - , after IDL~ TIMEou-r--~----,

Send: CONNECTION_CLOSE

Received: CONNECTION_CLOSE
CLOSED 14-----'

Figure 2.8.: QUIC Connection-level State Machine

other protocol information is carried in control and stream (data) frames that are
encrypted and authenticated. Once the connection is setup, QUIC provides multiple
byte-streams per connection, to reduce head-of-line-blocking. Reliability is enabled
with per-packet sequence numbers and encrypted acknowledgements providing up to
256 SACK blocks [52]. QUIC packet numbers always start at one and are never
retransmitted. Instead, missing frames are packaged into a new packet and resent.
This separation of packet and byte-stream sequence numbers eliminates retransmission ambiguity. QUIC currently uses the same congestion control algorithms as TCP
and combines them with packet pacing to help avoid burst loss [22, 52].
To provide 0-RTT connection establishment, QUIC provides a custom cryptographic handshake [53]. This handshake protocol operates as an exchange of messages
over a reserved QUIC byte-steam. The basic idea is to cache important information
about the server that will enable the client to determine the encryption key to be used
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for each new connection. The client can then encrypt application data without hearing from the server, providing 0-RTT connection establishment. The full connection
state machine for QUIC is shown in Figure 2.8.
The ﬁrst time a client contacts a given server it has no cached information, so it
sends an empty c hello message. The server responds with an s reject message
containing the server’s certiﬁcate and three pieces of information for the client to
cache. The ﬁrst of these is an object called an scfg, or server conﬁg. The scfg
contains a variety of information about the server, including a Diﬃe Hellman share
from the server, supported encryption and signing algorithms, and ﬂow control parameters. This scfg has a deﬁned lifetime and is signed by the server’s private key to
enable authentication using the server’s certiﬁcate. Along with the scfg, the server
sends the client a Source Address Token or stk and possibly a Server Nonce or sno.
The stk is used to prevent IP spooﬁng while the sno is used to prevent replay of
messages without requiring time synchronization for clients. The stk contains an
encrypted version of the client’s IP address and a timestamp while the sno contains
an encrypted timestamp and random value.
With this cached information, a client is able to establish an encrypted connection
with the server. It ﬁrst ensures that the scfg is correctly signed and that the server’s
certiﬁcate is valid and then sends a c hello indicating the scfg its using, any stk
and sno values it has cached, a Diﬃe Hellman share for the client, and a client nonce.
After sending the c hello message the client can create an initial encryption key
and send additional encrypted data packets. In fact, to take advantage of the 0RTT connection establishment it must do so. When the server receives the c hello
message, it validates the stk, sno, and client nonce parameters and creates the same
encryption key using the Diﬃe Hellman share corresponding to the scfg and the
client’s share from the c hello message.
At this point, both client and server have established the connection and setup
encryption keys, and all further communication between the parties is encrypted.
However, the connection is not forward secure yet, meaning that compromising the
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server would compromise all previous communication. This is because the server’s
Diﬃe Hellman share is the same for all connections using the same scfg. To provide
forward secrecy, the server sends an s hello message containing a newly generated
Diﬃe Hellman share after receiving the client’s c hello message. Once the client
receives this message, client and server derive and begin using a new forward secure
encryption key, providing forward secrecy for all data sent after the ﬁrst RTT.
The security of QUIC, and particularly its new cryptographic handshake, have
received signiﬁcant attention in prior work [24, 25, 56]. [24] focuses on proving the
security of QUIC’s handshake while [56] provides a formal proof of the security for
the protocol as a whole. In particular, the authors show that the protocol preserves
the integrity and authenticity of data against an attacker who can initiate protocol
connections, observe and modify target connections, and corrupt servers. Additionally, these proofs show that QUIC protects the server from spoofed connections. They
note, however, that data sent under the initial encryption key (i.e., 0-RTT data) is
not forward secret and can be recovered if an attacker compromises the server while
the scfg is still valid. Additional work [57] has pointed out that it is also possible to
replay 0-RTT data to other servers. As a result, it is crucial that data transmitted in
the ﬁrst RTT be idempotent. QUIC prevents 0-RTT data from being replayed later
in the same connection and even across connections to the same server. However,
it does not protect the same request from being replayed to additional servers that
implement the same application (i.e., other servers in a server farm). The work in [25]
demonstrates the importance of cross-protocol interactions by pointing out that exposing the same certiﬁcate over TLS 1.2 or below and QUIC enables an attacker to
mount a Bleichenbacher-attack [58] to forge the signature on a fake scfg. This could
potentially be used to launch a man-in-the-middle attack on QUIC. Such attacks can
be prevented by using diﬀerent certiﬁcates for QUIC and TLS 1.2 (or below) servers
running on the same domain.
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3 ATTACKER AND ATTACK MODEL
In this section we discuss the attacker capabilities and goals we consider in this work
and diﬀerentiate between major classes of possible attacks.

3.1 Attacker Capabilities
A malicious attacker targeting a transport protocol may have a variety of diﬀerent
capabilities for attacking the protocol. We can categorize these attacker capabilities
based on the attacker’s location in the network relative to the target connection or
link: blind, oﬀ-path, on-path, or endpoint. We discuss each of these in turn and
summarize them in Figure 3.1.
Blind Attackers. The blind attacker knows that some target connection or link
exists and seeks to attack it without being able to see any of the target traﬃc. Such
an attacker can inject spoofed packets into the network, but has no knowledge of
detailed protocol state. Thus, the attacker has to guess this protocol state or rely on
attacks that do not require it.
Oﬀ-path Attackers. An oﬀ-path attacker has the ability to both inject spoofed
packets and observe packets in the target connection or link. This ability is usually
obtained by sniﬃng traﬃc on the client’s local network. By observing the target
connection the attacker can gather detailed protocol state for use in injected packets
and even race messages from the server.
On-path Attackers. An on-path attacker can modify and control delivery of
legitimate packets in some target connection or link as well as inject new spoofed
packets. Such an attacker is usually a switch on the path between client and server.
Tampering with and injecting packets can be prevented using encryption and au-
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(a) Blind Attacker

(b) Oﬀ-path Attacker

(c) On-path Attacker

(d) Endpoint Attacker

Figure 3.1.: Attacker Types

thentication of the protocol packets. However, that does not stop this attacker from
controlling the delivery of legitimate packets.
Endpoint Attackers. An endpoint attacker is a malicious host who seeks to
subvert the protocol. Such an attacker can modify and control delivery of packets
arbitrarily as well as send additional packets. Encryption and authentication provide
no protection here because the client has the keys needed to encrypt arbitrary packets.
For unencrypted protocols, endpoint and on-path attackers are equivalent.
In this work, we consider attackers in all categories.

3.2 Attack Goals
In this work we focus on attacks that target the availability or performance of a
transport protocol. We discuss these goals more below:
Compromise Availability (Denial of Service). Attacks that target availability seek to make a particular network service oﬀered over some transport protocol
unavailable to its users. This may either deny access to a victim host globally or
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be focused only on a particular target connection. These attacks are often referred
to as denial of service attacks; however, there are a variety of ways an attacker may
go about achieving this goal beyond merely sending more traﬃc than the victim can
process.
Attacks that seek to deny access to the victim globally are likely to focus on overloading or crashing the victim. This can be done by simply overwhelming the victim
with traﬃc or by exploiting a bug in the victim’s transport protocol implementation
to crash the victim. The attacker may also attempt to manipulate the protocol to
cause it to improperly release resources, causing a resource exhaustion attack.
Attacks that target a particular connection are much more focused and precise.
The attacker is free to target either end of the connection and can monitor and seek
to disrupt the target connection with forged replies or other invalid responses. This
would typically cause the target connection to stall or be aborted.
Compromise Performance. Attacks that target performance seek to manipulate the transport protocol to compromise fairness with competing ﬂows. This may
be either to increase or decrease the throughput of some target ﬂow. Decreasing the
throughput of a target ﬂow can have signiﬁcant impact at the application level, especially for non-elastic data streams like real-time streaming video, while increasing
throughput enables an attacker to artiﬁcially increase the share of some target connection beyond what would be considered fair and may be used to increase the damage
done by a denial of service attack. Attacks seeking to compromise performance are
likely to focus on the protocol’s congestion control algorithm.
Attacks that manipulate data or impersonate hosts are not considered in this
work. Additionally, while we may identify crashes that compromise availability, we
consider further analysis of the exploitability of those crashes as out of scope.
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3.3 Attack Characteristics
We diﬀerentiate transport protocol attacks based on a couple of key characteristics.
Protocol Speciﬁc vs Generic. Attacks on transport protocols can be either
generic, applying to all transport protocols, or speciﬁc to a particular transport protocol. Dropping all packets in a connection is an example of a generic attack that
prevents any transport protocol from establishing a connection. While these attacks
are eﬀective, they are also fairly course grained and expected for any network protocol. In contrast, protocol speciﬁc attacks rely on speciﬁc modiﬁcations to a particular
protocol, induce much more subtle and unexpected failures, and are harder to ﬁnd.
In this work we focus on protocol speciﬁc attacks.
Stateful vs Stateless. Attacks on transport protocols can be either stateful,
requiring the attacker to maintain state about the protocol connection, or stateless.
Stateful attacks are much harder to execute since they require maintenance and usage
of the right state information at the right time; however, they are also usually much
harder to identify due to the much larger possible attack space. While we consider
both stateless and stateful attacks in this work, we are particularly interested in
stateful attacks.

29

4 AUTOMATED ATTACK DISCOVERY FOR TRANSPORT PROTOCOL
CONNECTIONS
Even manually identifying attacks on the performance or availability of transport
protocols is a complex task. Attempting to automate this process posses a number of
challenges, especially around detecting attacks, search space exploration, and protocol
information extraction. In this chapter, we investigate how to automatically identify
a broad variety of attacks on transport protocol availability and performance without
modifying or making assumptions about the protocol implementation.

4.1 Introduction
Transport protocols provide end-to-end communication in a layered network architecture by implementing guarantees such as reliability, in-order delivery, and congestion control. They are used not only directly by applications, but also by Internet
services such as BGP and secure protocols such as TLS.
Providing these guarantees causes the design and implementation of transport
protocols to be complex, with many components, special cases, error conditions,
and interacting features. Further, many implementations are written in low level
languages like C for improved performance and make use of error-prone, but highly
eﬃcient, constructs like pointer manipulation and type casting. Unfortunately, transport protocol implementations often sacriﬁce simplicity and ease of understanding for
improved performance, resulting in a high probability of bugs introduced during implementation.
Due to the ubiquitous role of transport protocols in network communication, there
are many diﬀerent implementations of these protocols. For example, the nmap security
scanner is able to detect 5,336 distinct TCP/IP network stack conﬁgurations in its
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most recent version [1]. This includes printers, VoIP phones, routers, and embedded
systems, along with general purpose operating systems. While many of these may be
diﬀerent conﬁgurations of a few common networking stacks, these variations represent
diﬀerent handling of particular network conditions, which often implies the exercise
of diﬀerent code paths.
Despite the importance of these protocols and the complexity and number of their
implementations, the testing of transport protocol implementations has been mainly
a manual and ad-hoc process [2–4]. This lack of systematic testing for transport
protocols and their implementations has resulted in a stream of new bugs and attacks [2, 3, 5, 6]. Consider TCP, one of the most well studied and well tested network
protocols; the list of discovered attacks extends from the mid-1980’s to the present
day [7–13]. Many of these attacks have been discovered repeatedly or rediscovered
again in slightly diﬀerent contexts.
Prior work in testing network protocol implementations has focused on easing the
development of manual tests [2, 14] and on enabling deeper testing for crashes by using stateful fuzzing techniques [15–17]. Other work has focused on systematic testing
by leveraging techniques like symbolic execution [5, 18] and dynamic interface reduction [19] in combination with concrete attack execution. Many of these techniques
require access to the source code and require heuristics to eﬃciently handle low level
constructs like type casting, pointer casting, and function pointers, which are heavily
used in network protocol implementations. The major challenge faced by all of these
approaches is search space explosion.
In this chapter, we focus on automated attack ﬁnding for transport protocol implementations. Speciﬁcally, we leverage information about packet formats and the
protocol’s connection-level state machine to automatically create attack scenarios
consisting of malicious actions performed on protocol packets in targeted protocol
states. Knowledge of the packet formats enables the generation of malicious packets
based on packet type while information about the protocol’s connection state machine
allows the tracking of the current state of the protocol at runtime. State tracking
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is achieved without code instrumentation by monitoring packets sent and received
while malicious packet manipulation is achieved using a network proxy. By inferring
the current state of the protocol’s connection state machine, our method can perform
malicious actions on all packets of a particular type in a particular protocol state instead of on individual packets, signiﬁcantly reducing the search space. The protocol’s
connection state machine also allows us to identify key points for attack injection in
the transport protocol, ensuring wide coverage.
The connection state machine and packet formats are an important part of any
protocol speciﬁcation. Unfortunately, these protocol speciﬁcations are usually informal documents written in natural language text, not formal speciﬁcations. We,
therefore, investigate whether we can leverage Natural Language Processing (NLP) to
automatically extract these protocol packet formats and rules (i.e., a protocol grammar) from the natural language speciﬁcation documents and use these automatically
extracted grammars to improve attack ﬁnding.
Given the inherent ambiguity of natural language text, extracting a protocol grammar is not a straight-forward task. The writers of protocol speciﬁcations often rely on
the human reader’s understanding of context and intent, making it diﬃcult to specify
a set of rules to extract information. This is by no means unique to the computer
networks domain, and as a result, the natural language community has shifted its
focus over the last decade to statistical methods that can help deal with this ambiguity. Speciﬁcally, most NLP methods are sensitive to the data used at training
time and do not adapt easily if applied on data from a diﬀerent domain. Applying
“oﬀ-the-shelf” implementations of NLP tools, typically trained on newswire data, or
combining them in an ad-hoc way, often results in reduced performance and brittle
applications. We, therefore, design an NLP framework to extract a network protocol’s grammar from its protocol speciﬁcation document by exploiting the structure
and linguistic regularities of documents and leveraging zero-shot learning to enable
adapting to new protocols.
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Our testing approach works with unmodiﬁed implementations irrespective of their
operating system, programming language, or required libraries. It does not require
access to the source code, enabling the testing of a wide range of transport protocol
implementations, including proprietary, closed-source systems.
The contributions of this chapter are:
• We present a new approach to search space reduction without instrumenting
the code. This approach leverages a description of the protocol’s connection
state machine to identify critical points in the search space for attack injection
and to explore the implementation more thoroughly. We use knowledge of the
protocol’s packet formats to perform a variety of malicious actions, including
packet ﬁeld manipulation, and apply these malicious actions to packet type,
protocol state pairs instead of individual packets, enabling signiﬁcant state space
reduction. We also use the protocol state machine to ensure that we test all
protocol states, providing wide coverage.
• We demonstrate our approach with SNAKE, a new tool for ﬁnding attacks
on unmodiﬁed transport layer protocol implementations running in arbitrary
operating systems and in realistic networks. SNAKE (State-based Network
AttacK Explorer) uses virtualization to run unmodiﬁed transport layer implementations in their intended environments and a network emulator to tie these
virtual machines together into a realistic, emulated network. The network emulator intercepts and modiﬁes packets, tracks the current protocol state during
execution, and uses this information to create packet-based attacks at speciﬁc
points in the state machine execution. SNAKE is general for use on many transport protocols, requiring only a description of the packet header formats (i.e.,
the protocol’s grammar) and the connection state machine as input.
• We use SNAKE to examine a total of 5 implementations, 2 transport protocols—
TCP [34] and DCCP [45]—, and 4 operating systems. We ﬁnd 9 classes of
attacks, 5 of which are, to the best of our knowledge, unknown in the literature.
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We also compare our state-based attack search with two baseline approaches
and show its eﬀectiveness in search space reduction.
• We deﬁne the problem of protocol grammar extraction as a set of NLP tasks.
By grammar, we mean protocol header ﬁelds and their properties, as well as
relations between these ﬁelds. We deﬁne the learning of protocol ﬁelds as an
entity recognition problem and the learning of properties and relations between
ﬁelds as a relation extraction problem.
• We design an NLP framework to solve these tasks. We minimize the manual
supervision eﬀort required for training our NLP framework by exploiting the
structure and linguistic regularities of the protocol speciﬁcation document domain. Unlike previous work that applied transformation rules to the output
of NLP tools directly, we propose a lightweight zero-shot learning framework
which can adapt to the speciﬁc properties of the networking domain. Speciﬁcally, we learn a similarity function between textual phrases and protocol ﬁelds
and relations. The similarity function captures the surface level string similarity, acronyms used in the text to refer to the ﬁelds, and anaphoric references
(“it”,“that ﬁeld”) based on their context. This approach allows us to adapt to
new protocols by providing diﬀerent sets of entities. We evaluate the quality
of the zero-shot learning process by training it on one set of protocol symbols
and testing it on a diﬀerent set (we use RFCs for GRE [59], IPv6 [60], IP [61],
TCP [34], UDP [31], DCCP [45], and SCTP [62]).
• We demonstrate the usefulness of the information extracted by our NLP framework by applying it to SNAKE. We compare three settings: Random, Manual,
and NLP-based, where the input packets were generated without protocol semantics knowledge, with manual speciﬁcation, and with NLP-extracted protocol semantics, respectively. We ﬁnd that our automatically generated protocol
grammars are as eﬀective in identifying attacks as manually created grammars
while enabling improved eﬃciency.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 present
the design and the implementation of SNAKE, respectively. Section 4.4 shows our
results, including the attacks we discovered. Section 4.5 discusses our work to further
automate SNAKE by leveraging Natural Language Processing to extract information
from protocol speciﬁcation documents automatically. Finally, Section 4.6 summarizes
this chapter.

4.2 Design
In this section, we discuss the design of SNAKE. We ﬁrst provide an overview of
our approach, then describe how we utilize the protocol’s connection state machine
to reduce the search space and generate attack strategies. Finally, we describe the
packet-level basic attacks we consider.

4.2.1 Overview
We focus on ﬁnding attacks by endpoint or blind attackers on unmodiﬁed implementations of transport protocols. We consider availability attacks that target
connection establishment as well as resource exhaustion attacks. Additionally, we
consider performance attacks resulting in throughput degradation or the compromise
of fairness. These attacks can be identiﬁed by examining the results of an attempted
data transfer. Speciﬁcally, connection establishment attacks can be identiﬁed by observing a target connection that transfers no data. Resource exhaustion attacks result
in incomplete socket cleanup at the server. Throughput degradation attacks and attacks on fairness can be identiﬁed by unfair competition between a target connection
and its competitor; throughput degradation attacks target the low throughput connection while attacks on fairness target the high throughput connection. All of these
attacks can be detected by running the protocol for a relatively short period of time.
We select an environment that combines virtualization with network emulation.
Virtualization allows us to test a wide range of implementations independent of lan-
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Figure 4.1.: Design of SNAKE

guage, operating system, or access to source code. The network emulation provides
us the reproducible measurements and attack isolation needed to detect performancerelated attacks. Figure 4.1 presents our system design.
The attack strategies we consider can be created by packet manipulation and
injection based on the packet type and the individual packet ﬁelds. These strategies
are selected from a set of basic attacks derived from information about packet formats.
For instance, an attack strategy may be to duplicate packets of type W ten times, or
to inject a new packet of type X with ﬁeld 3 set to Y, or to modify ﬁeld 5 of packet
type Z to 555. Each of these attack strategies are performed in particular protocol
states.
To determine what kinds of basic attacks would be most useful, we performed a
detailed literature study on transport protocol attacks and identiﬁed some common
components, or building blocks, used in many of these attacks. Based on this study,
we deﬁned a set of packet-based basic attacks that we use to compose attack strategies.
As we do not require access to the source code, our approach relies on intercepting
and modifying or injecting network traﬃc. We place an attack proxy between one of
our test hosts and the emulated network. This proxy emulates an on-path or endpoint
attacker and intercepts packets to apply basic attacks such as inﬂuencing the delivery
of packets or modifying the packets ﬂowing through it. We also use the proxy to
emulate a blind attacker who injects new packets into the network.
We detect if an attack was successful or not by comparing the connection performance under attack with a baseline generated from a test with no attacks and by
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checking for open sockets on the server after the test completes. Attack strategies
that appear successful are tested a second time to ensure repeatability.

4.2.2 Attack Injection
An important aspect of determining an attack search strategy is identifying the
attack injection points, that is, the points where attacks can be inserted into a test
run.
Send-packet-based attack injection. One simple approach is to have the
proxy intercept each packet generated by the client application running in the virtual
machine, apply any basic attacks desired, and forward the packet on to its destination.
This means that an attack injection point occurs whenever there is a send for a
particular packet type, as shown in Figure 4.2(a).
While this approach is relatively simple and can ﬁnd many attacks, it also results
in repeatedly performing attacks that have the same semantics for the protocol, thus
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resulting in redundant executions and lengthening the time required to complete
the search. In addition, this approach does not work well for blind attackers and
fails to ﬁnd attacks not connected with packet send events in the code. This is
particularly problematic for transport protocols because many availability attacks
against connection establishment and tear down fall into this category.
Time-based attack injection. One approach to provide support for blind attackers and ﬁner time granularity is to divide the running time into ﬁxed intervals
and, for each of these intervals, attempt to inject packets following all basic attacks,
as shown in Figure 4.2(b). While this approach is also relatively simple, a small time
interval must be used in order to catch many attacks. This will result in testing thousands of strategies that either do not inject attacks or inject many redundant attacks,
based on the semantics of the protocol. As a result, this approach also has a high
execution time overhead and can take a very long time to complete. Recall that some
of our attacks are packet manipulation attacks designed to simulate endpoint attackers. These attacks can only be inserted on a packet send. Nevertheless, this attack
injection strategy will attempt to insert them at very small increments throughout
the entire test, whether or not a packet send occurs at that point. Time-based attack
injection is also overly ﬁne-grained. It will attempt to inject an attack at every possible point in time. However, practical attacks are likely to have much broader timing
constraints—on the order of an RTT or between packet sends. Thus the time-based
scheme will test numerous attack scenarios that are practically identical.
Protocol state aware attack injection. Our approach to eliminate some of
the redundant testing scenarios, support blind attackers, and provide ﬁner granularity for injecting attacks is to take into account the semantics of the protocol when
injecting attacks. We can obtain information about the semantics of the protocol
from its connection state machine. Many transport protocols have well documented
state machines describing their connection lifecycles, and in the absence of such documentation, work in state machine inference may be leveraged [63].
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We propose a state-based search strategy that leverages several characteristics of
the protocol’s connection state machine to reduce the attack search space. Speciﬁcally,
we inject attacks at speciﬁc states in the protocol execution, as shown in Figure 4.2(c).
Because the protocol’s connection state machine deﬁnes key points in the operation of
the protocol, this approach allows us to quickly gain wide coverage within the search
space by focusing on each of these states. We also treat all attack injection points
in the same state in the same manner. This further prunes the number of search
paths to be explored. The motivation behind our approach is that two packets of the
same type received in the same protocol state usually cause similar results; however,
an identical packet received in two diﬀerent states may cause signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
results.
In order to apply our protocol state aware attack injection, we need a mechanism
to infer which state a protocol connection is in. As we do not require access to the
source code, we use packet monitoring to infer this state. This is accomplished by
a state tracking component (see Figure 4.1) that uses a description of the protocol’s
connection state machine supplied by the user. This state machine provides information about what packets determine transitions from one state to another. At run
time, the state machine tracker infers changes in the connection state machines of
each endpoint by observing the packets exchanged and matching them with state
transition rules, as shown in Algorithm 1. The state tracking component also keeps
track of some basic information about each observed state, including the packet types
observed in that state.
Note that this strategy assumes that implementations have correctly implemented
the protocol’s connection state machine as described in their speciﬁcation. Existing
work on state machine veriﬁcation [64] could be leveraged to overcome this limitation. However, connection state machines are unlikely to be implemented incorrectly
because of their simplicity, high granularity, and importance to the protocols. Taking
TCP as an example, the state machine has 11 states in total and all data transfer,
and associated retransmissions and congestion control, takes place in a single state
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(see Figure 2.2). A mistake in this state machine has a similar impact to getting the
packet header formats wrong; while the implementation may work with itself, it will
fail simple interoperability tests.
Algorithm 1: SNAKE Connection State Tracking
Input: Connection State Machine Graph G = (V, E) where all e ∈ E contains e.recv
and e.send, the packets sent and received during the transition
Output: h.CurrentState variable indicating the current connection state, as seen
on host h
1
2
3

Function Init(h)
if ht is Server then
h.CurrentState = LISTEN

L

5

else
h.CurrentState = CLOSED

6

return

4

7
8
9
10
11
12

13

L

Function OnPacket(p,h,E )
foreach e ∈ G.E do
if e.f rom == h.CurrentState then
if e.recv == p.type or e.send == p.type then
h.CurrentState = e.to
return
return

4.2.3 Attack Strategy Generation
Based on the packet types and connection state machine information, we automatically generate attack strategies. For each packet type we generate the basic attacks
described below.
We conducted an extensive study of the literature on transport protocol attacks
to develop these basic attacks. All of these attacks are conducted by our attack proxy
at a packet level, either one packet at a time or considering several packets together.
Malicious Endpoint attacks. The ﬁrst set of basic attacks we developed interfere with packet delivery or packet content. Packet delivery attacks model a malicious
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client who either ignores certain packets entirely or who delays processing packets in
order to interfere with the protocol. Packet content attacks model a malicious client
who sends packets that contain unexpected or invalid values.
We consider the following packet delivery attacks: drop, duplicate, delay, and
batch.
Drop: The attack proxy intercepts and drops a packet with a given probability
speciﬁed as a parameter in percent. This attack may impact many of the core features of transport protocols from connection establishment to connection tear down,
depending on when it is applied.
Duplicate: The attack proxy intercepts a packet and then sends multiple copies
of it to the destination. The number of duplicates to inject is speciﬁed as a parameter. This attack could impact many features of a transport protocol, but fairness
and congestion control are particularly vulnerable. Acknowledgment duplication, in
particular, can cause fairness problems [11].
Delay: The attack proxy intercepts a packet and then inserts a delay before
sending it on. The delay is speciﬁed as a parameter in seconds. Depending on the
length of the delay, this attack may cause reordering or retransmission situations.
It may also interfere with RTT estimation, which is usually a key component of
retransmission algorithms.
Batch: The attack proxy intercepts packets and waits some amount of time before
sending them all at once. The wait time is a parameter speciﬁed in seconds. This
attack is designed to ﬁnd attacks similar to the Shrew and Induced-Shrew attacks [8,
9].
We also consider the following packet content manipulation attacks: reﬂect and
lie.
Reﬂect: The attack proxy intercepts a packet and sends it back to its originating
host. This attack models sending an unexpected, but potentially valid, packet. It
is particularly likely to disrupt connection establishment and termination. Consider,
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for example, the TCP Simultaneous Open Attack where an attacker responds to a
SYN packet with another SYN packet [7].
Lie: The attack proxy intercepts a packet and modiﬁes a speciﬁed ﬁeld before
sending it on. Modiﬁcations supported include setting particular values, setting random values, or adding/subtracting/multiplying/dividing the current value by some
factor. The ﬁeld and the type of modiﬁcation are parameters. We use a list of modiﬁcations chosen based on the ﬁeld-type to be likely to cause unexpected behavior.
These include setting values like 0, the maximum value a ﬁeld can handle, and the
minimum value a ﬁeld can handle. This attack may impact all of the core features of
transport protocols from connection establishment to connection tear down, depending on when and where it is applied.
Blind attacks. The second set of attacks we developed are attacks on a connection by a blind attacker. These attacks spoof packets such that they appear to come
from the client or the server in a target connection. We consider the following blind
attacks: inject and hitseqwindow.
Inject: The attack proxy injects a new packet into the network. This attack
contains a number of parameters describing the ﬁelds in the packet, its source and
destination, and when it should be injected (in seconds from emulation start). Many
parts of a transport protocol may be aﬀected by such an attack, from reliability to
connection tear down.
HitSeqWindow : This attack is very similar to inject. Instead of injecting just
one packet, the attack proxy injects a whole series of packets with their sequence
numbers spanning the whole possible sequence range. This attack is designed to look
for attacks similar to the Reset and Syn-Reset attacks on TCP [3, 12].
Note that one can also consider more complex attack strategies that combine the
basic attacks described above into strategies consisting of sequences of actions. We
currently support only the basic attacks described above.
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Figure 4.3.: SNAKE Test Network Topology

4.3 Implementation
In this section, we discuss how we implement SNAKE. We ﬁrst present an overview
of the whole platform and then discuss our attack proxy, state tracking, and parallelism in more detail. See also Figure 4.1.

4.3.1 Overview
We separate the functionality of SNAKE into two components: a controller that
generates attack strategies and one or more executors that test the strategies.
The controller generates and selects the attack strategies based on the packet
formats and the connection state machine transitions obtained from the protocol
speciﬁcation supplied by the user. An executor ﬁrst runs a non-attack test and then,
for each strategy, runs the attack scenario and reports performance information back
to the executor, who determines whether an attack took place or not. SNAKE uses
parallelism to run multiple executors concurrently and speed up the attack ﬁnding
process.
The executor controls the execution of a testing scenario consisting of a set of
four virtual machines each running an unmodiﬁed instance of the protocol under
test. These virtual machines are connected in a dumbbell topology using a network
emulator and tap devices. We use KVM as the virtualization environment and NS-3
for network emulation.
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A dumbbell topology consists of two machines on each side of a bottleneck link as
shown in Figure 4.3. In our setup, the two machines on one side act as servers while
the two on the other act as clients. We conﬁgured our attack proxy to be between one
of the clients and the bottleneck link. The other client makes a connection to a server
that we refer to as the competing connection, as it will compete with the connection
through our proxy for bandwidth on the bottleneck link. This topology allows us
to test attacks from both endpoint and blind attackers. An endpoint attacker is
usually interested in targeting the fairness of the transport protocol or launching a
resource-exhaustion-based denial of service attack against the server while a blind
attacker often wishes to terminate or slow a connection between two other hosts. See
Section 3 for a more detailed discussion of these types of attackers and attacks.
To determine successful attacks, the controller examines the performance of the
client without the attack proxy (Client 2 in Figure 4.3) and the number of connections
the server is maintaining at the end of the test. This information is obtained by
the executor. Speciﬁcally, the executor calculates performance as the quantity of
data transferred during the test and queries the OS to determine the number of
connections maintained by the server, for example, by using the netstat command
on UNIX-based systems. After the test completes, the executor sends these metrics
to the controller, which compares the received metrics with metrics observed in a
non-attack test run.
The executor is implemented as a Perl script that listens for strategies from the
controller and then initializes the virtual machines from snapshots, starts the network
emulator, conﬁgures the attack proxy, and starts the test. Once the test completes,
it collects the performance data and any feedback from the attack proxy and sends
this back to the controller.
The controller is implemented in a combination of C and Perl and is responsible
for choosing strategies to execute and determining attacks based on the performance
data returned by the executor. Instead of generating all of the attack strategies
at once, we implement our controller to generate them a few at a time in response
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to feedback about packet types and protocol states observed by the state tracking
component of our attack proxy. This is equivalent to generating all the strategies at
once but is a little more ﬂexible.

4.3.2 Attack Proxy
Our attack proxy intercepts all packets along the ingress and egress paths in NS-3.
We modify NS-3 to allow us to designate malicious nodes and only intercept packets
to or from those nodes. The interception is done in NS-3’s tap-bridge module, which
connects NS-3 to outside tap-devices serving the virtual machines.
When the attack proxy receives a packet, it examines it to determine the protocol.
Protocols not of interest are returned to the tap-bridge for normal processing. For
packets of the target protocol, the type of the packet is examined and the sender’s
protocol connection state is identiﬁed from the state tracking system. If there is a
matching strategy, the basic attack is performed on the packet. To accomplish this,
our proxy needs a description of the protocol’s grammar or packet header format.
We use a simple language to describe this grammar and then automatically generate
C++ code to parse and modify the header.
Our malicious proxy is also capable of injecting packets into the network. Proper
packet headers are generated from the protocol grammar as part of our automatically
generated C++ protocol processing code, and the resulting packets can then be sent
using standard NS-3 packet send mechanisms.

4.3.3 State Tracking
We implement our protocol connection state machine tracking inside the attack
proxy. The tracker takes a description of the protocol’s connection state machine,
written in the dot language [65], as input. This description contains the state transitions, including the packets or actions that cause these transitions or result from
them. The use of a standardized graph language like dot to represent this state

45
machine enables the use of SNAKE on a variety of two-party protocols simply by
swapping out the connection state machine and packet header descriptions.
Our state machine tracker watches the packets that pass through the proxy and
uses the state machine transition rules to infer what connection state the client and
server are currently in. The state machine tracker also collects some useful statistics
about each state in the protocol. This includes what packet types and how many
packets were sent and received during each state. It also includes the amount of time
each host spent in each state and the number of times it visited that state. These
statistics are extracted from the attack proxy by the executor at the end of each test
and then sent to the controller along with the performance information.

4.3.4 Parallelism
We have implemented SNAKE as separate controller and executor modules to enable parallelism. These modules can even reside on separate systems, as all communication is done via TCP. Because testing each strategy takes about two minutes this
becomes a highly parallel problem, with linear speedup limited only by the amount
of processing power that can be thrown at the problem.
Each executor requires signiﬁcant resources, as it will start four virtual machines
and an NS-3 instance. In practice, we found that running about one executor for
every six hyperthreads resulted in good performance. The memory requirements
per executor depend primarily on the demands of the implementation and operating
system under test. In our tests, they ranged around 4-8GB per executor.
Our controller requires little processing power since its primary responsibility is
to identify attacks based on the performance information returned by the executors
and to supply new attack strategies to the executors. In our experiments, we did not
ﬁnd it necessary to dedicate a core to the controller.
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Table 4.1.: Summary of SNAKE Results
Proto

I
I

TCP
TCP
TCP
TCP
DCCP

Impl

I
I

Strats
Tried

I

I

I

I

Linux 3.0.0 5994
Linux 3.13 5717
Windows 8.1 5549
Windows 95 5013
Linux 3.13 4508

Attack
Strats
Found
128
163
137
147
67

I
I

On-path
Attacks

False
Positives

82
105
118
122
27

5
10
2
3
2

True
Attacks

I
I

41
48
17
22
38

Attack
Classes

I
I

4
3
4
3
3

I
I

4.4 Results
We applied SNAKE to test two protocols and a total of ﬁve transport protocol
implementations on four diﬀerent operating systems. The two protocols we tested
were TCP and DCCP. For TCP, we tested implementations in Linux 3.0.0, Linux
3.13, Windows 8.1, and Windows 95. For DCCP, we focused on the implementation
in Linux 3.13. We were able to ﬁnd attacks on all implementations, including several
previously unknown attacks. We discuss these protocols and present our ﬁndings
below, and summarize them in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
All of these tests were run on a hyperthreaded 16 core Intel R Xeon R 2.3GHz
system with 94GB of RAM. We ran ﬁve separate executors simultaneously. Testing
each implementation required about 60 hours, but this duration could be decreased
by running more executors.
We deﬁne successful attacks as strategies that result in an increase or decrease in
achieved throughput of at least 50% compared to the non-attack case or that cause
the server-side socket to not be released normally after the connection is closed. This
throughput threshold is based roughly on the notion that reasonable competition for
network ﬂows is achieving throughput within a factor of two of each other [32, 33] as
well as on experience.
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Table 4.2.: Classes of Attacks Discovered by SNAKE
Proto Attack

Description

Impact

TCP

Connections hang on
server if client exits and
resets are dropped
The handling of invalid
ﬂag combinations could
allow OS ﬁngerprinting
Frequently
duplicating acknowledgments
causes sender to increase window faster
than normal
Brute force a sequencevalid reset
A sequence-valid SYN
causes connection reset
Occasionally duplicating acknowledgments
result in indicated loss
and connection slow
down
Connection will hang
waiting for timeouts to
empty send queue if acknowledgments are disrupted
Connection can be
throttled by incrementing sequence number
in an acknowledgment,
resulting in a forced
resync
Any packet except Response received in REQUEST state results in
connection reset

Server DoS

TCP

CLOSE WAIT
Resource
Exhaustion
Packets with
Invalid Flags

TCP

Duplicate
Acknowledgment
Spooﬁng

TCP

Reset Attack

TCP

SYN-Reset
Attack
Duplicate
Acknowledgment
Rate Limiting

TCP

DCCP Acknowledgment
Mung Resource
Exhaustion

DCCP In-window
Acknowledgment
Sequence
Number
Modiﬁcation
DCCP REQUEST
Connection
Termination

Operating
System
Linux 3.0.0
Linux 3.13

New

Fingerprinting

Linux 3.0.0
Win 8.1

Yes

Poor
Fairness

Win 95

No [11]

Client DoS

All

No [13]

Client DoS

All

No [3]

Partially
[66]

Throughput Win 8.1
Degradation

Yes

Server DoS

Linux 3.13

Yes

Throughput Linux 3.13
Degradation

Yes

Client DoS

Yes

Linux 3.13
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4.4.1 TCP
We tested TCP in one of its most popular settings, HTTP. Speciﬁcally, we utilized
a large HTTP download with Apache or IIS running on the servers and wget for
clients.
For each of our TCP implementations, SNAKE tried between ﬁve and six thousand
strategies and determined that between 128 and 163 of these (depending on the implementation) resulted in signiﬁcant performance degradation or potential for resource
exhaustion. These attack strategies represent around 3% of the tested strategies.
On-path attacks. Some of the attacks we found, while possible, require an
on-path attacker. Strategies like modifying the source or destination ports or the
header size do prevent a connection from being established, but these strategies are
not possible for blind attackers and an endpoint attacker could simply not initiate
a connection. These attacks can be conducted by an on-path attacker. However, as
TCP was not designed to handle such attackers, we are not interested in these types
of attacks.
False positives. We found a few attacks that were false positive strategies for
each implementation. These were related to the hitseqwindow basic attack. This
attack injects numerous packets in an attempt to get one packet into the sequence
window of a target connection. Unfortunately, the injection of such a large number of
packets tends to slow down the target connection signiﬁcantly, irrespective of whether
the packets have any malicious impact. We manually inspect the packet captures for
attacks using this action to determine why an attack was declared and identify false
positives when the reduced performance is caused by the number of packets injected,
and not by hitting the target sequence window.
Endpoint and blind attacks. Discarding the false positive and on-path attacks
results in a set of between 17 and 48 (depending on implementation) attack strategies.
However, many of these strategies are functionally the same attack, just performed
on a diﬀerent ﬁeld or with a diﬀerent value. Ultimately, we found a total of six unique
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classes of attacks, several of which are eﬀective against multiple implementations. We
discuss each of these classes of attacks in detail below.
CLOSE WAIT Resource Exhaustion Attack (partially known). This
class of attack results in connections staying alive on the server in the CLOSE WAIT
state for tens of minutes after the client closes them. An attacker can easily initiate hundreds of thousands of such connections before they begin to expire, likely
rendering the server unavailable.
CLOSE WAIT is the TCP state that the passive close side of a TCP connection,
usually the server, remains in after receiving notiﬁcation of remote close and while
waiting for the local application to close the connection. After the local close, the
connection must remain in this state until a FIN can be sent.
If a Linux TCP client exits while in the middle of a data transfer (like an HTTP
download), Linux will send a FIN packet and then not acknowledge any more data
on the connection; any further packets will generate a reset. This is valid behavior
according to the RFC since the application will never receive this data [34]. If these
reset packets are blocked, it will appear to the sending TCP that the whole inﬂight window of packets was lost, triggering congestion avoidance and a series of
retransmissions that will never succeed.
When the server application eventually closes the TCP connection, TCP will
transition to the CLOSE WAIT state where it needs to remain until all outstanding
data is acknowledged, including the lost window of packets that were in-ﬂight when
the client exited. These packets will never be acknowledged, meaning that TCP is
stuck in CLOSE WAIT with (possibly signiﬁcant) data queued on the socket. Linux will
eventually force-close a TCP connection due to lack of delivery, but that requires 15
retries by default, which is between 13 and 30 minutes depending on the RTT [67].
To the best of our knowledge, this attack class is unreported in the research
literature. However, system administrators have been aware of similar problems with
connections stuck in CLOSE WAIT for many years [66]. SNAKE found this attack on
Linux 3.0.0 and Linux 3.13.
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Packets with Invalid Flags (new). Recall that the TCP header includes several
ﬂags that indicate the packet type. Not all combinations of these ﬂags make sense.
For instance, a packet with SYN+FIN+ACK+RST ﬂags would indicate a packet starting
a connection, closing the connection, acknowledging a packet in the connection, and
resetting the connection. This is clearly a nonsensical combination. One would expect
a TCP implementation to ignore such invalid packets. However, both Linux 3.0.0 and
Windows 8.1 respond to such invalid packets in an active connection.
Linux 3.0.0 attempts to interpret these nonsensical ﬂag combinations as best it
can. This results in sending a duplicate acknowledgment in response to a packet
with no ﬂags set, a situation that is never valid. We have also observed Linux 3.0.0
attempting to process SYN+FIN and SYN+FIN+ACK+PSH packets. Note that Linux 3.13
appears to have ﬁxed these problems and no longer responds to such invalid packets.
Windows 8.1 will also process and respond to invalid packets. However, it follows
a diﬀerent approach. If the RST ﬂag is set, the connection is reset irrespective of what
other ﬂags might also be set. Otherwise, nonsensical ﬂag combinations are ignored.
Responding to packets with invalid ﬂag combinations is not by itself a security
issue. We have found no instance where responding to invalid ﬂag combinations
achieves something that is not possible with valid ﬂag combinations. However, a
target’s responses to invalid ﬂag combinations could be used to ﬁngerprint the particular TCP implementation in use, indicating other possible vulnerabilities to exploit.
Further, packets with invalid ﬂag combinations may be interpreted diﬀerently by
end hosts and middleboxes like ﬁrewalls and intrusion detection systems, providing a
possible way to subvert such middleboxes.
Duplicate Acknowledgment Spooﬁng (known). This is a classic class of
TCP attacks originally discovered by Savage, et al. in 1999 [11]. These attacks operate against naı̈ve TCP implementations where the sender increases their congestion
window for every acknowledgment received, without checking for duplicates or checking how much data is currently outstanding in the network. As a result, a receiver
can signiﬁcantly increase its achieved throughput by simply acknowledging packets
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multiple times, thereby increasing the sender’s congestion window much faster than
normal.
These attacks require frequent duplication of acknowledgments to be meaningful,
as each acknowledgment only increases the congestion window by a very small amount.
In addition, if acknowledgments are duplicated more than three times, TCP will react
as if a loss occurred, halve its congestion window, and enter fast recovery. However,
in this mode, each acknowledgment received results in a new packet being sent. This
simpliﬁes the attack by allowing the attacker to control the sending rate by controlling
the acknowledgment rate.
There are mitigations to these attacks, including only allowing the congestion
window to be incremented by the number of data segments outstanding in the network. Another option would be a nonce in the TCP header and a sender side register
allowing acknowledgment of each nonce only once.
In our tests, SNAKE discovered this attack class against Windows 95 and was able
to use it to increase a malicious connection’s throughput by a factor of 5. SNAKE did
not ﬁnd this attack class against any other tested implementation, which is expected
as this attack class and its mitigations were well known by the time they were released.
Reset Attack (known). This class of attack works by spooﬁng a large number
of resets for a target connection. If one of these resets is sequence-valid, the receiving
TCP will reset the connection. The work in [13] showed these attacks to be much more
practical than previously supposed by pointing out that a reset packet anywhere in
the receive window is suﬃcient to reset the connection. Thus, one could send packets
at receive window intervals, greatly reducing the number of packets required.
In our testing, SNAKE discovered this attack class against all of our TCP implementations. Since these attacks utilize a feature of the TCP speciﬁcation itself, all
implementations should be vulnerable. The only thing implementations can do to
protect themselves is to keep their receive window small.
SYN-Reset Attack (known). This attack class is very similar to the Reset
Attack discussed above. In this case, the TCP speciﬁcation says that the receipt of
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a sequence-valid SYN packet on an active connection should result in the connection
being reset. As a result, an attacker can spoof a large number of SYN packets at receive
window intervals in an attempt to slip one into the target connection’s sequence
window, resulting in a connection reset. This attack has been known since at least
2009 [3].
In our testing, SNAKE discovered these attacks against all of our TCP implementations. Like the Reset Attack, this attack class utilizes a feature of the TCP
speciﬁcation itself, which makes it diﬃcult for implementations to protect against.
Duplicate Acknowledgment Rate Limiting (new). Duplicate Acknowledgment Rate Limiting is a new class of attack that SNAKE discovered against Windows
8.1. It operates by duplicating PSH+ACK packets, which occur only occasionally in the
data stream, ten times. This causes duplicate acknowledgments to be sent to the
sender by the receiver. After three duplicate acknowledgments, the sender halves its
congestion window and retransmits the indicated packet.
So far, this is standard TCP behavior common to all TCP New Reno implementations. However, for a Windows 8.1 server and a Linux 3.0.0 client, we observe a
throughput degradation of a factor of 5 compared to the competing ﬂow. Both of
the Linux implementations we tested show throughput consistent with normal TCP
competition in this scenario; that is, approximately fair bandwidth sharing.

4.4.2 DCCP
For DCCP testing, we used iperf to measure throughput. Since DCCP is not a
reliable protocol, we measured performance based on server goodput, or actual data
received. As DCCP is currently only supported on Linux and is fairly uncommon, we
focused our eﬀorts on a single implementation, the Linux kernel 3.13 implementation.
SNAKE tried just over 4,500 strategies against DCCP. Of these, it identiﬁed 67
candidate strategies that caused signiﬁcant performance issues or potential resource
exhaustion. This is about 1.5% of the total strategies tested.
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On-path attacks. As with TCP, DCCP was not designed to be resilient to
on-path attacks. Thus, we exclude all on-path attacks found by SNAKE.
False positives. We also found 2 attacks that were false positives. As with TCP,
these attacks are both hitseqwindow strategies that attempt to inject packets into a
target connection at sequence window intervals. Injecting this quantity of packets
tends to signiﬁcantly slow down the competing target connection, irrespective of any
malicious impact of the injected packets. Thus, these strategies tend to fall below
our attack threshold.
Endpoint and blind attacks. Discarding the on-path attacks and the two false
positives leaves us with 38 strategies that represent actual attacks. However, many
of these strategies are functionally the same attack, just repeated on diﬀerent ﬁelds
or with diﬀerent values. Ultimately, we found three classes of attacks; none of which
have been reported in the literature. We discuss each of these classes of attacks below.
Acknowledgment Mung Resource Exhaustion Attack (new). This class
of attack is possible because a DCCP sender will not close a connection until its send
queue is empty. This send queue defaults to 10 packets, but may be much larger for
applications like video streaming. As a result, if a connection’s congestion control
can be persuaded to send at the minimum rate, a connection can be held in an openbut-useless state for a very long time. By repeating this process, one can create an
eﬀective resource exhaustion attack that may render the target host unavailable.
Note that DCCP does not retransmit data. As a result, while similar attacks
against TCP last until TCP gives up retransmitting a particular packet and resets the
connection, DCCP will continue sending at its minimum rate until the application and
the human trying to use it explicitly close the connection. Once the application closes
the connection, DCCP will send all queued packets and then close the connection and
free related resources.
There are several ways to convince DCCP’s congestion control to send at its
minimum rate. Most of them work by invalidating or dropping the acknowledgments
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from the receiver. Modifying the sequence or acknowledgment numbers are very
eﬀective because this results in an additional exchange of SYNC and SYNCACK packets.
In-window Acknowledgment Sequence Number Modiﬁcation (new). This
attack class targets sequence numbers in the receiver’s acknowledgment packets. Recall that sequence numbers in DCCP are per-packet and that every packet increments
the sequence number; even pure acknowledgment packets.
If the sequence number of one of these acknowledgments is increased, such that it
is still sequence valid, the sender will begin to acknowledge this bad acknowledgment
number in its data packets. However, when the receiver receives these data packets
it will ﬁnd they acknowledge packets that have not yet been sent. As a result, it
will drop these packets and send a SYNC in response. The SYNC packet will result
in a SYNCACK packet from the sender, resynchronizing the sequence numbers and
allowing the connection to proceed. However, by that point an entire window of
packets will have been dropped, resulting in DCCP’s congestion control reducing the
connection’s allowed sending rate. It may even trigger a timeout and subsequent slow
start, assuming DCCP’s CCID 2 congestion control is in use.
To perform these attacks, an attacker does not have to be an endpoint. It suﬃces
to be able to sniﬀ and spoof network traﬃc (i.e., an oﬀ-path attacker). Such an
attacker can inject an acknowledgment with a slightly higher sequence number and
trigger this vulnerability.
REQUEST Connection Termination Attack (new). This class of attack is
an eﬀective way to terminate a connection during the connection initiation phase. A
client enters the REQUEST state on initiating a connection, immediately after having
sent a REQUEST packet to the server, and stays in this state until it receives a RESPONSE
packet from the server.
The only valid packets in the REQUEST state are RESPONSE or RESET; any other
packet results in a reset. Note that both the pseudo-code in RFC 4340 [45] and the
Linux 3.13 DCCP implementation perform this packet type check before checking the
sequence numbers. Thus, it is possible to reset a DCCP connection in the REQUEST
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state by sending any non-RESPONSE packet with any sequence and acknowledgment
numbers.
This makes this attack class exploitable by anyone who can sniﬀ and spoof packets
(i.e., an oﬀ-path attacker). A blind attacker can also launch this type of attack, if
they can guess the connection initiation time (to within an RTT) and the source port.

4.4.3 Beneﬁts of State-based Strategy Generation
Our state-based strategy generation algorithm enabled us to ﬁnd 9 attacks against
2 transport protocols and a total of 5 implementations. 5 of these attacks were
previously unknown. To accomplish this, we required about 60 hours per tested
implementation. Removing parallelism, this becomes 300 hours of computation per
tested implementation.
By contrast, the time-based attack injection approach discussed in Section 4.2.2
requires trying our malicious strategies at intervals of 5 microseconds, which is roughly
the amount of time needed to send a minimum sized TCP packet at 100Mbits/sec.
Thus, there are 12 million possible injection points in a 1 minute test connection.
For each of these injection points, we would have to test about 60 diﬀerent malicious
strategies resulting from the 8 general malicious actions and the 13 ﬁelds in the TCP
header. This results in 720 million strategies to test.
At 2 minutes to test each strategy, this would require 24 million hours of computation. At an equivalent level of parallelism, this would take 548 years to complete,
which is clearly impractical.
The send-packet-based attack injection approach is more practical. A one minute
non-attack test with TCP results in the sending of about 13,000 packets. For each of
these packets, we would need to test about 53 diﬀerent malicious strategies for packet
manipulation, resulting in a total of 689,000 strategies. This would require 22,967
hours of computation. At an equivalent level of parallelism, this would take about
191 days.
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However, send-packet-based attack injection provides no support for packet injection attacks modeling blind attackers. As a result, it would be impossible to ﬁnd the
Reset and Syn-Reset attacks using this attack injection model.

4.5 Natural Language Processing Pipeline
We now consider how to automatically extract the protocol descriptions that
grammar-based fuzzers, like SNAKE, depend on to automatically ﬁnd attacks. These
descriptions encode the layout of packet ﬁelds and protocol semantics. For example,
consider the TCP protocol (its header is shown in Figure 2.1) where bytes 17 and
18 contain a checksum of the rest of the TCP header. A test packet that contains a
modiﬁed ﬁeld and wants to test a particular part of the code must also contain the
correct checksum in order to pass the trivial checksum check and reach the desired
part of the code. Similarly, bit 6 of byte 14 (the URG ﬁeld) controls whether bytes
19 and 20, the urgent pointer ﬁeld, are interpreted or not. Hence, a test packet to
test an urgent pointer value of 10, must set bytes 19 and 20 and set bit 6 of byte
14 to one.
Unfortunately, these protocol descriptions are usually created manually by an
expert and are not easily transferable from one protocol to another. As a result,
many grammar-based network protocol fuzzers, including SNAKE, suﬀer from limitations like: (1) time-consuming manual protocol deﬁnition, (2) diﬃculty adapting
to new protocols, (3) poor test coverage, and (4) false positives that must be manually triaged. However, we observe that there is an untapped resource of information
available for network protocols in the form of natural language speciﬁcation documents, e.g., RFCs. With the recent interest in using data to solve problems in several
ﬁelds, we ask the question: “Can we leverage natural language speciﬁcations of protocols to improve protocol fuzzers? ” It seems likely that the information that is manually
extracted by human experts today could be extracted in an automated manner with
the help of Natural Language Processing (NLP) tools.
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Extracting protocol information from natural language text is not a straightforward task. Natural language text has inherent ambiguity and the writers of protocol speciﬁcations often rely on the reader’s understanding of context and intent.
Thus, it is not easy to automate information extraction by simply specifying a set of
rules. The natural language community has shifted its focus to statistical methods to
address this ambiguity, but domain adaption remains a major challenge. Speciﬁcally,
most NLP methods are sensitive to the data used at training time and do not adapt
easily if applied on data from a diﬀerent domain. Applying “oﬀ-the-shelf” implementations of NLP tools, typically trained on newswire data, or combining them in an
ad-hoc way, often results in reduced performance and brittle applications.
Previous work has applied NLP techniques to related problems. WHYPER [68]
and DASE [69] apply NLP techniques to identify sentences that describe the need for a
given permission in a mobile application description and extract command-line input
constraints from manual pages, respectively. The work in [70] used documentation
and source code to create an ontology allowing the cross-linking of software artifacts
represented in code and natural language on a semantic level. These approaches focus
on a small, predeﬁned set of entities; analyze small, structured sentences; and use
rule-based approaches. Other works infer protocol speciﬁcations using network traces
[71–75], program analysis [18, 76–78], or model checking [79, 80]. These approaches
rely extensively on input from human experts and do not easily generalize to new
software or protocols.
In this section, we study how to improve the coverage and eﬀectiveness of grammarbased fuzzers for network protocols through automated learning of protocol rules from
existing textual documentation. We focus on RFCs1 as this is the most common form
in which Internet protocols are speciﬁed. They also follow some writing guidelines [81]
that render them more amenable to automated learning. We ﬁrst deﬁne the problem
of grammar extraction as a set of NLP tasks and then design an NLP framework to
solve these tasks. We then evaluate our framework in terms of its ability to extract
1

An RFC is a formal document from the IETF that is the result of committee drafting and subsequent
review by interested parties.
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protocol grammars from a set of 7 protocol RFCs and demonstrate the usefulness of
the extracted information by applying it to SNAKE.

4.5.1 Problem Deﬁnition
In this section we formulate the problem of automating protocol grammar extraction from natural language protocol speciﬁcation documents as a set of NLP
problems. First, we describe background on relevant NLP concepts, and then we
deﬁne the problem of protocol grammar extraction.

Relevant NLP Background
NLP overview. Natural language processing tasks are organized hierarchically,
into low level tasks, deﬁned over words and phrases, and higher level tasks, deﬁned
over sentences and even the entire document. The set of tools developed by the NLP
community for basic text processing is usually known as the NLP pipeline. These
tools are chained together, such that outputs of low-level tasks are used as inputs to
more advanced tasks [82].
Low level tasks include word and short phrase analysis, such as segmentation, partof-speech (POS) tagging [83, 84], and entity extraction [84, 85]. More advanced tasks
capture long-range relationships between words, either within a given sentence or
across multiple sentences. For example, a dependency parser [86,87] constructs a tree
connecting the words of a given sentence based on their syntactic dependencies (e.g.,
subject). A co-reference resolution system connects noun phrases that correspond to
the same entity [82].
One of the key NLP challenges is domain adaption, accounting for the diﬀerences
between the training domain used to train tools (typically, this is newswire data) and
the test domain, over which the tools are used after training (in our case, technical
documents).
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Figure 4.4.: NLP Analysis: two possible outcomes for the senses of the word “points”
(top: verb, bottom:noun)

To help clarify these concepts, Figure 4.4 describes the output of several NLP tools
over the sentence “the urgent pointer points to the sequence number of the octet” from
the TCP speciﬁcation [34]. We predict the POS tags for each word, corresponding
to determiners (DET), nouns (NN,NNS), verbs (VBZ), and prepositions (IN,TO). We
also identify phrases (known as chunks, marked with brackets). Finally, we identify
syntactic relationships between chunks (e.g., subject and object) using a dependency
parser. We can observe the problem of domain adaptation by considering the two
interpretations of the word “points”. The correct interpretation of this word is as a
verb (see top half of Figure 4.4); however, systems trained over newswire data are
likely to interpret this word as a noun (e.g., “the Dow Jones rose by three points”)
as described in the bottom half of Figure 4.4. Note that this mistake propagates to
other steps in the pipeline, resulting in incorrect chunking and parsing decisions.
Linking Text to Protocol Entities and Relations.

The standard NLP

pipeline oﬀers task-independent language analysis. However, many applications (including protocol grammar extraction) require a more advanced analysis, mapping the
raw text to an application-speciﬁc ontology. For example, the phrase “president Bush”
can refer to two diﬀerent people. The standard NLP pipeline would identify that the
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phrase corresponds to a PERSON while an entity linking system [88,89] would map the
phrase, based on its context, to an entity in a knowledge-base (e.g., the appropriate Wikipedia entry). Entity linking maps raw entities to a canonical representation
deﬁned by an external knowledge-base and is domain-speciﬁc (in our case, protocol
ﬁelds). Using relation extraction the identiﬁed concepts can then be connected via a
set of speciﬁed relations, often expressed as function symbols (in our case, relations
between ﬁelds).
Zero Shot Learning for Entity and Relation Linking. The traditional, fully
supervised, approach for constructing NLP tools can be deﬁned as learning a mapping, T→E, from a text t to an output symbol ei ∈ E (where E is the set of output
symbols, e.g., protocol entity types). Taking this approach would require annotating
data for each protocol separately, as the set of domain symbols is diﬀerent for each
protocol. This would result in a prohibitively expensive process and would defeat
our goal of fully automated protocol grammar extraction. Zero-shot learning [20]
addresses this problem as follows. It learns a mapping <T,E>→{t,f} from a tuple
containing the input and output to a Boolean value indicating whether the pair is
correct or not. The main observation behind zero-shot learning is that the set of
output symbols does not have to be fully speciﬁed durning training, and unlike traditional supervised learning, the system is expected to perform well even over outputs
that were not observed during training. In practice, this can be done by learning a
similarity metric, sim(t, ei ), and deﬁning the prediction as: arg maxei ∈E sim(t, ei ).

Protocol Grammar Extraction
A network protocol is ﬁrst and foremost deﬁned by the header attached to transported packets. This header often has ﬁxed size (in bits), where certain parts of it,
known as ﬁelds, have deﬁned meaning and size. Consider the TCP header presented
in Figure 2.1, which has a size of 20 bytes, where bytes 17 and 18 contain a checksum
of the rest of the header, meaning that those two bytes can be interpreted as a 16 bit
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number. Protocol semantics are deﬁned by the relations that exist between several
ﬁelds, in the example above, those 16 bits represent the checksum of all other ﬁelds
in the header. Note that not all ﬁelds have a size which is a multiple of 8 bits or 1
byte.
Fields, properties, relations. We consider protocol grammars to have three
components: a set of ﬁelds that correspond to the header, with each ﬁeld having a
name, a size (i.e., the number of bits in the ﬁeld), and an order in the packet header; a
set of properties that can be attached to a ﬁeld; and a set of binary relations between
these ﬁelds.
Speciﬁcally, given a header H of n bits, a set of property names P , and a set of
relation operators R, we deﬁne a ﬁeld f as the tuple < name, size, start > where
name is the identiﬁer of the ﬁeld, size represents the size in bits, and start represents
the starting position in the header H from byte 0. We deﬁne a property as the tuple
< f, p > to denote that ﬁeld f has property p, and we deﬁne relations as < f1 , r, f2 >
to denote that ﬁelds f1 and f2 are connected through relation r. As an example,
consider the TCP header from Figure 2.1. Fields include sequence number, with a
size of 32 bits and a starting position of 4 bytes, and control flags, with a size of
6 bits and a starting position of 13 bytes and 2 bits. A relation exists between two
ﬁelds if they are connected to each other. For example, in Figure 2.1, the ﬁeld urgent
pointer has meaning only if bit 6 of the control flags ﬁeld is set. A property
indicates something about the purpose or characteristics of a ﬁeld. For example, in
Figure 2.1 the ﬁeld data offset indicates the length of the packet header.
We use the term document to refer to any protocol speciﬁcation. For example,
such a speciﬁcation can be an RFC.
Given these notations, we deﬁne two NLP problems which help extracting the
needed protocol information. The ﬁrst problem looks at automatically extracting the
set of output symbols from text, while the second problem corresponds to learning
how to link the document text to the set of extracted output symbols.
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Problem 1 - Entity Type (Protocol Field) Extraction. Given a set of
network protocol documents D, we want to extract in an automated way the relevant
protocol ﬁeld names (including their sizes in bits and order).
Problem 2 - Extracting and Linking Entity Mentions, Properties, and
Relations.

Given a set of protocol documents D, a set of (previously extracted)

protocol ﬁeld names F , a set of property names P , and a set of relations operators
R (speciﬁc to the networking domain) we want to extract in an automated way the
properties of the extracted ﬁelds and the relations between them.

4.5.2 Design
We describe the design of our framework for automated extraction of protocol
grammars. We ﬁrst present our approach and then discuss in detail the pipeline we
use.

Our Approach
In designing an NLP pipeline to solve the two problems deﬁned in Section 4.5.1
we have two design goals: (1) minimize the manual supervision eﬀort required for
training and (2) adapt to new protocols without re-training the system. Previous
work that used the output of NLP tools directly via a set of transformation rules
does not adapt well to new protocols. Instead, we propose a lightweight zero-shot
learning framework which can adapt to the speciﬁc properties of the network domain
and extract relevant information.
The design of our NLP pipeline is presented in Figure 4.5. The pre-processing
step reads in the raw speciﬁcation documents and normalizes their structure. The
entity types extraction task leverages the hierarchical structure of protocol speciﬁcation documents, like RFCs. We use a hand-tuned rule-based system leveraging RFC
speciﬁc formatting [81, 90] for identifying and extracting entity types. Note that this
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Figure 4.5.: System Design for Automated Extraction of Protocol Grammars

step can be extended to accommodate diﬀerent structures of protocol documentation
or can be replaced with a knowledge-base or domain ontology, when one exists.
For the task of extracting properties and relations, we take an approach where we
ﬁrst locate entity mentions in the document, and then, by examining the context in
which they are mentioned, we look for properties and relations. For both parts we
use a zero-shot learning approach, where a classiﬁer is trained to look for similarities
between document text and a list of things we are looking for. In the ﬁrst case,
this is the list of entity types (extracted from the document structure in the prior
step) while in the second case it is a small list of relevant properties and relations.
In both cases we developed new classiﬁers trained on network protocol data instead
of using an oﬀ-the-shelf NLP system since existing systems are trained over data
collected from non-technical domains like newswire, resulting in poor performance in
our highly technical domain.
Finally, the goal of the post-processing step is to transform the data extracted in
the entity extraction and property/relation extraction tasks into a protocol grammar
description. Diﬀerent tools can then transform this description as needed for diﬀerent
applications and languages. Below we give more details about each step.
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Pre-processing
The pre-processing stage takes the raw text of the document and prepares it for
the rest of the pipeline while preserving the useful document structure. The output
of this stage are chunks, where a chunk represents a single grammatical phrase, like
a noun phrase or verb phrase, made up of one or more words. The text below shows
an example of “chunked” text from an RFC [34].
[If] [the ACK control bit] [is set] [this field] [contains] [the value]
[of] [the next sequence number the sender] [of] [the segment] [is
expecting to receive] . [Once] [a connection] [is established] [this]
[is] [always] [sent] .

RFC documents are text ﬁles formatted with page breaks and page headers to
enable printing. We detect these page breaks and page headers and remove them.
Additionally, we remove any embedded ASCII art tables and images from the document.
RFCs follow a structure where the document is divided into many sections with
each section focusing on a particular topic, which may be a packet ﬁeld, a protocol
state, or a particular action. We ﬁnd this structure to be very helpful for extracting
entity types, and we preserve it by parsing the text itself into a hierarchical structure
of sections, each of which has a header line, body text, and possible subsections. We
run a set of standard NLP tools from the CoreNLP [82] package over the section
bodies and headers to split each section into sentences and then compute part-ofspeech (POS) tags for each word and the parse-tree for each sentence. Based on these
POS tags and the parse-tree, we split each sentence into chunks.
Even for these simple tasks, we have to make allowances for the mis-match between the newsprint domain that standard NLP tools are trained for and our technical domain. In particular, RFCs capitalize some very common words like MUST,
SHOULD, and MAY to give them speciﬁc, technical meaning [91]. This confuses
CoreNLP’s POS tagging, which is trained on newswire. We, therefore, identify these
special words, mark them, and convert them to lowercase before doing POS tagging.
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Entity Types Extraction
The entity types extraction stage performs named entity recognition. It takes
the pre-processed document and extracts the entity types, or packet ﬁelds, from the
document. In addition to the entity types themselves, it also extracts their size (i.e.,
number of bits in the ﬁeld) and their order.
We ﬁnd that the document structure we preserved in the pre-processing step
enables us to extract this information with a simple rule-based system. In particular,
each entity type is described in order by a section, with the name and size of the entity
type as the section title. Hence, we scan all section headers in the document, ignoring
high-level section headers that begin with a number. Further, we ignore headers
containing function words, as these do not occur in ﬁeld names. The remaining
section headers refer to the entity types and are in packet order. To parse each
section header, we check for a colon separating the entity type’s name from its size
and for commas or the word “and” indicating multiple entity types in a single section
header. This results in a list of entity types with their sizes and order. An example of
entity types extracted by this method from one of the RFCs in our dataset is below:
1,Source Port,16 bits
2,Destination Port,16 bits
3,Sequence Number,32 bits
4,Acknowledgment Number,32 bits
5,Data Offset,4 bits
6,Reserved,6 bits
7,Control Bits,6 bits
8,Window,16 bits
9,Checksum,16 bits
10,Urgent Pointer,16 bits
11,Options,variable
12,Maximum Segment Size Option Data,16 bits
13,Padding,variable
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Table 4.3.: Protocol Fields
Protocol
UDP
TCP
SCTP
IPv6
IP
GRE
DCCP

Number of Entity Types Examples of Entity Types
Length, Source Port
4
Data Oﬀset, Window
18
Veriﬁcation Tag
40
Flow Label, Version
20
Flags, Type of Service
22
Protocol Type, Checksum
6
Source Port, Type
18

Entity Mention Identiﬁcation
In order to extract properties and relations from documents, we ﬁrst need to
ﬁnd where the entity types speciﬁc to each network protocol are mentioned in the
document. Once we ﬁnd these mentions, we can then look at the context where they
are mentioned to identify properties and relations. For this task, the needed inputs
are the pre-processed document and the list of entity types. We used the entity types
list we extracted automatically from each document, but any ontology consisting of
relevant entity types could also be used.
Since entity types vary dramatically both in name and number between documents
(i.e., protocols), as shown in Table 4.3, we use a zero-shot learning approach [20].
Instead of training a classiﬁer to identify mentions of speciﬁc entity types, we consider
the entity type to be a second input and build a classiﬁer to identify references to
the given entity type in an input text. The resulting classiﬁer learns a similarity
metric between text snippets that takes into account character level similarity, writing
style (e.g., capitalization patterns, abbreviations), and relevant context words. This
approach allows our classiﬁer to generalize to previously unseen entity types that
appear in new protocol documents.
Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a binary classiﬁcation problem over all pairs (ej , ci ) where
ej represents each entity type and ci represents a chunk in the document text, as
shown in Figure 4.6. If the chunk ci contains a reference to entity type ej , the pair is

67

Chunked Text:

[The urgent pointer] [points] [to]
[the sequence number] [of] [the
octet] [following] [the urgent data] .
[This field] [is] [only] [be
interpreted] [in] [segments] [with]
[the URG control bit set] .

Is Entity in
Chunk?
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Chunk?
Is Entity in
Chunk?
Is Entity in
Chunk?
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Options

Figure 4.6.: Example of Zero-shot Learning Classiﬁcation for Entity Mentions

labeled as a positive example. The pair is labeled as a negative example otherwise.
This way we learn a similarity score between ej and ci that is able to generalize to
diﬀerent entity types. We train an SVM classiﬁer for this problem using the set of
binary features shown in Table 4.4. The text below shows an example of the output
of our entity mention identiﬁcation classiﬁer; note that acknowledgement number
and sequence number are entity types that were extracted during the entity types
extraction stage.
If the ACK control bit is set [(entity mention: Acknowledgement Number)
this field]

contains the value of [(entity mention: Sequence Number) the

next sequence number the sender] of the segment is expecting to receive.
Once a connection is established this is always sent .

Property and Relation Extraction
The property and relation extraction stage identiﬁes particular properties of and
relationships between entity types and extracts them from the document body. We
seek to identify a ﬁxed set of properties and relations; however, the set of entity types
related in these ways is not ﬁxed. Because relations and properties are scarce in our
dataset (see Table 4.9), we, again, take a zero-shot learning approach and train a
binary classiﬁer to identify references to a property or relation (given as input) in a
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Table 4.4.: Features for our Entity Mention Identiﬁcation Classiﬁer
Num
1
2
3

4
5
6

7

8
9

Feature
More than two sequential words from the chunk match the section header.
A word in the chunk is not compound and matches a section header that
is not a function word.
Either the entity is subsumed by the chunk, with any additional words
being function/jargon words, or the entity contains a word in parenthesis
and that word occurs in the chunk.
A single word header exactly matches a single word chunk
Entity exists in current section header and chunk contains a pronoun phrase
like “this ﬁeld”, “they”, or “their”.
Entity is subsumed by the chunk and the next word in the chunk has a speciﬁc part-of-speech. We ﬁnd only Coordinating Conjunctions, Determiners,
and Nouns to be useful.
Entity is subsumed by the chunk and the prior word in the chunk has a speciﬁc part-of-speech. We ﬁnd only Coordinating Conjunctions, Determiners,
Adjectives, Nouns, and Pronouns to be useful.
Entity is a single word, the lemma of the entity appears in the chunk, and
the next word is one of:“list”,“ﬁeld”,“area”,“space”.
Entity is a single word, the lemma of the entity appears in the chunk, and
the prior word is “all”.

given text. Additionally, we do not initially diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent relations
or properties.
Based on an analysis of a wide variety of network protocols, we selected 9 properties and 6 relations to extract. The properties we consider include checksum,
which marks packet ﬁelds containing checksums; port, which marks packet ﬁelds
used for multiplexing diﬀerent communication channels; and multiple, which indicates that a ﬁeld’s value is a multiple of some constant. Relations we consider include
significant, indicating that some ﬁeld is only signiﬁcant if another ﬁeld has a speciﬁc value, and offset, indicating that some ﬁeld encodes an oﬀset from another ﬁeld.
The full list of attributes and relations we consider is shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6.
Note that unlike entity types, which vary between protocols, we look for the same
properties and relations in each protocol. We choose these properties and relations
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Table 4.5.: Properties
Name
sequence
number
checksum
port
packet type
header length
multiple
monotonically
increasing
mbz
range

Description (A, B denote
entities)
A contains a sequence number
A (ﬁeld) is a checksum
A is used for multiplexing
A denotes diﬀerent types of
packets
A indicates length of packet
header
A’s value is is scaled by a
constant
A is monotonically increasing
A is reserved and currently
unused
A’s values are in a limited
range

Key phrases
data octet, sequence number, acknowledgment number
checksum
port
type, packet type, packet, control
length, header, data oﬀset, size
integral number
should not be lessened
must be zero, reserved, zeros,
zero, zeroes, 0
takes a value of, range

Table 4.6.: Relations
Name

Description (A, B denote
entities)
oﬀset
A is an oﬀset from B
signiﬁcant
A is only signiﬁcant if B has
a particular value
ﬁeld present A is only present in pkt type
B
contains
A contains B
greater
A is always > B
less
A is always < B

Key phrases
oﬀset, indicated in
signiﬁcant, only interpreted with, =,
valid
contain, carry, present, following format, following parameters, packets
from left to right, these parameters
greater than
must not be greater, less
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Table 4.7.: Features for our Property/Relation Extraction Classiﬁer
Num Feature
Maximum % of word overlap between a key phrase and the chunk
1
Maximum % of character overlap between a key phrase and the chunk
2
Longest common substring between a key phrase and the chunk
3
Overlap between a key phrase and the chunk (binary feature)
4
Key phrase is a substring of the chunk (binary feature)
5
Exact match between a key phrase and the chunk (binary feature)
6
Length of the chunk
7

because they are widely present across network protocols and contain information
that is useful for generating test cases. For example, knowing that a ﬁeld represents
a checksum means that we should not spent a lot of time testing random values for
that ﬁeld. Similarly, knowing that some ﬁeld is only relevant if another ﬁeld has a
particular value enables us to consider these ﬁelds together and not waste time testing
them separately.
We train a single binary SVM classiﬁer for this problem. This classiﬁer relies on a
small, focused, predeﬁned set of key phrases associated with each of the 9 properties
and 6 relation types (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). The features we consider are shown
in Table 4.7 and were extracted for a window of [-1, +1] chunks around the current
chunk.
This classiﬁer identiﬁes chunks of text that express a relation or property; however,
it does not determine which relation/property nor the identify of the arguments (i.e.,
the entity types involved in the relation or property). Identifying the type of a relation
or property is done simply by choosing the relation or property with the maximum key
phrase overlap. To determine the arguments of the relation or property, we use the
entity mentions identiﬁed in the previous stage and two heuristics. For properties,
we choose the entity type deﬁned in the title of the section in which the property
appears. Since many properties refer to the entity type currently being discussed,
this makes sense. For relations, we choose the closest entity type to the left and the
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Property extraction:
Section Title: [(entity mention: Data Oﬀset)Data Oﬀset] : 8 bits
Section Text: The oﬀset from the start of the packet ’s DCCP [(property keyword:
header length) header] to the start of its application data area , in 32-bit words . The
receiver must ignore packets whose Data Oﬀset is smaller than the minimum-sized
header for the given Type or larger than the DCCP packet itself .
Property: Header Length, Data Oﬀset
Relation Extraction:
Section Title: Urgent Pointer : 16 bits
Section Text: This ﬁeld communicates the current value of [(entity mention: Urgent
Pointer) the urgent pointer] as a positive [(relation keyword: oﬀset) oﬀset] from
[(entity mention: Sequence Number) the sequence number] in this segment . The
urgent pointer points to the sequence number of the octet following the urgent data
. This ﬁeld is only be interpreted in segments with the URG control bit set .
Relation: Urgent Pointer, oﬀset, Sequence Number
Figure 4.7.: Examples of Property and Relation Extraction

closest entity type to the right of the relation as the arguments. Figure 4.7 shows an
example of the output of this classiﬁer.

Post-processing
This process leverages domain knowledge about how entity types, properties, and
relations typically occur in network protocols. We discard any entity types with
unknown or variable lengths as well as any following entity types because ﬁelds with
unknown lengths prevent interpretation of later ﬁelds and variable length ﬁelds are
uncommon in the protocols we consider. We convert the remainder of the list of entity
types into a C-struct-style description of the protocol’s packet header. In order to do
this, a number of complex transformations are required because while packet ﬁelds
can conceptually be arbitrary length, C is constrained to working with single bytes
or multiples of 2, 4, or 8 bytes. Hence, ﬁelds that do not match these sizes, or are
not aligned, need to be transformed into one or more bitﬁelds.
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We post-process the properties and relations by leveraging domain speciﬁc knowledge. Since these properties and relations are being used to characterize the protocol,
we only need a single (property, entity) or (relation, entity, entity) tuple no matter
how many times this property or relation (i.e., tuple) appears in the document. This
beneﬁts us signiﬁcantly because we usually have multiple opportunities to extract
each property or relation tuple. In addition, many properties can occur only on a
single ﬁeld in the packet header (e.g., packet type, header length) while other relations or properties cannot occur in combination (e.g., packet type and sequence
number are mutually exclusive). Finally, if our pipeline was unable to identify key
properties like packet type, header length, and checksum, we attempt to guess
which ﬁelds have these properties based on ﬁeld names and sizes. Finally, we associate our cleaned properties and relations with the packet ﬁelds. This results in a
concise and clean protocol description.

4.5.3 Case Study: SNAKE
We demonstrate the usefulness and eﬀectiveness of our automated protocol grammar extraction framework by applying it to SNAKE, providing several beneﬁts including:
(1) Closing the gap between speciﬁcation and testing. By automating the
generation of a protocol description, our approach closes the gap between speciﬁcation
and vulnerability ﬁnding and eliminates the need for a protocol expert to manually
create a description of the protocol for testing purposes. Note that while our approach
requires some annotation for training, this is a one time cost; additional protocols can
be analyzed with no manual eﬀort. The output produced by our pipeline was easily
integrated with SNAKE.
(2) Optimizing test cases. The properties and relations that our automated
document processing pipeline identiﬁes enable us to optimize test case generation by
eliminating some irrelevant tests and providing better manipulation values in other
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Table 4.8.: Packet Field Modiﬁcations for Test Cases
Field Info
1 bit ﬁelds
2 bit ﬁelds
3 bit ﬁelds
4 bit ﬁelds
5 bit ﬁelds
6 bit ﬁelds
7 bit ﬁelds
8 bit ﬁelds
16 bit ﬁelds
32 bit ﬁelds
64 bit ﬁelds
port property
checksum property
mbz property
sequence number prop
monotonic increasing prop
range property
greater relation
less relation
oﬀset relation

Modiﬁcations
0,1
0,1,3
0,2,3,7
0,2,4,8,15,+1,-1
0,2,4,8,16,9.31,+1,-1
0,2,4,16,63,+1,-1
0,3,4,8,19,64,127,+1,-1
0,255,random
0,65535,random
0,4294967295,random
0,16777216,random
1025
random
random
+1,-1,+10,-10,+100,-100
+1,+10,+100,+100
4 locations within range
+1, +100, +1000, -1000
-1, -100, -100, +1000
+1, -1, +1000, -1000

cases, with the goal of providing more meaningful test cases. For example, from the
deﬁnition of checksums and protocol ports, we expect that tampering with them will
result in modiﬁed packets simply being thrown away. Therefore, we apply only a single
modiﬁcation—to conﬁrm expected behavior—to ﬁelds identiﬁed as checksums or ports
(via the checksum or port properties). In a similar manner, mbz (must-be-zero) ﬁelds
are those with no current functionality, included for padding or extensibility purposes.
We apply only a single modiﬁcation to ﬁelds identiﬁed as such because we expect these
ﬁelds to be irrelevant to protocol operation. In other cases, like sequence number or
monotonically increasing ﬁelds, we optimize the set of operations we perform. In
both cases, adding or subtracting from the current ﬁeld value is likely to be much more
interesting than setting an absolute value, since the absolute values may vary widely
between or during tests. The full set of improvements we make to ﬁeld modiﬁcations
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Table 4.9.: Dataset Statistics
Statistic
Documents
Entity Types
Entity Mentions
Properties
Relations

Value
7
128
516
88
49

are shown in Table 4.8. This allows us to generate fewer strategies than SNAKE did
previously, by pruning uninteresting strategies, while testing a similar amount of the
protocol.
(3) Reducing false positives. The properties provided by our NLP pipeline
enable us to identify and ﬁlter test cases that are expected to fail based on the
properties associated with modiﬁed ﬁelds, reducing the test cases that need to be
manually triaged. Examples include header length or checksum ﬁelds which contain
fundamental details about packets. When these ﬁelds are modiﬁed, we expect that
the resulting packets will to fail to parse.

4.5.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our document processing pipeline to understand how
eﬀective it is at extracting entity types and properties from textual speciﬁcation
documents and how eﬀectively that information can be leveraged to ﬁnd attacks
against protocol implementations.
Dataset. To train the classiﬁers for our pipeline, as well as develop the rulebased entity type extractor, we annotated a set of training protocol speciﬁcation
documents in the form of RFCs. RFCs are public documents available from the
IETF at [92]. They are a common form for protocol speciﬁcation and are written
in plain text following a speciﬁc format [81, 90, 91]. We use RFC documents for
seven protocols: GRE [59], IPv6 [60], IP [61], TCP [34], UDP [31], DCCP [45], and

75
SCTP [62]. We selected these RFCs because they specify common transport and
network layer protocols, meaning that we expect their designs to have similarities.
Additional details about the dataset are shown in Table 4.9.

NLP Pipeline Evaluation
We evaluate our NLP pipeline by examining each of its three stages: extracting the
entity types for each protocol, identifying entity mentions, and extracting properties
and relations. We compare our use of specialized features and classiﬁers with simpler
approaches based on keyword overlap to understand the additional value added by
our approach. We use standard K-way cross validation, where we train on K − 1
documents and test on the last. Our results are shown in Table 4.10.
Entity Types Extraction. Results for this stage are shown in Table 4.10a. We
ﬁnd that our rule-based extractor is quite eﬀective in most cases, obtaining an average
precision of 0.75, recall of 0.72, and F1-score of 0.74.2
We note that this rule-based method fails completely for two protocols, UDP and
GRE. Both UDP and GRE depart signiﬁcantly from the normal method for entity
type description. Speciﬁcally, entity types are described either in paragraph form
(UDP) or in numbered headings (GRE), which causes our rule-based system to incorrectly ignore them as not relevant. These kinds of departures from the normal
method of description pose signiﬁcant diﬃculties for any extraction technique. Fortunately, for all other protocols, our extractor does quite well. This is crucial because
errors here have cascading eﬀects down the rest of the pipeline in entity mention
identiﬁcation and property/relation extraction. We are currently looking at machine
learning based methods to improve the performance of entity extraction.
Entity Mention Identiﬁcation. Results for this stage are shown in Table 4.10b.
Since identifying entity mentions requires the protocol’s entity types, we consider how
well this stage performs using both the set of entity types from our annotations and
2

Recall is the fraction of true instances identiﬁed while precision is the fraction of predicted instances
that are correct. F1-score is the harmonic mean of recall and precision.
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Table 4.10.: NLP Document Processing Pipeline Evaluation
(a) Entity Types Extraction

Protocol
UDP
TCP
SCTP
IPv6
IP
GRE
DCCP
Total

Precision Recall I F1
0
0
0
0.75
0.67
0.86
0.73
0.78
0.73
0.86
0.90
0.82
0.65
0.64
0.65
0
0
0
0.94
0.94
0.94
0.75
0.72
0.74

I Instances
4
18
40
20
22
6
18
128

(b) Entity Mention Identiﬁcation

Protocol
UDP
TCP
SCTP
IPv6
IP
GRE
DCCP
Total

Pipeline
Precision
0
0.92
0.57
0.81
0.93
0
0.91
0.73

Entity Types
Recall F1
0
0
0.59
0.72
0.36
0.44
0.75
0.78
0.56
0.69
0
0
0.55
0.69
0.46
0.57

Annotated
Precision
0.33
0.97
0.69
0.94
0.82
1.0
0.87
0.82

Entity
Recall
0.14
0.71
0.43
0.89
0.60
0.81
0.81
0.61

Types
F1
0.20
0.82
0.53
0.92
0.69
0.89
0.84
0.70

Instances

FP Rate

Instances

0.32
0.33
0.21
0.44
0.24
0.36
0.34
0.29

5
12
38
10
8
4
11
88

7
41
240
73
45
21
89
516

(c) Property Extraction

Protocol

Found

UDP
TCP
SCTP
IPv6
IP
GRE
DCCP
Total

1.00
0.92
0.87
0.90
0.88
1.00
1.00
0.91

Linked
(Pipeline
Mentions)
0.0
0.75
0.55
0.90
0.75
0.0
0.92
0.66

Linked
(Annotated
Mentions)
0.80
0.83
0.58
0.90
0.88
1.00
1.00
0.76
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Table 4.11.: Entity Mention Identiﬁcation Baselines
Approach
Overlap ≥ 50%
Overlap ≥ 70%
Overlap ≥ 85%
Overlap ≥ 100%
RB1
RB2
Our Approach

Precision
0.18
0.36
0.55
0.69
0.74
0.69
0.82

Recall
0.75
0.66
0.59
0.49
0.19
0.52
0.61

F1
Correct Refs FP Refs
1800
0.29 387
609
0.47 341
248
0.57 303
115
0.57 252
34
0.30 95
116
0.59 264
201
0.70 315

our extracted entity types from the prior stage. We ﬁnd that this stage performs quite
well, with an overall F1-score of 0.70 when using the annotation entity types. Since the
overwhelming majority of chunks are negative instances (i.e., do not contain an entity
mention), we tune the classiﬁer to strongly penalize false positives, preferring precision
to recall. With our extracted entity types, we observe a decrease in performance across
the board, mostly in recall due to missing entity types. Overall F1-score drops to
0.57; however, this is largely due to UDP and GRE where the prior stage failed to
ﬁnd any entity types. Many of the other protocols have F1-scores around 0.70.
We compare our classiﬁer to six simpler baseline approaches in Table 4.11. The
ﬁrst four baselines are simple string matching systems. Here, we measure the overlap
between an entity type and the current chunk and classify a chunk as a mention if the
overlap is at or above a certain percentage P . The trade-oﬀ in these systems is clear,
the higher P , the higher the precision and the lower the recall. As we reduce P , recall
increases and precision suﬀers. Best results are obtained using a threshold of between
85% and 100%. None of these systems perform nearly as well as our approach, with
the F1-score topping out at 0.57, compared to 0.70 using our approach. Precision is
especially problematic, topping out at 0.69 compared to 0.82 with our approach.
The last two baselines are simple rule-based systems. Here we take the same set of
features used by our classiﬁer and weigh them manually. In baseline RB1 , we weight
each feature by its frequency of occurrence. In other words, for each feature fj we
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calculate prj and nrj . We then give each feature fj a weight of +prj if prj > nrj ,
a weight of −nrj if nrj > prj , and a weight of 0 if prj = nrj . We use a weight of
−nrj for the bias term. In the second baseline RB2 , we weight each feature with +1
if it occurs more often in positive examples and −1 if it occurs more often in negative
examples. In other words, we give each feature fj a weight of +1 if prj > nrj and a
weight of −1 if nrj > prj and a weight of 0 if prj = nrj . We use a weight of −1 for
the bias term. While RB2 performs better than string matching, it stills performs
worse than our classiﬁer. In short, we see value from both our carefully crafted set of
features and our use of an SVM classiﬁer.
Property and Relation Extraction. Results for this stage are shown in Table 4.10c. Our classiﬁer does quite well at identifying properties, ﬁnding 91% of the
properties on average with a 29% false positive rate.3 Note that for this task we
are more concerned with recall, ﬁnding all possible properties, than with precision
because our post-processing step is able to eliminate many incorrect properties by
leveraging domain-speciﬁc knowledge. As a result, incorrect properties are much easier to handle than missing ones. The prior stage made the opposite trade oﬀ because
it is much less likely that a chunk is a mention than that it is not.
Once we have found a property, we need to link it with the relevant entity type.
This is a much harder problem and depends on the entity mentions we identiﬁed in the
previous stage, which depend on the entity types from the stage before. Because of
this, we consider the performance of property linking both with entity mentions from
annotation and with the entity mentions identiﬁed in the prior stage. We observe
a success rate of 76% with the annotation entity mentions, with many protocols
signiﬁcantly above that. This drops to 66% when using identiﬁed entity mentions
from the prior stage. Again, this is partly due to issues with extracting entity types
from UDP and GRE in the entity types extraction stage.
To understand how eﬀective our classiﬁer-based property extraction approach is,
we compare with six simpler baseline approaches in Table 4.12. The ﬁrst four baselines
3

This corresponds to a recall of 0.91 and a precision of 0.71. Our Found/Linked columns are
equivalent to recall while the FP Rate columns are 1 − precision.
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Table 4.12.: Property Extraction Baselines
Approach
Overlap ≥ 50%
Overlap ≥ 70%
Overlap ≥ 85%
Overlap ≥ 100%
RB1
RB2
Our Approach

Found
0.90
0.77
0.72
0.72
0.91
0.94
0.91

FP Rate
0.44
0.16
0.13
0.13
0.79
0.79
0.29

are simple string matching systems. Here, we measure the overlap between property
key phrases and the current chunk and classify a chunk as a property if the overlap
is at or above a certain percentage P . These systems tend to have a high success
rate and low false positive rate, which is good. However, all perform worse than
our approach, with success rates topping out at 77%, compared to 91% with our
approach. In the case of 50% overlap, even though we are able to ﬁnd 90% of the
properties, the false positive rate is considerably higher.
The last two baselines are the same rule-based systems we considered for entity
mention identiﬁcation. They take the same set of features used by our classiﬁer and
weigh them manually. In baseline RB1 we weight each feature by its frequency of
occurrence while in RB2 we weight each feature with +1 if it occurs more often in
positive examples and −1 if it occurs more often in negative examples. While these
systems do better than string matching and have an equivalent or slightly higher
success rate compared to our classiﬁer, the false positive rate is 79%, high enough
to be extremely problematic. In short, we see beneﬁts from using both our carefully
crafted set of features and our SVM classiﬁer, especially when it comes to avoiding
false positives.
For relations, our classiﬁer is able to identify 80% of them with a 31% false positive
rate, as shown in Table 4.13. Interestingly, in many protocols the success rate is 100%,
but the performance on the two protocols with the most relations, TCP and SCTP,
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Table 4.13.: Relation Extraction Evaluation
Protocol
UDP
TCP
SCTP
IPv6
IP
GRE
DCCP
Total

Found
0
0.67
0.71
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.80

Relations
FP Rate Instances
0.41
0
0.35
6
0.23
28
0.45
3
0.24
2
0.37
4
0.35
6
0.31
49

is much lower. This is likely due to an uneven distribution of diﬀerent types of
relations in our documents, with SCTP having the vast majority of field present
relations and TCP having the vast majority of significant relations. Given that
we only have 49 relations in the entire training set, there are not enough relations
in the remaining data to fully train the classiﬁer. For our fuzzing case study with
TCP, we ﬁnd that the vast majority of improvements comes from properties, with
even annotated relations providing no signiﬁcant improvements. Therefore, we do
not consider relations further here.
Summary. Overall, we have seen that our document processing pipeline is eﬀective at extracting entity types, entity mentions, and properties from natural language
speciﬁcation documents. We ﬁnd that our entity types extraction achieves an impressive F1-score of 0.74 despite poor performance on UDP and GRE. Our entity mention
identiﬁcation achieves an F1-score of 0.70 while our property and relation extraction
identiﬁes 91% of all properties in the document and links 76% of them.

Fuzzer Evaluation
We now evaluate how eﬀectively the entity types and properties extracted by our
NLP pipeline can be used to test real protocol implementations for attacks. We
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seek to understand: (1) How much beneﬁt does a protocol grammar description,
either automatically extracted or manually created, provide over just blindly fuzzing
the protocol? and (2) How eﬀective is testing based on our automatically extracted
protocol grammar compared to testing that uses manually deﬁned descriptions?
Fuzzer conﬁgurations. We use SNAKE and concentrate on a single protocol,
TCP [34], and a single implementation, Linux 3.0.0 in Ubuntu 11.10. We compare
three diﬀerent testing conﬁgurations: Random, Manual, and NLP-based.
Random. This is the simplest baseline and uses SNAKE conﬁgured with no information about the protocol grammar. It generates tests that randomly replace a
random number of the ﬁrst 20 bytes of packets with random data. We only modify
the ﬁrst 20 bytes to approximate the length of a typical transport protocol header.
Note that in any given test the same bytes in all packets are modiﬁed. Attack injection is on every packet sent. We generate 1,000 test strategies in this manner to
compare with our other testing conﬁgurations.
Manual. This conﬁguration uses SNAKE with a manually created protocol grammar as discussed earlier in Section 4.2. Note that we do not use the connection-level
state machine in this testing, to better compare with our NLP-based conﬁguration
that also lacks a state machine. For each packet type, test strategies are created to
inject new messages, modify all packet ﬁelds, and apply all delivery actions to those
packets. For modifying packet ﬁelds, tests modify ﬁelds based on their size. During
each test, all packets of a particular type are modiﬁed, and attack injection is on
every packet.
NLP-based. This conﬁguration uses SNAKE but conﬁgured with our automatically extracted protocol grammar, derived from extracted entity types and properties.
This conﬁguration generates a similar set of tests that injects new packets, modiﬁes
the delivery of packets, or overwrites a single ﬁeld in packets during each test. During
each test, all packets of a particular type are modiﬁed, and attack injection is on every packet. For each packet type, test strategies are created to inject new messages,
modify all packet ﬁelds, and apply all delivery actions to those packets. This conﬁgu-
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ration has more information about packet ﬁelds available to it, thanks to our pipeline.
We leverage this information to apply better ﬁeld modiﬁcations, as discussed in Section 4.5.3. For example, from the deﬁnition of checksums and protocol ports, we
expect that tampering with them will result in modiﬁed packets simply being thrown
away. Thus, we apply only a single modiﬁcation—to conﬁrm expected behavior—to
ﬁelds that are identiﬁed as checksums or ports (via the checksum or port properties).
We anticipate this resulting in similarly eﬀective testing with a reduced number of
strategies.
Metrics. We use the number of test strategies generated to measure the amount
of eﬀort required to test an implementation. We measure coverage as the number of
unique packet type traces observed. A packet type trace records the order in which
diﬀerent types of packets are observed in a TCP ﬂow. Thus, a packet type trace
succinctly summarizes a protocol connection and approximates the path traversed
through the code. To eﬀectively test a protocol, as many distinct connections, or
code paths, as possible should be explored, hence unique packet type traces.4 Ideally,
we want to expend a small amount of eﬀort while achieving high coverage.
The number of attacks identiﬁed indicates how many test strategies were reported
by the testing conﬁguration as attacks. Unfortunately, many of these attacks are
on-path attacks which are not interesting since TCP does not attempt to provide
protection against these attacks. Removing these on-path attacks leaves us with
the interesting endpoint or blind attacks, which we refer to as interesting attacks.
Note that many strategies may exercise the same underlying root vulnerability, so we
perform a manual analysis of all reported attack strategies to identify the number of
unique attacks actually identiﬁed.
The results from running all three of our testing conﬁgurations can be found in
Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16.
Random Testing vs Grammar-based Fuzzing. Table 4.14 compares coverage, in terms of unique packet type traces, achieved by all three conﬁgurations.
4

Note that we record packets prior to any possible modiﬁcation to avoid counting traces where the
only diﬀerent packet is one that was intentionally modiﬁed.
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Table 4.14.: Coverage Evaluation
Unique Packet Type Traces Total Strategies
1000
13
Random
901
784
Manual
819
NLP-based 713

Table 4.15.: Attack Discovery Results

I

Reported Attacks
996
Random
219
Manual
NLP-based 220

I

Interesting Attacks Unique Attacks
0
0
5
63
5
69

Table 4.16.: Attacks Discovered
Attack
CLOSE WAIT Exhaustion
Reset Attack [13]
SYN-Reset Attack [3]
FIN-injection Attack [3]
Packets with Invalid Flags

Man
X
X
X
X
X

NLP
X
X
X
X
X

We observe that the manual and NLP-based conﬁgurations achieve similar coverage,
around 700 unique traces, while random achieves only 13 traces. To achieve this
coverage, all three conﬁgurations required about 1,000 strategies. Since the number
of strategies is directly equivalent to the amount of eﬀort required for testing, we can
say that random fuzzing is signiﬁcantly less eﬃcient than grammar-based fuzzing.
This occurs primarily because in the random test conﬁguration all packet manipulation strategies stall the connection. This is because modifying the packet corrupts
the TCP checksum, resulting in the packet being thrown away at the receiver. In
order to correct this, the fuzzer would need to know the exact location of the checksum in the packet, which is exactly the information provided by a protocol grammar.
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Similarly, all packet delivery strategies in the random test conﬁguration stall the connection because they drop or delay key packets like the TCP SYN. In order to work
around this, the fuzzer would need to know the type of each packet, which is also
supplied by a protocol grammar. All of these connection stalls generate similar traces
and traverse similar code paths, resulting in very poor coverage.
In addition to very poor coverage, Table 4.15 indicates that the random test
conﬁguration also generates a lot of reported attacks, but none of them are interesting.
This is because each of the connection stalls mentioned above is reported as an attack
on availability. Unfortunately, these are on-path attacks and so are not relevant for
TCP.
NLP-based vs Manual Conﬁgurations. We ﬁrst consider testing coverage,
shown in Table 4.14, and conﬁrm that, thanks to the additional properties provided
by our document processing pipeline, the NLP-based conﬁguration generates fewer
strategies than the manual conﬁguration. This results in a reduction in the amount
of time and eﬀort required for testing. This does result in slightly lower coverage, but
only by about 70 traces.
We also consider the attacks that are reported by both testing conﬁgurations,
shown in Table 4.15. We ﬁnd that our NLP-based testing system reports one more
attack than our manual testing system and that more of those it reports are interesting. Further, we ﬁnd that both our manual conﬁguration and our NLP-based
conﬁguration discover the same set of ﬁve attacks, as conﬁrmed by Table 4.16. None
of these attacks are new, although one was initially discovered by SNAKE (see Section 4.4). However, they all have serious impacts on TCP connections, ranging from
denial of service to server ﬁngerprinting [3, 13].
Summary. Overall, we ﬁnd that grammar-based fuzzing, like SNAKE, provides
signiﬁcant beneﬁts in terms of eﬃciency and ability to ﬁnd attacks and that our
automatically generated protocol grammars are as eﬀective in identifying attacks as
manually created grammars while enabling improved eﬃciency. In addition, our NLP
document processing pipeline enables completely automated testing.

85
4.6 Summary
Transport layer networking protocols form an important part of the Internet, yet,
to date, their testing has been mostly manual and ad-hoc. This has resulted in a
stream of vulnerabilities stretching back to the 1980’s. To help remedy this situation, we present SNAKE, a tool to allow systematic testing of unmodiﬁed transport
protocol implementations, utilizing the protocol’s connection state machine to reduce
the search space. We demonstrate SNAKE by testing 2 diﬀerent protocols, TCP
and DCCP, and 5 implementations, including both open-source and closed-source
systems. We found 9 classes of attacks, 5 of which we believe to be unknown in the
literature. To do this testing, SNAKE requires a description of each protocol and its
connection-level state machine.
We then design and build an NLP pipeline to extract these protocol descriptions,
or grammars, from natural language speciﬁcation documents automatically. Our NLP
pipeline extracts protocol entity types—or packet ﬁelds—, properties, and relations
from natural language network protocol RFCs using a zero-shot learning approach.
We evaluate our ability to extract protocol grammars on a corpus of 7 protocol speciﬁcation documents and achieve an F1-score of 0.74 for extracting entity types and
a success rate of 76% at ﬁnding and linking properties. We further demonstrate the
value of our approach by applying it to SNAKE and comparing it to using a manual
grammar. We ﬁnd a reduction in the testing eﬀort (from 901 to 819 test cases) while
identifying the same set of attacks and doing so in a fully automated manner. We
believe that SNAKE and our NLP pipeline can contribute to securing the transport
layer of modern network stacks.
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5 AUTOMATED ATTACK DISCOVERY FOR TCP CONGESTION CONTROL
In the previous chapter, we introduced SNAKE, a system to automatically ﬁnd performance and availability attacks on transport protocols. While SNAKE allows us to
ﬁnd many attacks on transport protocols, it has important limitations. In particular,
the techniques that SNAKE uses to broadly ﬁnd a huge range of attacks on a variety
of transport protocols are ineﬀective for ﬁnding complex and highly dynamic attacks
on complicated guarantees like congestion control that may operate very diﬀerently
between protocols. In this chapter, we investigate how to automatically ﬁnd attacks
on one of these more complicated guarantees, congestion control, for a particular
transport protocol, TCP.

5.1 Introduction
TCP is the protocol that underlies most of the Internet traﬃc including encrypted
traﬃc via TLS and HTTPS. In addition to reliable and in-order data delivery, TCP
has two critical goals – eﬃcient delivery based on network conditions and fairness with
respect to other TCP ﬂows in the network. These two goals are achieved by using
congestion control mechanisms that cause a sender to adapt its sending rate to the
current network conditions (e.g., network congestion) or to the receiver’s processing
resources (e.g., a slow receiver). Without congestion control, the network can enter a
condition where the majority of sent data is eventually dropped, known as congestion
collapse; such a collapse occurred on the Internet in 1986, causing throughput to drop
by a factor of a thousand [93].
TCP congestion control relies on acknowledgement packets from the receiver to
explicitly provide the sender with correct information about the number of data bytes
received (and implicitly about the real network conditions). However, TCP does not
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have any cryptographic mechanisms to ensure authentication and integrity of sent
packets, including acknowledgments. Application-layer secure protocols such as TLS
provide no protection for TCP headers or TCP control messages, and network-layer
secure protocols such as IPsec [94] require separate infrastructure and protect only
up to the tunnel termination point. Thus, an attacker that can intercept acknowledgment packets can modify them without being detected by the intended recipient, who
will blindly trust the information they provide. TCP has a protection mechanism
against packet injection in the form of a sequence number included on each packet.
However, numerous attacks demonstrate that this protection mechanism can be bypassed by blind attackers performing TCP sequence guessing [95–98] or by oﬀ-path
or on-path attackers that can observe the target stream. Thus, an attacker can also
inject well-crafted acknowledgment packets into a TCP stream without detection. By
creating such crafted acknowledgments that propagate malicious information about
the data received, an attacker can manipulate TCP congestion control into sending
data at rates that beneﬁt the attacker. For example, by creating an acknowledgement
that acknowledges data packets prior to receiving them and injecting it into a target
stream, an adversarial TCP receiver can persuade the sender to increase its sending
rate beyond the rate prescribed by correct congestion control, possibly forcing the
network into congestion collapse [11].
Several manipulation attacks against TCP congestion control have been discovered; some of these attacks use external data ﬂows to create the impression of congestion [8, 9] and others use acknowledgement packets to directly mislead the congestion
control mechanisms [3, 11, 99, 100]. These attacks are more subtle and diﬃcult to
detect than traditional crash or control-hijacking attacks. Acknowledgement-based
attacks, in particular, do not raise suspicions as long as the packets are consistent with
the receiver’s state (unlike data that might not assemble properly at the application
level). We focus on attacks against congestion control created through maliciously
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crafted acknowledgement packets (by fabrication of new ones or modiﬁcation of existing ones) and refer to them as manipulation attacks.1
Previous work on attacks against TCP congestion control relied mainly on manual
analysis. The only work we are aware of that used automation for ﬁnding attacks in
TCP congestion control implementations is the work in [5] which relies on the user to
provide a vulnerable line of code and then performs static analysis. The vulnerable
line of code from the user is critical to ensure the scalability of the approach. In addition, the method is restricted to a speciﬁc implementation, language, and operating
system.
In this chapter, we aim to automatically discover manipulation attacks on congestion control without requiring the user to provide any vulnerable line of code and
without being dependent on speciﬁc implementation, language, or operating system
characteristics. Protocol fuzzing [6, 15, 101] is a well-known approach where packet
contents are either randomly generated and injected into the network or randomly
mutated in-transit. However, without explicit guidance, given a vast input space,
fuzzing fails to concentrate on relevant portions of the source code (i.e., for inducing
protocol-compliant behaviors).
Our previous work on testing transport protocols, SNAKE (see Chapter 4), used
the protocol’s connection state machine to guide the fuzzing process and prune unnecessary executions. However, unlike the attacks SNAKE ﬁnds, which usually consist
of one action, attacks against congestion control require a potentially long sequence
of actions spanning several states and transitions, where each action might trigger
a new state, which in turn might require a diﬀerent attack action. Automatically
discovering these combinations at runtime is not practical for scalability reasons. For
example, using SNAKE’s approach for congestion control would require a search space
of about 1.2 × 1024 cases, assuming only 5 types with 4 parameter choices for creating the malicious acknowledgements and 4 possible states for injecting them. Even
1
Note that attackers can also create the impression of network congestion without manipulating the
acknowledgement packets but by using external data ﬂows [8, 9]. We consider such attacks out of
scope for this chapter.
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limiting this to test at most one manipulation at a time in each state would generate
194,480 cases, which is still impractical for testing in a real network.
To address this scalability challenge while still guaranteeing that we test relevant
portions of the code, we use model-based testing (MBT) [102], an approach that
generates eﬀective test cases based on a model of the program. The approach uses
a model, an abstract representation of the desired behavior of the program that is
typically derived from speciﬁcations, to derive functional tests. These functional tests
contain the same level of abstraction as the model, and are converted to concrete test
cases to be tested against the implementation. MBT does not require the source code
and guides the testing to concentrate only on relevant portions of the source code.
Our approach. We propose to automatically ﬁnd manipulation attacks by guiding a protocol fuzzer with concrete attack actions derived from abstract attack strategies, which are obtained using a model-guided technique inspired by model-based testing. Our model is a ﬁnite state machine (FSM) that captures the main functionality of
several types of congestion control algorithms used by deployed TCP implementations
and is constructed from RFC speciﬁcations. We use this abstract model to generate abstract attack strategies by exploring the diﬀerent paths in the FSM that modify
state variables controlling throughput, and thus can be leveraged to mount an attack.
We then map these abstract strategies to concrete attack strategies that correspond
to real attacker capabilities; a concrete strategy consists of acknowledgment-packetlevel actions with precise information about how the packets should be crafted and the
congestion control states in which these actions should be performed. Our approach
provides maximum coverage of the model of congestion control while generating an
optimum number of abstract strategies. The number of concrete attack strategies is
bounded by the number of malicious actions that describe an attacker’s capabilities.
We consider oﬀ-path attackers and on-path attackers; both can sniﬀ traﬃc and obtain TCP sequence numbers and data that has been acknowledged or sent. However,
there is one fundamental diﬀerence, an oﬀ-path attacker can only inject malicious
acknowledgements, but cannot prevent the correct ones from reaching the receiver;
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an on-path attacker can modify acknowledgements such that the victim sees only
acknowledgments from the attacker.
We created and implemented a platform, TCPwn, to create and inject concrete
attack scenarios. The platform combines virtualization (to run diﬀerent implementations in their native environment), proxy-based attack injection, and runtime congestion control state machine tracking (to inject the attacks at the right time during
execution). Our state machine tracking at runtime does not require instrumenting the
code. Speciﬁcally, we use a general congestion control state machine (e.g., TCP New
Reno) and infer the current state of the sender by monitoring the network packets
exchanged during fuzzing. While this option is less accurate than extracting the state
machine from an implementation’s code, it is less complex and more general.
Our model-based attack generation ﬁnds 21 abstract strategies that are mapped
into 564 (for on-path attackers) and 753 (for oﬀ-path attackers) concrete strategies.
Each strategy can be tested independently and takes between 15 and 60 seconds. We
evaluated 5 TCP implementations from 4 Linux distributions and Windows 8.1, all
using congestion control mechanisms that can be modeled as the ﬁnite state machine
we used to generate abstract strategies. Overall, we found 11 classes of attacks, of
which 8 were previously unknown.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We describe our attacker model
in Section 5.2. We provide details on the design of our system in Section 5.3 and
describe our implementation in Section 5.4. We present our results in Section 5.5 and
then summarize this chapter in Section 5.6.

5.2 TCPwn Attack Model
In this section we discuss the attacker capabilities and congestion control attacks
that we consider in this chapter.
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5.2.1 Attacker and Attack Goals
A typical attacker might be a botnet trying to enhance the power of a DDoS attack
by using increased throughput attacks to render TCP ﬂows insensitive to congestion.
This gives the attacker the power of a UDP ﬂood with the ubiquity of TCP traﬃc;
perfect for the coremelt attack [103]. Alternately, a nation-state actor could launch
decreasing throughput attacks to discourage or prevent use of certain undesirable
services.
Decreasing Throughput. In this case, the attacker manipulates the congestion
control algorithm of a target connection such that it falsely detects congestion, resulting in a rate reduction. This rate reduction can have signiﬁcant impact at the
application level, especially for inelastic data streams like streaming video.
Example. Consider the Blind Throughput Reduction Attack [3]. In this attack, the
attacker sends spoofed invalid acknowledgements to the target connection’s receiver,
which cause the receiver to send duplicate acknowledgements to the sender. These
duplicate acknowledgements, when received in the Congestion Avoidance or Slow
Start states, mislead the sender about the existence of lost packets and the level of
congestion in the network, causing the sender to transition to the Fast Recovery state
and slow down (see Figure 5.1). The sender will continue to slow down as long as the
attacker emits its spoofed acknowledgements.
Increasing Throughput. In this case, the attacker manipulates the congestion
control algorithm such that it perceives signiﬁcant available bandwidth along with
low latency and loss. As a result, the sender rapidly increases its sending rate beyond
what is fair to competing connections. Any actual congestion in the network will not
be observed, which may be used to damage or deny service to target links or to other
connections sharing the same links.
Example. Consider the Optimstic Ack Attack [11]. In this attack, the receiver
repeatedly sends acknowledgements for data that has not actually been received yet
in order to dramatically increase its sending rate and render the sender insensitive
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to actual congestion in the network. Acknowledging data not yet received in the
Congestion Avoidance, Slow Start, or Fast Recovery states misleads the sender about
the data that has been received and the RTT of the connection. As a result, the sender
does not react to actual congestion in the network and is unfair to any competing
connections.
Target Flows. Any TCP ﬂow that sends more than an initial window (10 packets,
about 15KB) of data is vulnerable to these attacks. We focus on bulk data transfers
because they result in the widest array of attacks, are easiest to automate, and easiest
to explain; however, these attacks are not restricted to such ﬂows. Short transfers,
like web pages, are also vulnerable to attacks on congestion control, and ﬂows with a
limited bitrate, like streaming video, are vulnerable to decreasing throughput attacks.
Interactive ﬂows are vulnerable if their sending rate is limited by congestion control
and not by the availability of data from the application.

5.2.2 Attack, Strategy, Action
Congestion control constrains the sender’s data-transfer rate, primarily through
acknowledgements. Thus, we consider attacks conducted through acknowledgement
packets.
Congestion control manipulation attacks. These are attacks conducted by manipulation of TCP acknowledgements in order to mislead congestion control about
current network conditions and cause it to set an incorrect sending rate. They can
result in either increasing or decreasing the throughput, and sometimes in connection
stall. In order to achieve the high-level goals of manipulating congestion control, an
attacker applies an attack strategy.
Attack strategy. Given a TCP stream, where a sender sends data to a receiver,
we deﬁne a concrete attack strategy as a sequence of acknowledgment-based malicious actions and the corresponding sender states (as described in Figure 2.3 and
Section 2.1.1) where each action is performed.
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Malicious actions. A malicious action itself requires an attacker to (1) craft acknowledgements by leveraging protocol semantics to mislead congestion control, (2)
infer the state at the sender, and (3) inject the malicious acknowledgment on the
path and in the target stream. For example, a malicious action can be to craft an acknowledgment that acknowledges data not yet received and inject it when the sender
is assumed to be in Congestion Avoidance.
Crafting malicious acknowledgements. TCP does not use any cryptographic mechanisms to ensure authentication and integrity of packets; thus, an attacker can fabricate packets or modify intercepted ones to have a malicious payload. In order to
intercept, the attacker will need to be on the path. Moreover, these crafted acknowledgements are semantic-aware, that is, the attacker is aware of the meaning of the
bytes acknowledged. For example, in the example above, an attacker will need to
know the highest byte of data that was acknowledged in order to acknowledge data
that has not been received yet.
Inferring the state machine at the sender. We assume that the attacker can observe
the network traﬃc but does not have access to implementation source code and thus
cannot instrument the implementation.
Injecting malicious acknowledgments. This requires an attacker to spoof packets
and have knowledge of the TCP sequence number, the only protection TCP has
against injection. We do not consider blind attackers here, since, while they can
inject spoofed packets into the network, they have no knowledge of sequence numbers
or data being acknowledged and thus are restricted to guessing this information. We
distinguish between oﬀ-path and on-path attackers. An oﬀ-path attacker can observe
packets in the target connection or link and inject spoofed packets. For example he
can sniﬀ traﬃc on the client’s local network — e.g., coﬀee house Wi-Fi. An on-path
attacker can intercept, modify, and control delivery of legitimate packets in some
target connection or link, as well as inject new spoofed packets. For example, such
an attacker can be a switch on the path between client and server.
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New ACKs

Figure 5.1.: New Reno congestion control and the Optimistic Ack attack. Transitions
in blue increase throughput while those in red decrease throughput.

5.3 Design
In this section we describe the design of TCPwn, our automated platform for
ﬁnding attacks on congestion control. We ﬁrst provide a high-level overview, then
discuss our model-guided attack strategy generation and congestion control protocol
state tracking.

5.3.1 Overview
We motivate our approach with the Optimistic Ack Attack [11]. Consider its
interactions with the congestion control state machine as shown in Figure 5.1. In order
to be successful, the attacker must inject packets with an acknowledgement number
above the real cumulative acknowledgment number and below the highest sequence
number that the sender has sent, and it has to do this in either the Congestion
Avoidance, Slow Start, or Fast Recovery states. Each time the sender receives one of
these new acknowledgements in those states, it causes a self-loop transition (in blue
in Figure 5.1), increasing the congestion window cwnd, which directly controls the
sending rate.
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Figure 5.2.: Design of TCPwn

Finding all these transitions (i.e., that impact the sending rate at runtime) is
challenging because of the large search space. We address this challenge by using a
model-based attack strategy generation algorithm that ﬁnds all possible attack strategies in a model of congestion control (shown in Figure 2.3). We refer to these as
abstract strategies. To test them in real implementations, we translate them to concrete attack strategies, obtained by mapping the abstract strategies to attack actions
corresponding to attacker capabilities and consisting of speciﬁc content for a malicious packet and the state in which it will be injected. An attack injector takes these
concrete packet-based attack strategies and injects them in our testing environment
during an actual execution of the target implementation. Our attack injector requires
information about the current congestion control state of the sender. A state tracker
determines this current protocol state so that actions can be performed as speciﬁed
by the strategy. After the execution of each attack, our system collects logs that
capture performance metric(s). By comparing the resulting performance with the
expected baseline performance, TCPwn identiﬁes whether the strategy indeed leads
to a successful attack. Figure 5.2 shows the conceptual design of our system.
Testing strategies with real implementations provides strong soundness properties
since any strategy that TCPwn identiﬁes as an attack caused noticeable performance
changes in a real TCP connection of the implementation under test. This prevents
most classes of false positives, except tests with performance outside of the considered
normal range (> 2 standard deviations from average). Our completeness is limited
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by the accuracy of the congestion control model and state tracking. Here, we choose
to trade oﬀ some completeness for the ability to test many implementations and use
a generalized congestion control model and inferred state tracking.
Example for TCPwn attack generation. We demonstrate this attack strategy
generation approach using the same Optimistic Ack Attack example as above, where
the attacker’s goal is to increase the sending rate; this can also be expressed as an
increase in the sender’s cwnd variable. Our abstract strategy generator identiﬁes each
of the paths in the FSM (Figure 2.3) containing at least one transition that increments

P: SlowStart → FastRecovery → CongestionAvoidance



the cwnd variable. One of the identiﬁed paths (say, P) looks as follows:

where the self-loop in CongestionAvoidance increments cwnd (see Figure 2.3). An
abstract strategy S is a projection on the condition of each transition along P and is
represented as the following sequence of (state, condition) pairs:
(In: SlowStart, Condition: ACK && Dup && dupACKctr≥3)
(In: FastRecovery, Condition: ACK && New && pkt.ack ≥ high - water)
(In: CongestionAvoidance, Condition: ACK && New)+

This strategy S dictates that when the sender is in SlowStart and is sending data to
the receiver, the attacker can send 3 duplicate ACKs to the sender so that it moves to
FastRecovery. Next the attacker can send the sender 1 new ACK (that acknowledges
all the outstanding data). As a result, the sender moves to CongestionAvoidance,
and the attacker can keep on sending new ACKs that optimistically acknowledge all
outstanding data even if the receiver has not received it yet. + (the superscript)
signiﬁes that the attacker can apply this segment of S repeatedly.
TCPwn maps S to several concrete strategies that can be directly tested inside
the testing environment running the given implementation. TCPwn relies on a map
which associates the abstract network conditions to concrete basic actions. For S,
TCPwn generates 72 concrete strategies, based on actions mimicking both oﬀ-path
and on-path attackers. One such concrete strategy is:
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(In: SlowStart, Action: 3 × Inject Dup-Ack)
(In: FastRecovery, Action: Inject Pre-Ack)
(In: CongestionAvoidance, Action: Inject Pre-Ack)+

This concrete strategy dictates that when the sender is in SlowStart, the attacker
can use the Dup-Ack basic action to inject 3 duplicate ACKs. Similarly, for acknowledging all the outstanding data in the next step, the attacker can use the Pre-Ack
basic action. Once the sender is in CongestionAvoidance, the attacker can repeatedly
apply Pre-Ack. We will describe all supported basic actions in Section 5.3.3.

5.3.2 Abstract Strategy Generation
We now describe in detail the core of our approach. We observe that a successful
attack will (1) trigger a transition that causes an increase or decrease in the congestion
window cwnd and (2) traverses a cycle in the congestion control state machine.
Changes to cwnd. The congestion window, cwnd, adjusts the sending rate of
TCP to avoid congestion collapse and provide fairness.2 This variable controls the
amount of data allowed in the network at any given time, which directly corresponds
to TCP’s allowed sending rate. As a result, any attack on congestion control will
have to impact this variable to have any impact on the network traﬃc. There may
be attacks on TCP that do not manipulate this variable, but these are not attacks
on TCP’s congestion control.
Further, congestion control modiﬁes cwnd frequently during the course of its normal operation. These modiﬁcations are done on many transitions of the congestion
control state machine and either increase or decrease cwnd depending on the transition. As a result, an attacker can increase or decrease cwnd, and therefore TCP’s
2

This is true for all congestion control algorithms except Google’s new BBR [104] congestion control.
This includes Reno [35], New Reno [36], CUBIC [42], Compound TCP [105], and Vegas [106], among
others. However, BBR does maintain a variable containing the explicitly computed allowed sending
rate, which has similar properties for our purposes. As BBR’s public release was concurrent with
this work, we do not consider it further here.
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sending rate, merely by inducing TCP to follow speciﬁc normal transitions in the
congestion control state machine.
State Machine Cycles. Successful congestion control attacks traverse a cycle in
the congestion control state machine. This is due to the highly dynamic and cyclical
nature of congestion control where a sender often traverses the same set of states
many times over the course of a connection and multiple state transitions in a single
second are common. As a result, the impact on cwnd from a single transition is
quickly diminished by other transitions. For an attack to be eﬀective and achieve
measurable, lasting impact, an attacker has to frequently induce TCP to follow some
desirable transition. Such a series of desirable transitions will form either a cycle or a
unique path in the state machine. Given the relatively small size (under 10 states) of
the congestion control state machine and the frequency of state transitions, anything
but the shortest connections would require a cycle to achieve a suﬃciently long series
of desirable transitions.
Note that these characteristics are necessary but not suﬃcient for an attack on
congestion control. For instance a cycle may contain two manipulations to cwnd that
balance each other out, or a cycle may not be triggerable by the attacker.
Our abstract strategy generator takes as input an FSM model of congestion control
and a description of the desirable transitions. In our case, a desirable transition is
one that modiﬁes cwnd. It outputs a list of all paths with cycles that contain a
desirable transition and can therefore be used by an attacker to achieve his goal.
This list includes the transitions in each path as well as the conditions that cause
each transition. We use a modiﬁed depth-ﬁrst traversal to enumerate all paths in the
FSM. We formally deﬁne the abstract strategy generation problem and our algorithm
below.
State Machine Model. We deﬁne a model M describing the state machine of
the congestion control algorithm as a tuple (S, N , V, C, A, σ, T ). S is a ﬁnite set of
states {s0 , . . . , sn }, and the initial state is σ ∈ S. N represents a ﬁnite set of network
events (e.g., ACK signiﬁes the reception of a TCP acknowledgment). V is a ﬁnite
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set of variables including both some ﬁelds of a received packet and some program
variables. For instance, New means the received ACK acknowledges some new data
and cwnd indicates the program variable that represents congestion window size. C
represents a ﬁnite set of conditional statements such that each element c ∈ C is a
quantiﬁer-free ﬁrst order logic (QF-FOL) formula [107] over V (e.g., dupAckCtr < 2).
A represents a ﬁnite set of assignment statements (i.e., protocol actions) over a subset
of V (e.g., “cwnd = 1” means the congestion window is set to 1). In addition, N ,
V, C, and A are pairwise disjoint. T represents the transition relations such that
T ⊆ S × N × C × 2A × S.
Let ψ : T 7→ S and ξ : T 7→ S be two maps indicating the source and target of
a transition. For example, if a transition t ∈ T begins at sb and ends at se , then
ψ(t) = sb and ξ(t) = se . Let λ : T 7→ N × C and ℵ : T 7→ P(A) be two maps to
indicate the triggering conditions and the set of actions of a transition, respectively.
Now we deﬁne a path as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.3.1 Path: A path P in M is a sequence of pairs of states and transitions h(si0 , tj0 ), (si1 , tj1 ), . . . , (sik , tjk )i, where k ≥ 0; each six ∈ S for 0 ≤ x ≤ k
and si0 = σ (the initial state); ∀y [tjy ∈ T ∧ ψ(tjy ) = siy ∧ ξ(tjy ) = si(y+1) ] where
0 ≤ y ≤ k − 1; tjk ∈ {T , ⊥} and [ψ(tjk ) = sik ∧ ξ(tjk ) ∈ {S, ⊥}]. In addition,
6 sis ∧ tjr 6= tjs ], where r, s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}.
∀r, s[r =
6 s → sir =
In other words, a path P starts at σ and moves to the state si1 by taking the
transition tj0 . By following the sequence, P ﬁnally reaches at sik . The last segment
of P (i.e., (sik , tjk )) is special as it determines the existence of a cycle. If P contains
a cycle, then [tjk 6= ⊥ ∧ tjk ∈ T ] and ∃z[ξ(tik ) = siz ], where z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}. When
P has no cycle, tjk = ⊥ and ξ(tjk ) = ⊥.
Deﬁnition 5.3.2 Vulnerable path: Given a vulnerable action α ∈ A, a path P in
M is a vulnerable path if P has a segment (six , tjx ) such that α ∈ ℵ(tjx ), where
x ∈ {0, . . . , k} and k ≥ 0.
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Deﬁnition 5.3.3 Abstract strategy: Given a vulnerable path P in M such that P =
h(si0 , tj0 ), . . . , (sik , tjk )i for some k ≥ 0, the corresponding abstract strategy S is
deﬁned as h(si0 , λ(tj0 )), (si1 , λ(tj1 )), . . . , (sik , λ(tjk ))i, where λ(tjx ) ∈ (N × C) if tjx ∈
T or λ(tjx ) = ⊥ if tjx = ⊥ for each 0 ≤ x ≤ k.
Abstract Strategy Generator. Given M, a directed multigraph 3 with cycles,
and the attacker’s goal α ∈ A, the Abstract Strategy Generator aims to ﬁnd all
the vulnerable paths in M with respect to α. We devise the algorithm shown in
Algorithm 2, which begins the search from the function VulnerablePathFinder.
Intuitively, the algorithm traverses the entire graph in a depth-ﬁrst fashion, starting
at the initial state σ ∈ S. For each transition t ∈ T such that ψ(t) = σ, the algorithm
initializes a new path P , appends (σ, t) to P , and recursively continues its exploration
of the subgraph rooted at ξ(t). For P , the recursion stops when it encounters a cycle
(line 13) or a terminating state (line 15). If any of these stop conditions is met,
the algorithm checks if P is a vulnerable path with respect to α; if so, it adds P to
the set of the vulnerable paths (line 20). Unlike traditional depth-ﬁrst traversal, the
algorithm restores the subgraph rooted at ξ(t) by marking it unvisited (line 28) in
order to ﬁnd all possible vulnerable paths w.r.t. α. Upon termination, the algorithm
returns the set of vulnerable paths w.r.t. α (line 10) identiﬁed during the exploration.
This set of vulnerable paths contain our abstract strategies. We generate our abstract
strategies {S} by taking projections on the conditions of the transitions along each
path.

5.3.3 Concrete Strategy Generation
An abstract strategy just speciﬁes a path in the FSM that can lead to an attack.
However, there are usually several ways in which this path can be concretely achieved
at runtime. Concrete strategy generation takes our abstract strategies and converts
3

A multigraph permits multiple edges between a pair of vertices
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Algorithm 2: TCPwn Abstract Strategy Generator
Input: Multigraph M = (S, N , V, C, A, σ, T ), ψ, ξ, λ, ℵ and a vulnerable action
α∈A
Output: All vulnerable paths with respect to α
1

V ulnerableP aths := ∅

2

Function VulnerablePathFinder(M, α)
root := σ
Mark root as visited
foreach transition t such that ψ(t) = root do
Create a new path P
P := P k(root, t)
/* concatenating */
v := ξ(t)
RecursiveSearch(v, P, α)

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15

/* to store vulnerable paths */

return V ulnerableP aths
Function RecursiveSearch(v, P, α)
base case := false
if v is already visited then
base case := true

/* reached a cycle */

else if exists no t such that ψ(t) = v then
/* v is a terminating state */

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

base case := true
P := P k(v, ⊥)

/* concatenating */

if base case is true then
if P is a vulnerable path w.r.t. α then
V ulnerableP aths := V ulnerableP aths ∪ P
else
Mark v as visited
foreach transition t such that ψ(t) = v do
v 0 := ξ(t)
/* creating a copy */
P 0 := P
0
/* concatenating */
P := P k(v , t)
RecursiveSearch(v 0 , P 0 , α)
Mark v as unvisited
return
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them into sets of basic message-based actions that can be applied by our attack
injector in particular states of the FSM.
Our concrete strategy generator considers each abstract strategy individually and
iterates through each transition in that strategy. Each of these network conditions is
mapped to a basic action that the attacker can directly utilize to trigger that network
condition in that state. This results in a set of (state, action) pairs which we call a
concrete strategy. A transition condition may be triggered by multiple basic actions,
in which case this mapping results in a set of basic actions that could be applied in
that state to cause the next transition. Our generator creates one concrete strategy
for each combination of actions from these sets. Note that we require a domain
expert to provide the mapping of network conditions to basic actions since it relies on
domain knowledge. This mapping only needs to be updated when the state machine
model changes or new actions are added; generating concrete actions for a given
implementation is completely automated.
We developed our set of basic actions based on an extensive study of TCP and
known congestion control attacks. We also sought to restrict the information required
by our attack injector primarily to message format and current congestion control
state information, for practicality. We consider two categories: injection of acknowledgements, which captures the capabilities of an oﬀ-path attacker, and modiﬁcation
of acknowledgements, which captures the capabilities of an on-path attacker.
Injection of acknowledgements (oﬀ-path attacker). This type of action
injects new spoofed acknowledgement packets for either the client or server of a target
connection. Since congestion control algorithms usually rely on acknowledgements to
indicate lost packets and to gradually increase the sending rate, injecting additional
acknowledgements may cause signiﬁcant issues for congestion control at fairly low
cost to an attacker. This type of action parallels the capabilities of oﬀ-path attackers.
We support a number of diﬀerent ways of injecting acknowledgements:
(1) Duplicate Acknowledgements (param: dup - no, delay, oﬀset) — Injecting many
acknowledgements with the same acknowledgement number as an apparent set of du-
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plicate acknowledgements. This enables an oﬀ-path attacker to slow down a connection. This action assumes that target connection’s sequence and acknowledgement
numbers are known or can be guessed. Parameters control the number of duplicates
injected (2, 10, 1000), the spacing between these duplicates (1ms), and oﬀset from
the current acknowledgement number (0, 3000, 90000).
(2) Oﬀset Acknowledgements (param: num, delay, data, oﬀset) – Injecting a series
of acknowledgements with an acknowledgement number oﬀset from the legitimate acknowledgement number. Acknowledges either less or more data than is acknowledged
by the receiver. This action assumes that target connection’s sequence and acknowledgement numbers are known or can be guessed. Parameters control the number of
acknowledgements injected (10000, 50000), the spacing between these acknowledgements (1ms, 2ms), any bytes of data included (0, 10), and any oﬀset from the current
acknowledgement number (0, 100, 3000, 9000, 90000).
(3) Incrementing Acknowledgements (param: num, delay, data) — Injecting a series of acknowledgements where the acknowledgement number increases by a variable
amount each time. Congestion control expects these acknowledgements to indicate
the successful receipt of new data and will act accordingly. This action assumes that
target connection’s sequence and acknowledgement numbers are known or can be
guessed. Parameters control the number of acknowledgements injected (50000), the
spacing between these acknowledgements (1ms), and the amount the acknowledgement number is incremented with each packet (9000, 90000).
Modiﬁcation of acknowledgements (on-path attacker). This type of action
changes the manner in which acknowledgements for the sequence space are sent. To
do so, it requires an on-path attacker because the genuine acknowledgement packets
need to be modiﬁed. This action leverages the key role that acknowledgements play
in TCP congestion control. Not only are they used to determine loss via duplicate
acknowledgements, but they are used to clock out new data packets (the “conservation
of packets” principle [93]) and increase the sending rate. We support a number of
manipulations to the sequence of acknowledgements for a data stream:
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(1) Division (param: chunk size) — Acknowledge the sequence space in chunks
much smaller than a single packet. This splits a single acknowledgement packet
into many acknowledgement packets that acknowledge separate ranges. A parameter
controls the number of bytes to acknowledge in a single chunk (100). This technique
has been known to cause signiﬁcant and unfair increases in sending rate with overlytrusting senders who assume that one acknowledgement represents one packet [11].
(2) Duplication (param: dup no) — Duplicate acknowledgements of chunks of the
sequence space repeatedly. A parameter controls the number of duplicate acknowledgements to create (1, 4, 100). This breaks the assumption that each acknowledgement received corresponds to a packet that left the network. The Dup Ack Attack
leverages this assumption during Fast Recovery to trick the sender into sending new
data packets at the same rate as incoming duplicate acknowledgements [11].
(3) Pre-acknowledging (param: none) — Acknowledging portions of the sequence
space that have not been received yet. This hides any losses, preventing slow downs,
and eﬀectively shrinks the connection’s RTT, allowing faster than normal throughput
increases. This is referred to as the Optimistic Ack Attack [11].
(4) Limiting (param: none) — Prevents the acknowledgement number from increasing. This generates duplicate acknowledgements but also prevents any new data
from being acknowledged. This is likely to stall the connection and lead to an RTO.

5.3.4 State Tracker
In order to test a strategy against an implementation, TCPwn needs to know the
state of the sender with respect to congestion control. This is not an easy problem as
there are several implemented congestion control algorithms such as Reno [35], New
Reno [36], CUBIC [42], Compound TCP [105], and Vegas [106]. Implementations may
also choose to include an Application Limited state, adjustable dupACKctr thresholds,
and optional enhancements like SACK [37], DSACK [38], TLP [39], F-RTO [41],
and PRR [40]. Additionally, we desire to do this without modifying the sender or
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making assumptions about what kind of debugging information it makes available.
Finally, key variables that determine the state of the sender (like cwnd, ssthresh,
and rto - timeout) are not exposed by the sender and are not readily computable from
network traﬃc. Further, the observed behavior of an implementation depends not
only on events observable from the network but also on internal events like the fullness
of the driving application’s buﬀer. As one example, it is impossible, by looking only
at the network traﬃc, to distinguish an RTO event from an idle application that
suddenly decided to send a single packet of data.
To overcome these challenges, we choose to approximate the congestion control
state machine by focusing on its core states and assume a bulk transfer application
that always has data available to send. This is practical because nearly all TCP
congestion control algorithms contain the same basic core set of states from TCP
New Reno (see Figure 2.3) with the diﬀerences being in terms of small changes in the
actions done on each transition or the insertion of extra states. For example, CUBIC
TCP simply modiﬁes the additive increase and multiplicative decrease constants on
the transitions to Fast Recovery and Congestion Avoidance. Similarly, TLP adds a
single state before Exponential Backoﬀ. It is entered using a slightly smaller timeout
and sends a single new packet to try and avoid an expensive RTO. Assuming a bulk
transfer application enables us to make assumptions about application behavior when
needed.
We developed the novel algorithm shown in Algorithm 3 to track the sender’s
congestion control state using only network traﬃc. We ﬁnd that this algorithm works
well even when used with implementations containing complex state machines and
enhancements that we approximate using only TCP New Reno. Our algorithm detects
the Fast Recovery state even when the cwnd reduction is CUBIC’s 0.8 factor and not
the 0.5 used by New Reno. It still identiﬁes retransmitted packets and enters Fast
Recovery even if SACK is in use and Fast Recovery was triggered via SACK blocks.
TLP is a case where our approximation fails, but even here we misclassify a tail-loss-
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Algorithm 3: State Tracking for TCPwn
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Function Init()
Start timer intervalT imer to expire every sub rtt ms (10ms)
priorP kt = curP kt = now()
urgEvent = false
state = UNKNOWN
Function OnPacket(p)
update dataBytes, dataP kts, ackBytes, ackP kts, seqHigh, highAck, curP ktT ype and
rexmits based on p
if curP kt < now()− max burst gap then
lastIdle = now()

L

priorP kt = curP kt
curP kt = now()
Reset timer packetT imer to expire in max burst gap ms (5ms)
if rexmits > 0 then
urgEvent = true
Reset timer packetT imer to expire now

l

Function OnTimer()
if urgEvent or curP kt >max burst gap or lastIdle > 4∗sub rtt then
urgEvent = false
if curP ktT ype is SYN then
state = INIT
return

l
l

if curP ktT ype is FIN or RST then
state = END
return
curRatio = dataBytes / ackBytes
pktSpace = curP kt − priorP kt
if dataP kts > 0 and (pktSpace > 200ms) then
state = EXP BACKOFF

L

else if state == FAST RECOV and ackHigh < ackHold then
state = FAST RECOV

L

else if rexmits > 0 or (ackBytes == 0 and ackP kts > 3) then
ackHold = seqHigh
state = FAST RECOV

l

else if (curRatio + priorRatio)/2 > 1.8 then
state = SLOW START

L

else if (curRatio + priorRatio)/2 > 0.8 then
state = CONG AVOID

L

else if state == EXP BACKOFF and curRatio < 0.1 then
ackP kts = 0

L

else
priorRatio = 0.8 ∗ curRatio + 0.2 ∗ priorRatio
return

l

priorRatio = curRatio
ackP kts = ackBytes = dataP kts = dataBytes = rexmits = 0
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probe as an RTO. This is only a minor issue because both states are entered via by
timeouts and trigger the transmission of a single packet.
The core idea of our algorithm is to take a small (sub-RTT) time slice and observe
the packets received and sent by an implementation. If about twice as many bytes
of data have been sent as acknowledged, the state is inferred to be Slow Start and
the sending rate is increasing exponentially. If about an equal number of bytes have
been sent and acknowledged, the state is inferred to be Congestion Avoidance since
the sender is maintaining a steady sending rate. If fewer bytes have been sent than
acknowledged or there are retransmitted packets, the state is inferred to be Fast
Recovery, and if no packets are received and only a few packets are sent, then an
RTO event was observed and the sender is in state Exponential Backoﬀ.
Our algorithm uses two timers, the ﬁrst ﬁres every sub rtt seconds and the second
ﬁres max burst gap seconds after each packet unless reset. This ﬁrst timer handles
the case where TCP is operating at high speed and has packets in ﬂight constantly
while the second handles the case where TCP has not yet reached peak eﬃciency
and is sending packets in bursts and then waiting for their acknowledgements before
sending more. We experimentally set sub rtt to 10ms and max burst gap to 5ms
based on a network with an RTT of around 20ms.
Whenever either of these timers expires, the algorithm determines whether TCP
is sending data smoothly or in bursts. If TCP is sending data in bursts and it has
been less than max burst gap seconds since the last packet, this timer expiration is
ignored. Otherwise, the state inference is updated. If the most recent packet was
a SYN, FIN, or Reset, then the connection state is INIT or END. Otherwise, we
compute the ratio of sent to acknowledged data and the space between the two most
recent packets, and use this information to determine what state the sender is in based
on the intuition presented above. We then reset our data sent and data acknowledged
counters. For the Slow Start and Congestion Avoidance state, we average the ratios
from the last two sampling periods as we found experimentally that this helped to
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produce more accurate results. Finally, if the ratio is less than 0.8, a situation that
should never occur, we ignore this sample and do not reset our counters.

5.4 Implementation
This section discusses how we implemented TCPwn and apply it to real implementations of TCP to identify attacks.
TCPwn is able to test real implementations easily, despite diverse programming
languages, operating systems, hardware support, and libraries. Given the diﬀerent
variants of TCP congestion control algorithms, features, and optimizations [37–43]
any implementation has to make choices about what conﬁguration and combination
of features will be provided. This leads to minor diﬀerences in congestion control
behavior between implementations which can enable or prevent particular attacks or
even attack classes. Further, TCP implementations are typically written as part of the
operating system in a low level language like C and highly optimized for performance,
leading to an increased probability of implementation bugs.
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5.4.1 Testing Environment
We developed a testing environment (Figure 5.3) which leverages virtualization
for both client and server, enabling us to run a wide range of implementations, independent of operating system, programming language, libraries, or availability of
source code.
We connect four virtual hosts into a dumbbell topology with two clients on one
side, two servers on the other, and a single bottleneck link between. When each
client connects to one of the servers, this topology provides an environment where
two ﬂows have to compete for bandwidth on the bottleneck link. This competition is
precisely what an attacker must inﬂuence in order to either increase or decrease the
throughput of his target ﬂow. We connect the virtual machines together with Linux
tap devices and bridges. We artiﬁcially cap the bandwidth on the bottleneck link and
introduce a 10ms delay, using Linux traﬃc control. This gives us a virtual network
based on the widely used Linux networking stack that supports throughput in excess
of 800Mbits/sec.
One of the servers runs the target TCP implementation under test. The other
hosts run a standard TCP stack and serves simply to complete the test harness and
generate necessary traﬃc. To generate traﬃc, our tests use ﬁle transfers over HTTP.
This simpliﬁes setting up the target implementation, as HTTP servers are available
for a wide variety of operating systems and implementations.
The Attack Injector is implemented as a proxy placed in the middle of the bottleneck link. It intercepts all packets in the target connection and applies any on-path
basic actions. It can also inject new packets into the network to emulate an oﬀ-path
attacker. The proxy also measures connection length and amount of data transferred
for attack detection and is implemented in C++.
The State Tracker component is also implemented as a proxy and is placed in our
testing environment as near to the target sender as possible. This proxy observes
the packets sent and received by the sender over small timeslices to automatically
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infer the current state of the sender’s TCP congestion control state machine. We
experimentally set sub rtt to 10ms and max burst gap to 5ms based on a network
with an RTT of around 20ms. This proxy is also implemented in C++.
This whole environment is controlled and coordinated by a Controller script that
takes a concrete strategy from our strategy generator, orchestrates the virtual machines, applications, Attack Injector, and State Tracker components to test that strategy, collects the results, and returns them for analysis.

5.4.2 Attack Detection
The goal of an attacker targeting congestion control is to impact throughput. We
distinguish between four cases for a target connection that are the observable outcome
of an attack:
• Benign: no attack occurs.
• Faster: the sender sends at a faster rate that is should; throughput is larger
than the benign case; this corresponds to a sender bypassing congestion control
to send faster.
• Slower: the sender is made to send at a slower rate that what the network
conditions will allow; the throughput is smaller than a benign connection.
• Stall: the connection has stalled and will never complete; this corresponds to
the case where the attacker made the connection to stall.
Measuring the time it takes to transfer a ﬁle at the application layer is not suﬃcient
because it does not allow us to distinguish between two cases: sending faster or
connection stalled. Both appear, in some cases, as stalled because the TCP receiver
has blocked reassembling data, while all data has already been sent. Thus, the ﬁrst
metric we use is the time it takes to transfer and acknowledge all data packets at the
TCP level, referred to simply as T ime below.4 Thus, we measure the time from when
4

This deﬁnition explicitly excludes trailing RTO retransmissions that are never acknowledged.
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the SYN packet is sent to the last set of data carrying packets that arrive within a
second of each other.
The time needed to transfer the data at the TCP level is not suﬃcient to accurately
classify attacks because it does not capture the case when the connection stalls out
part way through due to an attack and the ﬁle has actually not been transferred in its
entirety. To detect this case, we use a second metric, the amount of data transferred
in the connection at the TCP-level, referred to as SentData below.
We perform 20 tests transferring a ﬁle of size F ileSize without any attacks being
injected to create baseline average and standard deviation values of T imeBenign and
stddev. Then, using the T ime and SentData metrics deﬁned above, our detection
works as follows:
if Time is > (TimeBenign + 2*stddev):
Attack: Slower
else if Time is < (TimeBenign + 2*stddev):
if SentData >= (0.8*FileSize):
Attack: Faster
else:
Attack: Stall
else:
Benign

5.5 Results
We tested ﬁve diﬀerent implementations of TCP in ﬁve operating systems: Ubuntu
16.10, Ubuntu 14.04, Ubuntu 11.10, Debian 2, and Windows 8.1. The tests were run
on a hyperthreaded 20 core Intel R Xeon R 2.4GHz system with 125GB of RAM. We
conﬁgured the bottleneck link to be 100Mbits/sec, with a 20ms RTT, and generated
traﬃc for both the target and competing TCP connections with a 100MB HTTP ﬁle
download for all implementations except Debian 2. Due to limitations with the virtualized NIC, Debian 2 was limited to 10Mbits/sec, so we also limited the bottleneck
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Table 5.1.: Summary of TCPwn Results
Implementation
Ubuntu 16.10 (Linux
Ubuntu 14.04 (Linux
Ubuntu 11.10 (Linux
Debian 2 (Linux 2.0)
Windows 8.1
Ubuntu 16.10 (Linux
Ubuntu 14.04 (Linux
Ubuntu 11.10 (Linux
Debian 2 (Linux 2.0)
Windows 8.1
Total

Attacker
4.8) On-path
3.13) On-path
3.0) On-path
On-path
On-path
4.8) Oﬀ-path
3.13) Oﬀ-path
3.0) Oﬀ-path
Oﬀ-path
Oﬀ-path

Tested
564
564
564
564
564
753
753
753
753
753
6585

Marked FP Attacks
35
3
38
36
1
37
10
6
16
3
0
3
8
1
9
458
8
466
439
9
448
10 554
564
425
0
425
468
3
471
2477
41 2436

link to that same rate with a 20ms RTT while traﬃc generation used a 10MB ﬁle.
We used the Apache webserver for Linux and IIS on Windows.
Testing each implementation took about 13 hours for the on-path testing and 21
hours for the oﬀ-path testing, using only 6 cores. Testing each strategy is independent
and takes between 15 and 60 seconds. With 48 cores running eight testing environments (each needs 6 cores), the on-path testing could have been completed in 1.6
hours and the oﬀ-path testing in 2.6 hours.
Over all the tested systems, we tested 6,585 strategies and found 2,436 attacks,
which we classiﬁed into 11 classes. 8 of these classes were previously unknown in the
literature. We summarize the attacks in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
While this analysis was performed manually, we observe that it is amenable to
automation. In our results, three classes of attacks—Optimistic Ack, Desync, and Ack
Lost Data—make up the majority of marked strategies. An automated classiﬁcation
of these three categories leaves only 281 (11%) strategies to manually examine.
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Table 5.2.: Classes of Attacks Discovered by TCPwn
Num Attack
1
Optimistic
Ack
2
On-path
Repeated
Slow Start

Attacker
On-path
On-path

3

Ampliﬁed
Bursts

On-path

4

Desync
Attack

Oﬀ-path

5

Ack
Storm
Attack

Oﬀ-path

6

Ack
Data

Lost

Oﬀ-path

7

Slow
Injected Acks

Oﬀ-path

8

Sawtooth
Ack

Oﬀ-path

9

Dup Ack
Injection
Ack
Ampliﬁcation

Oﬀ-path

10

11

Oﬀ-path
Repeated
Slow Start

Oﬀ-path

Oﬀ-path

Description
Acking data that has
not been received
Repeated cycle of Slow
Start, RTO, Slow Start
due to ﬁxed ack number during Fast Recovery
Send acks in bursts,
amplifying the bursty
nature of TCP
Inject data to desynchronize
sequence
numbers and stall
connection
Inject data into both
sides of connection,
creating ack loop
Acknowledge lost data
during Fast Recovery
or Slow Start
Inject acks for little data slowly during
Congestion Avoidance
Send
incrementing
acks in Congestion
Avoidance/Fast
Recovery, but reset on
entry
Inject >= 3 duplicate
acks repeatedly
Inject acks for lots of
new data very rapidly
during
Congestion
Avoidance or Slow
Start
Repeated cycle of Slow
Start, RTO, Slow Start
due to increased duplicate ack threshold

Impact
Increased
Throughput
Increased
Throughput

Impl
ALL

New
No [11]

U16.10,
U11.10

Yes

Increased
Throughput

U11.10

Yes

Connection
Stall

ALL

No [99]

Connection
Stall

D2,
W8.1

No [100]

Connection
Stall

ALL

Yes

Decreased
Throughput

U11.10

Yes

Decreased
Throughput

U16.10,
U14.04,
U11.10,
W8.1

Yes

Decreased
Throughput
Increased
Throughput

D2,
W8.1
U16.10,
U14.04,
U11.10,
W8.1

Yes

Increased
Throughput

U11.10

Yes

Yes
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5.5.1 On-path Attacks
We only consider attacks resulting in increased throughput for some target connection to be of interest to this attacker. Our model-guided strategy generation
produced 564 strategies based on the basic actions described in Section 5.3.3. As
shown in Table 5.1, our system marked between 3 and 38 of these strategies (depending on implementation). A few of these marked attacks were false positives, due to
the imprecision of testing with a real network and real implementations. In particular, while our target connection typically incurs its ﬁrst loss within 0.5 seconds of
starting, due to competing with the background connection, in these false positive
tests the ﬁrst loss in the target connection does not occur until after at least 1.5
seconds. Since TCP continues to increase its sending rate until it gets a loss, this
results in an unusually high sending rate. This longer time to loss is not attributable
to any basic action applied, but is simply a result of variations in packet arrival and
departure times, packet processing delays, operating system scheduling, and other
random variations. The remaining marked strategies are real attacks against a TCP
implementation. We identiﬁed between 3 and 36 of these, depending on the implementation. Through manual analysis, we grouped these into 3 classes (Table 5.2),
two of which are previously unknown in the literature.
On-path Repeated Slow Start (new). These attacks operate by repeatedly
inducing an RTO followed by Slow Start. Thanks to Linux’s choice to use a short
RTO timer, the rapid increase in sending rate during Slow Start balances out the
idle period needed to cause an RTO and in many tests actually provides a higher
average sending rate. This is partly due to the signiﬁcant impact this attack has on
competing connections because of the repeated, rapid sending periods that end in
a loss for both connections. These repeated losses cause the competing connection
to slow down repeatedly. We found this attack class against both Ubuntu 11.10 and
Ubuntu 16.10. For both implementations, this behavior is best induced by preventing
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an increase of the cumulative acknowledgement in Fast Recovery, preventing recovery
of losses and causing an RTO. We believe this attack to be unknown in the literature.
Ampliﬁed Bursts (new). This class of attack operates by collecting acknowledgement packets and then sending them together in a burst. This additional burstiness often causes more frequent losses in the competing connection which causes it to
slow down and our target ﬂow to increase its throughput. We found this attack class
against Ubuntu 11.10 with a strategy that collected acknowledgement packets to send
them in bursts during Congestion Avoidance and optimistically acknowledged data
during Slow Start, increasing the size of cwnd. It is interesting to note that without
our model-guided strategy generation we would have been extremely unlikely to ﬁnd
this attack. This is because delaying acknowledgements and sending them in bursts
is only a good idea during Congestion Avoidance. During Slow Start, cwnd is small
enough that there may not be enough acknowledgements in ﬂight to make a single
burst, leading to a connection stall. Similarly, in Fast Recovery, the sender needs to
get acknowledgements as soon as possible so that it can recover from the loss and
keep sending data. Delaying acknowledgements and collecting enough for a single
burst tends to cause the connection to stall.
This attack bears signiﬁcant resemblance to the Induced-Shrew Attack [8]. However, that attack seeks to manipulate a TCP connection to cause catastrophic throughput reduction on other competing connections while maintaining a minimal sending
rate itself. Instead, the Ampliﬁed Burst attack focuses on increasing the throughput of our target connection; we believe this attack to be previously unknown in the
literature.
Optimistic Ack (known). This class of attack operates by optimistically acknowledging data that the receiver has not received and acknowledged yet. This
reduces the eﬀective RTT of the connection, allowing TCP to increase its sending
rate faster, and hides lost packets, preventing TCP from slowing down in response
to congestion. By hiding lost packets, the receiver will not receive the complete data
transfer, but this may be acceptable if the data stream can tolerate losses or if the
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attacker does not care about the data, i.e., is simply conducting a denial of service
attack.
This attack class was ﬁrst identiﬁed in [11]. Unfortunately, the mitigations proposed require non-backwards-compatible modiﬁcations to TCP, such as inserting a
random nonce into each packet. As a result, this attack class is still present in modern
TCP implementations, and we found many instances of it in all 5 of the implementations we tested. In our tests, this attack usually caused the target connection to
consume all available bandwidth up to the network and/or sending system capacity. This left the competing connection starved for bandwidth, often doing repeated
RTOs, and with throughput near zero for the duration of the attack.

5.5.2 Oﬀ-path Attacks
An oﬀ-path attacker can observe network traﬃc but cannot directly modify such
traﬃc. As a result, they are limited to injecting new (possibly spoofed) packets into
the network. In addition to increasing throughput, possibly as part of a denial of
service attack, an oﬀ-path attacker might be interested in decreasing the throughput
or stalling some target connection.
Our model-guided strategy generation produced 753 strategies based on injecting
spoofed packets. As shown in Table 5.1, our system marked between 425 and 564 of
these strategies (depending on implementation) as attacks. A few of these marked
attacks turned out to be false positives. These are mostly cases where, due to imprecision from testing real implementations, the target connection does not see its ﬁrst
loss for an abnormally long time, leading to a higher sending rate than normal. We
present a summary of the attack classes found in Table 5.2.
Ack Lost Data (new). This class of attacks contains a wide range of operations
that cause lost data to be perceived as acknowledged at some point in the connection.
This occurs when an attacker injects a spoofed acknowledgement packet acknowledging data above the current cumulative acknowledgement when the network is about
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to enter Fast Recovery. In this case, at least some of the lost data will be deemed
acknowledged by the victim, causing that data to never be retransmitted. At this
point, anything the sender retransmits or sends will not cause the receiver to increase
the cumulative acknowledgement and the connection permanently stalls. We found a
wide variety of strategies in this attack class against all implementations we tested.
Slow Injected Acks (new). These attacks operate by injecting spoofed acknowledgements that increase their acknowledgment number at a slow and constant
rate. As these acknowledgement packets are injected, each one causes TCP to send
a few packets—equivalent to the amount of data acknowledged—, due to TCP’s selfclocking design. This essentially causes TCP to bypass congestion control and cwnd
entirely and send at the rate at which the spoofed acknowledgements are acknowledging data: ack amount∗injection f requency. This rate can be made much slower than
TCP would otherwise achieve. Additionally, due to the spoofed acknowledgements,
any real acknowledgements for data will be considered old and ignored. We found
this class of attacks against Ubuntu 11.10 and believe it to be unknown previously in
the literature.
Sawtooth Ack (new). These attacks also operate using spoofed acknowledgements that increase their acknowledgement number at a steady pace. However, these
packets may acknowledge more data and occasionally reset their acknowledgment
number to the true cumulative acknowledgement point. This starting over, typically
at a state transition from Congestion Avoidance to Fast Recovery or back, results in
a long string of spoofed acknowledgements with increasing acknowledgement numbers that eventually reaches the previous high acknowledgement, at which point the
sender begins sending new data. This causes a very prominent sawtooth pattern in
a time sequence graph of the connection. Due to the increasing number of acknowledgements that must be sent to reach the highest acknowledgement each time, the
sending rate of a connection under this type of attack continuously decreases. We
found this class of attacks against Ubuntu 16.10, Ubuntu 14.04, Ubuntu 11.10, and
Windows 8.1 using a variety of strategies. In our tests, this attack usually resulted
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in approximately a 12x reduction in throughput. The attacker is required to expend
approximately 40Kbps to keep the attack going.
Dup Ack Injection (new). This class of attack operates by repeatedly injecting
three or more spoofed duplicate acknowledgements into the target connection in hopes
of spuriously triggering Fast Recovery and slowing the connection down. We have
found this class of attack to be very eﬀective against Windows 8.1 and Debian 2.
Newer Linux versions are not vulnerable to this attack due the use of DSACK [38] to
detect spurious retransmissions and a mechanism to dynamically adjust the duplicate
acknowledgement threshold needed to trigger Fast Recovery [108]. In our tests, this
attack often resulted in approximately a 12x reduction in throughput when using
Windows 8.1 or Debian 2. The connection repeatedly enters Fast Recovery and
needlessly retransmits signiﬁcant data. The attacker needs only 40Kbps of bandwidth
to launch this attack.
Ack Ampliﬁcation (new). This class of attack operates similarly to Slow Injected Acks. Instead of sending spoofed acknowledgements with increasing sequence
numbers slowly, the attacker sends them very quickly. Each one causes the sender
to send a large burst of packets, eﬀectively bypassing congestion control and cwnd
completely. This eﬀect is even more pronounced in Slow Start, where the sender can
send two bytes for every one acknowledged. Additionally, since any losses are masked
by the spoofed acknowledgements, TCP will never slow down. This results in a very
powerful class of attack where an attacker can cause the target connection to consume
all available bandwidth up to the network and/or sending system capacity by simply
sending acknowledgements at around 40Kbps. In our tests, the competing connection
was left starved for bandwidth, with throughput near zero, and often doing repeated
RTOs for the duration of the attack. The low bandwidth required of the attacker
makes this ideal for a denial of service attack. We found a wide variety of strategies
in this attack class against Ubuntu versions 16.10, 14.04, 11.10, and Windows 8.1.
Oﬀ-path Repeated Slow Start (new). This class of attacks is very similar to
the On-path Repeated Slow Start attacks discussed previously. The diﬀerence is that
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instead of repeatedly inducing Slow Start by preventing acknowledgements in Fast
Recovery from acknowledging new data, we instead inject duplicate acknowledgements to increase Linux’s duplicate acknowledgement threshold to the point where
Fast Recovery is never entered and an RTO occurs instead. From there, we enter
Slow Start and repeat. As in the on-path version, the rapid increase in sending rate
during Slow Start balances out the idle period needed to cause an RTO and in many
tests actually provides a higher average sending rate. These attacks also signiﬁcantly
impact competing connections due to the repeated, rapid sending periods that end in
a loss for all connections. These repeated losses cause competing connections to slow
down repeatedly.
We found this attack against Ubuntu 11.10. We believe this attack to have been
previously unknown in the literature.
Desync Attack (known). This class of attacks operates by spooﬁng packets
containing a few bytes of data to both sender and receiver in the target connection.
If a host is not currently receiving data, this injected data will incorrectly cause its
cumulative acknowledgement number to increase. All future packets by this host will
then have an acknowledgement number higher than anything the other host sent. and
will be ignored, causing an unrecoverable connection stall.
These attacks were ﬁrst identiﬁed by [99]. The only known mitigation is encryption to prevent access to the sequence numbers of the packets. We identiﬁed many
instances of this attack class against all tested implementations and in all congestion
control states.
Ack Storm Attack (known). Ack Storm attacks are similar to Desync Attacks. The diﬀerence is that while only one half of the connection is desynchronized
in Desync Attacks, both sides become desynchronized by Ack Storm Attacks. As
before, we spoof packets with a few bytes of data to both sender and receiver in
the target connection. However, in this case, both sides are idle, so cumulative acknowledgments at both sender and receiver are increased and both sides send new
acknowledgements. Unfortunately, since neither side actually sent any data, both will
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consider these acknowledgements invalid. As it happens, the TCP speciﬁcation [34]
requires that a host receiving an invalid acknowledgement should respond with a
duplicate acknowledgement. This leads to an inﬁnite storm of acknowledgements between both sides of the connection, as each responds to the invalid acknowledgements
from the other. Additionally, as in Desync Attacks, the target connection itself is
stalled and no further data can be transferred.
This is a known attack, ﬁrst identiﬁed by [100]. One mitigation to this attack is
to ignore invalid acknowledgements if they show up too frequently. Unfortunately,
neither Debian 2 nor Windows 8.1 provide this mitigation, enabling us to discover
this attack with several diﬀerent strategies.

5.6 Summary
Today, the testing of congestion control and the discovery of attacks against it is
mostly a manual process performed by protocol experts. We developed TCPwn, a
system to automatically test real implementations of TCP by searching for attacks
against their congestion control. TCPwn uses a model-guided attack generation strategy to generate abstract attack strategies which are then converted to concrete attack scenarios made up of message-based actions or packet injections. Finally, these
concrete attack scenarios are applied in our testing environment, which leverages virtualization to run real implementations of TCP independent of operating system,
programming language, or libraries. We evaluated 5 TCP implementations including
both open- and closed- source systems, using TCPwn. We found 2,436 attack strategies which could be grouped into 11 classes, of which 8 were previously unknown.
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6 PERFORMANCE AND AVAILABILITY ATTACKS FOR QUIC
Next generation transport protocols are introducing security features like data and
header encryption and performance optimizations like 0-RTT connections that have
important implications on the kinds of attacks they are vulnerable too. Some of these
features, like encryption, reduce the attack surface signiﬁcantly, while others, like 0RTT connections based on caching, open up whole new areas that have not been
previously explored. In this chapter, we investigate one next generation transport
protocol, Google’s QUIC, and identify attacks on its performance and availability.

6.1 Introduction
The proliferation of mobile and web applications and their performance and security requirements have exposed the limitations of current secure transport protocols.
Speciﬁcally, secure protocols like TLS [49] have a relatively high connection establishment latency overhead, causing user unhappiness and often resulting in a decreased
number of customers and ﬁnancial losses. As a result, several eﬀorts [48, 62, 109, 110]
have gone into designing new transport protocols that have low latency as one of
the major design goals, in addition to basic security goals such as conﬁdentiality,
authentication, and integrity.
One of the most promising of these protocols is QUIC [48], a secure transport
protocol developed by Google and implemented in Chrome in 2013. QUIC integrates
ideas from TCP, TLS, and DTLS [111] in order to provide security functionality
comparable to TLS, congestion control comparable with TCP, as well as minimal
round-trip costs during connection setup/resumption and in response to packet loss.
Some of the major design diﬀerences from TLS are not relying on TCP in order
to eliminate redundant communication and the use of initial keys to achieve faster
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connection establishment. QUIC also includes techniques similar to to TCP Fast
Open [112], TLS Snap Start [113], and forward error correcting codes.
QUIC has already seen signiﬁcant deployment, being supported by all Google
services and the Google Chrome browser; as of 2016, more than 85% of Chrome
requests to Google servers use QUIC [22]. In fact, given the popularity of Google
services, QUIC now represents a substantial fraction (estimated at 7% [114]) of all
Internet traﬃc. As a result, it is critical to understand its performance and availability
guarantees in the presence of attackers, especially considering that QUIC is envisioned
mainly for web content delivery and mobile applications.
Previous work examining QUIC has investigated its security guarantees [24,25] or
its performance in benign environments [26–30], but has not investigated its performance and availability in the presence of attackers. There exists a signiﬁcant body of
work looking at attacks on the performance and availability of older transport protocols like TCP [3, 5, 7–13]; however, these attacks all assume the ability to observe,
modify, or inject packets in the connection under attack. QUIC’s use of encryption
prevents packet modiﬁcation or injection in the vast majority of cases as well as protecting against observation of packet data and acknowledgement information. This
complicates and restricts possible attacks. However, the caching of detailed information about a server provided by QUIC’s server conﬁg (scfg), which enables 0-RTT
connections, is unheard of in existing protocols and provides a wealth of possible
information for attackers. This opens up a whole new mode of attack unavailable in
traditional transport protocols like TCP or DCCP.
In this chapter, we investigate QUIC’s performance and availability in the presence of attackers and the root causes underlying this behavior. Due to the use of
encryption, which eﬀectively obscures any user data and most protocol state, we are
limited to considering the connection setup packets, which are sent in plain text. We
focus our investigation on the cacheable information in QUIC used to achieve 0-RTT
connections, as 0-RTT seems to be an important performance motivator for this and
other next generation transport protocols. We consider attacks by on-path attackers,
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with ability to modify packets; oﬀ-path attackers, with the ability to observe and
spoof packets; and blind attackers, who are limited to only injecting packets blindly
into the connection.
Through this investigation, we show that the very mechanisms used in QUIC to
achieve 0-RTT connections, such as unprotected ﬁelds on handshake packets and the
use of publicly available information on both client and server sides, can be exploited
by an adversary to attack QUIC’s availability during the connection establishment
handshake. In particular, we identify two classes of attacks on QUIC’s availability
based on replaying cached information or modifying unprotected information in the
packets used for the connection establishment handshake. We then successfully implement 5 attacks against the Chromium implementation of QUIC.1 Four of these
attacks prevent a client from establishing a connection with a server, compromising
availability, while the ﬁfth is a resource exhaustion denial of service attack against
QUIC servers. Note that these attacks only compromise the availability, not the security of QUIC. In all cases, we found the attacks easy to implement and completely
eﬀective. In many cases, the client is forced to wait for QUIC’s ten-second connection
establishment timeout before giving up.
Our results suggest that the techniques used in QUIC to minimize latency may
not be useful in the presence of malicious parties. Although these weaknesses are not
completely unexpected, they are of signiﬁcant concern to the QUIC team at Google
who have been developing a dedicated monitoring infrastructure to try to address
them [115]. Moreover, these issues appear to be fundamental limitations in 0-RTT
connections that rely on caching, an important result for next generation transport
protocols.
We note that some of these attacks are similar to known attacks against TLS
and TCP and investigate this similarity. However, TLS and TCP make no general
promises about their performance in the presence of adversaries. We ﬁnd that even
1

Speciﬁcally, QUIC version Q021, from October 2014.
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if QUIC’s performance may not be perfect, it is not worse than that of TLS in the
worst case, and is much better in the absence of adversaries.
To summarize, the contributions of this chapter are:
• We investigate QUIC’s performance and availability in the presence of attackers,
focusing on ways to leverage the use of caching during the connection establishment handshake to attack the connection. Later phases of the connection
are protected by encryption, which prevents the modiﬁcation and injection of
packets as well as blinds the attacker to most protocol state. Our investigation
considers a variety of attackers, including on-path, oﬀ-path, and blind attackers.
• We identify two classes of attacks on QUIC’s availability based on replaying
cached information or modifying unprotected information in the packets used
for the connection establishment handshake. These classes of attacks are of
particular interest to other next generation transport protocols because they are
general to 0-RTT protocols relying on caching or protocols with any unprotected
packet ﬁelds. We further identify multiple attacks on QUIC within these classes.
• We demonstrate 5 attacks compromising the availability of QUIC clients or
servers running the Chromium QUIC implementation. Four of these attacks
prevent a client from establishing a connection with a server, compromising
availability, while the ﬁfth is a resource exhaustion denial of service attack
against QUIC servers. Note that these attacks only compromise the availability,
not the security, of QUIC.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents our investigation of possible attacks against QUIC while Section 6.3 implements the attacks we
discovered and discusses their impacts on a real QUIC implementation. Section 6.4
then discusses these attacks and examines their similarity to existing attacks on TCP
and TLS. Finally, we summarize this chapter in Section 6.5.
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6.2 QUIC in the Presence of Attackers
In this section we investigate QUIC’s performance and availability in the presence
of attackers. Due to QUIC’s use of encryption during later phases of the connection,
we focus on the connection establishment handshake. In particular, we concentrate on
attacks possible by leveraging that cacheable information used to provide 0-RTT connections or unprotected packet ﬁelds used during the handshake. QUIC’s cacheable
information consists of three components: 1)the server conﬁg or scfg that contains
important information about the server including a Diﬃe Hellman share, supported
encryption and signing algorithms, and ﬂow control parameters; 2) the source-address
token or stk; and 3) the server nonce or sno. The scfg contains all the information
about the server needed to establish a 0-RTT connection and initial encryption key
while the stk is used to prevent IP spooﬁng and the sno is used to prevent packet
replay attacks. These components are unique to transport protocols providing 0-RTT
connections and contain a wealth of information about a server.
Also important to our investigation are unprotected packet ﬁelds in QUIC. With
so much of the packet encrypted or authenticated during the connection (i.e., any
data, any acknowledgment information, the contents of the scfg), it is important
to pay attention to those ﬁelds that are not authenticated immediately. These are
ﬁelds that may be able to be manipulated or spoofed by an attacker. These ﬁelds
include the connection id or cid, QUIC version number (if present), and public ﬂags.
Additionally, a number of ﬁelds are considered as opaque byte-strings by the client
but authenticated by the server. These include the stk and sno.
Our investigation of these ﬁelds and components led to the identiﬁcation of two
classes of attacks that compromise QUIC’s availability. The ﬁrst of these classes
requires only an oﬀ-path attacker and operates by replaying QUIC’s cacheable information to the client or server, misleading the other party about the progress of the
connection. The second of these classes modiﬁes unprotected packet ﬁelds, requiring
an on-path attacker, to create diﬀerent ideas about connection state on each side of
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the connection. Both of these classes prevent QUIC connection establishment. Persistent failure to establish a QUIC session could further result in a fall-back to TCP,
defeating QUIC’s purpose of minimizing latency while securing the transport layer.
In the remainder of this section we discuss these two classes of attacks and multiple
speciﬁc attacks within each class.

6.2.1 Replay Attacks
Once at least one client establishes a session with a particular server, an attacker
could learn the public values of that server’s scfg as well as the source-address token
value stk corresponding to that client during their respective validity periods. An
attacker could then replay the server’s scfg to the client and the source-address token
stk to the server, misleading in either case the other party. This requires an oﬀ-path
attacker, with the ability to observe and inject packets.
Server Conﬁg Replay Attack. An attacker can replay a server’s public scfg
to any other clients sending initial connection requests to that server while keeping
the server unaware of such requests from clients. Thus, these clients believe they have
enough information to establish an initial connection with the server. When combined
with a random stk or sno, which a client cannot verify, this leads to a server not
recognizing the client and rejecting the their packets. While data conﬁdentiality is
not aﬀected, the clients would experience additional connection establishment latency
and waste computational resources deriving an initial key.
Source-Address Token Replay Attack. An attacker can replay the sourceaddress token stk of a client to the server that issued that token many times to
establish additional connections. This action would cause the server to establish
initial keys and even ﬁnal forward-secure keys for each connection without the client’s
knowledge. Any further steps in the handshake would fail, but an attacker could
create a denial of service attack on the server by creating many connections on behalf
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of a many diﬀerent clients and possibly exhausting the server’s computational and
memory resources.
Ironically, these attacks stem from parameters whose main purpose was to minimize latency by enabling 0-RTT connections. These attacks are more subtle than
simply dropping QUIC handshake packets because they mislead at least one party
into “believing” that everything is going well while causing it to waste time and
resources deriving an initial key.
Resolving these types of attacks seems to be infeasible without reducing the scfg
and stk parameters to one-time use, because as long as these parameters persist for
more than just a single connection, they can be used by an attacker to fake multiple
connections while they remain valid. However, such restriction would prohibit QUIC
from ever achieving 0-RTT connection establishment, the primary motivation for
using these parameters.

6.2.2 Packet Manipulation Attacks
An on-path attacker with access to the communication channel used by a client
to establish a connection with a particular server could ﬂip bits of any unprotected
parameters, leading to diﬀerent connection state at client and server. Of particular
interest are unprotected ﬁelds that are used to derive encryption keys. There are two
of these: the connection id cid and the source-address token stk. Modifying these
parameters leads the client and server to derive diﬀerent initial keys which ultimately
leads connection establishment to fail. For a successful attack, the attacker has to
make sure that all parameters modiﬁed in this way seem consistent across all sent and
received packets with respect to any single party but inconsistent from the perspective
of both parties participating in the handshake.
This type of attack does not raise concerns over the conﬁdentiality and authenticity of communication that is encrypted and authenticated under the initial encryption
key, because even though the initial keys are diﬀerent, they are not known by the
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attacker. Note also that if both parties do not agree on an initial key, they cannot establish a ﬁnal encryption key in QUIC because the ﬁnal s hello message is encrypted
and authenticated under the initial key. Therefore, these attacks do not compromise
the conﬁdentiality and authenticity of communication encrypted and authenticated
under the ﬁnal key.
These packet manipulation attacks are smarter than just dropping QUIC handshake packets because the client and server progress through the handshake while
having a mismatched conversation, resulting in the establishment of inconsistent keys.
This causes both parties to waste time and resources deriving keys and other connection state. In particular, the server performs all the processing required for a
successful connection, unlike in attacks that simply drop QUIC handshake packets.
A simple strategy for mitigating this type of attack would be to have the server sign
all such modiﬁable ﬁelds in its s reject and s hello packets. However, this would
incur the cost of computing a digital signature over all such modiﬁable parameters,
which would in turn open another opportunity for a denial of service attack in which
the adversary, with IP spooﬁng, could send many initial connection requests on behalf
of as many clients as it desires.

6.3 Attack Results
We have implemented the attacks on QUIC’s availability described in the previous section and discuss their results here. We target the Chromium implementation
of QUIC2 in our attacks, as this is the canonical implementation. Our attacks were
developed in python using the scapy library.3 We summarize our attacks, their properties, and impacts in Table 6.1.
2

https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git. We tested QUIC version Q024 from
git revision 50a133b51fa9c6a3dc2b82ce9fedcf074859cd13 from October 1, 2014.
3
http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/
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Table 6.1.: Attacks on QUIC
Attack Name
Server Conﬁg Replay Attack
Source-Address Token Replay Attack
Connection ID Manipulation Attack

Type
Replay
Replay
Manip

Attacker
Oﬀ-path
Oﬀ-path
On-path

Source-Address Token Manipulation
Attack
Crypto Stream Oﬀset Attack

Manip

On-path

Other

Oﬀ-path

Impact
connection failure
server DoS
connection failure;
server load
connection failure;
server load
connection failure

6.3.1 Replay Attacks
Replay attacks use values designed to be cached by the client, like the server conﬁg
scfg and the source-address token stk, to mislead either the client or the server into
believing that a connection is being established correctly. As these attacks require
snooping on legitimate connections, they require an oﬀ-path attacker.
Server Conﬁg Replay Attack. To conduct this attack, an attacker must ﬁrst
collect a copy of the target server’s scfg. This can be done either by actively establishing a connection to the server or by passively listening for a client to attempt
a connection. In either case, the server’s scfg can be readily collected from a full,
1-RTT QUIC connection handshake.
Once the attacker has scfg, he waits for the target client to attempt to start
a connection. When the attacker sees a c hello message from the client, he can
respond with a spoofed s reject message using the collected scfg and randomly
generated stk and sno values. Similar s reject messages are the proper response to
a client that either does not have a cached copy of the server’s scfg or has a copy
that is no longer valid. We assume that the attacker is closer to the client than the
server is so that the s reject message reaches the client prior to the response from
the legitimate server. When the client receives this spoofed s reject message, it
promptly sends a new c hello message using these new scfg, stk, and sno values.
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When the real server receives this new c hello message, it will attempt to validate
it. However, the stk and sno values were randomly generated by the attacker and
so are almost certain to fail the validation. In response to this failure, the server
generates a new s reject message containing scfg and new stk and sno values.
This new s reject message provides the client with valid stk and sno values so
another c hello message could correctly complete the connection. However, when
testing this attack, we found two further issues, the combination of which will always
result in the connection terminating abnormally. The ﬁrst issue is that each QUIC
packet includes an entropy bit in its header and QUIC acknowledgment frames include
a hash of these bits along with a list of unseen packets. The goal of this mechanism
is to prevent Optimistic Ack attacks [51]. In our case, an acknowledgment frame
will typically be included with the client’s second c hello message acknowledging
the spoofed s reject message. If the entropy bit in the attacker’s spoofed s reject
message does not match the entropy bit in the server’s real response, then the entropy
hash in this acknowledgement will not validate and the server will abruptly terminate
the connection.
The second issue is that a single QUIC connection provides multiple byte-streams
for data transfer, and the QUIC handshake takes place within a special byte-stream
reserved for connection establishment. This implies that all the c hello, s reject,
and s hello messages we have mentioned so far occur within the context of this bytestream and have oﬀset and length attributes. As a result, if the attacker’s s reject is
not exactly the same size as the server’s response, then this byte-stream is eﬀectively
broken. Any further messages from the server will be at oﬀsets either above or below
the client’s position in the byte-stream. These messages will either be dropped or
buﬀered forever. After ten seconds the client will abruptly terminate the connection
because it is unable to complete the handshake.
In our tests, the combination of these two issues completely prevented the establishment of any QUIC connections. Connection attempts always terminated after
either half a second, in the case of an entropy bit mismatch, or ten seconds, if the en-
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tropy bits matched, but the byte-stream was corrupted. Our python implementation
requires that the attacker be about 20ms closer to the client than the server is, in
order to create an s reject message and have it reach the client before the server’s
legitimate response. However, with an optimized C implementation, this requirement
could be signiﬁcantly reduced.
Source-Address Token Replay Attack. The stk token is supposed to prevent
packet spooﬁng by ensuring that a connection request originates at the IP address
claimed. The stk is created by the server as part of the s reject message. It contains
the client’s IP address and the current time, both encrypted. A client must present a
valid stk in its c hello message in order to perform a 0-RTT connection. However,
the stk token must be presented prior to encryption being established. This means
that any attacker who can sniﬀ network traﬃc can collect stk tokens that can be
used to spoof connection requests from a speciﬁc host for a limited period of time, by
default 24 hours.
This attack operates by sniﬃng the network for s reject messages from the target
server. Each s reject message contains a new stk being sent to some client. For
each new stk seen, our attacker grabs the stk, the scfg, and the client’s IP address
and starts repeatedly spooﬁng 0-RTT connection attempts with random cids from
this client.
When the target server receives these requests, they appear to be legitimate 0RTT connection requests. The stk will validate because the stk is replayed from a
legitimate connection with an actual client at the spoofed IP address. As a result,
the server will create a new connection for this request. This includes creating initial
and forward-secure encryption keys and sending an s hello message. At this point,
the server believes it has completed connection establishment with the spoofed client.
In our tests, we used separate virtual machines for the attacker and server. We
found that a single attacker starting with a single stk and sending packets at 200KB/sec
was able to completely overwhelm our test server. The 2.4 GHz Intel R Xeon R CPU
dedicated to our server was pegged at 100% utilization, and the operating system’s
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out-of-memory killer eventually killed the server process after it exhausted the 3GB
of memory allocated to the server’s virtual machine.
It seems apparent that the QUIC server implementation in Chromium has no
limitation on the number of connections that can be established from a single IP
address. While we do not believe that this is the server implementation that Google
uses in production, it is the only open-source QUIC server available. Additionally,
much of the QUIC code is a library that we expect would be used by any production
QUIC server. Note, however, that even if a limit on the number of connections from
a single IP were added, this attack can inﬂate the number of connections to the server
by this maximum number for every observed QUIC client.

6.3.2 Manipulation Attacks
Manipulation attacks subvert key agreement by causing the client and server to
agree on diﬀerent keys. This is done by modifying unprotected packet ﬁelds that
are used as input to the key derivation process. Two ﬁelds, the connection id cid
and source-address token stk, seem particularly interesting. We developed attacks
against both of these parameters. Note that modifying packet ﬁelds requires an onpath attacker.
Connection ID Manipulation Attack. In this attack, the attacker is positioned on the path between the client and the server and re-writes the cid such that
the client and server see diﬀerent values. The handshake proceeds as normal, with
the client requesting the scfg, if it does not have a cached copy, and then sending a
c hello message. This c hello is processed by the server and an s hello message
sent in response. At this point, the server believes the connection has been successfully established. However, when the client receives the s hello message sent by the
server, it will fail to decrypt. This is because the cid is an input to the encryption
key derivation process. Since the attacker changes the cid, the client and server will
compute diﬀerent encryption keys.
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Unfortunately, decryption failure is not a sign of catastrophic handshake failure
because it can be caused by reordering. In particular, packets encrypted with the
forward-secure key will fail to decrypt prior to the reception of the s hello message,
which may be delayed due to reordering. As a result, packets failing decryption are
buﬀered until the handshake completes. With the bad s hello message buﬀered, the
client will eventually timeout and retransmit its c hello message. This process will
repeat until the client’s 10 second timer on connection establishment expires. At that
point the connection will be terminated.
An error message will be sent to the server when the connection is terminated.
However, this message will be encrypted with the initial encryption key, and thus the
server will fail to decrypt it and will queue it for later decryption. Since it cannot
decrypt the error message, the server will retain the connection state until the idle
connection timeout expires. This timeout defaults to 10 minutes.
Source-Address Token Manipulation Attack. The goal of this attack is to
prevent a client from establishing a connection, either denying access to the desired
application or forcing the client to fall back to TCP/TLS. It requires an attacker
positioned on the path between the client and the server who re-writes the stk such
that the client and server see diﬀerent values. It is important that the server always
see the value it initially sent because it will validate stk later. To the client, however,
stk is simply an opaque byte string.
Any attempted connection request will proceed as normal, except that the attacker
silently changes the stk values seen by client and server. The client requests the scfg
from the server, which replies with the current scfg and an stk value. The client
then sends a full c hello to initiate the connection. The server receives and processes
this c hello and sends an s hello message in response.
When the client receives this s hello message sent by the server, it will fail to
decrypt. This is because stk is an input into the encryption key derivation process,
and the attacker has changed the stk value seen at the client. As a result, the client
and server will compute diﬀerent encryption keys.
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However, as mentioned previously, a decryption failure is not a sign of catastrophic
handshake failure because this could happen due to reordering, if packets encrypted
with the forward-secure key were received before the s hello message. Hence, the
client buﬀers the bad s hello message for later decryption. Eventually the client
times out and retransmits the c hello message. This process will repeat until the
client’s 10 second timer on connection establishment expires. At that point the connection will be terminated.
The client will notify the server that it terminated the connection, but, unfortunately, this message will be transmitted encrypted with the initial encryption key.
Hence, the server will be unable to process it and will continue to retain the connection state. This state will only be removed when the idle connection timeout expires,
by default after 10 minutes.
We found that this attack eﬀectively prevented all targeted QUIC connections.
Further, all targeted connections experienced a 10 second delay before timing out.

6.3.3 Other Attacks
While developing and testing the Server Conﬁg Replay Attack, we discovered an
additional attack against QUIC. This attack results from QUIC treating handshake
messages as part of a logical byte-stream.
Crypto Stream Oﬀset Attack. Recall that handshake messages are part of
a logical byte-stream in QUIC. As a result, by injecting data into this byte-stream
an attacker is able to break the byte-stream and prevent the processing of further
handshake messages. The attack results in preventing a client from establishing a
connection using QUIC, either denying access to the desired application or forcing
the client to fall back to TCP/TLS.
We create the attack by injecting a four character string into this handshake
message stream. This injection is suﬃcient to prevent connection establishment. Our
attacker listens for c hello messages and responds with a spoofed reply containing
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the string “REJ\0” in the handshake message stream. As observed before, this breaks
connection establishment because any messages from the server will now start at the
wrong oﬀset in the handshake message stream. Hence, they will be discarded or
buﬀered indeﬁnitely.
A connection that is attacked in this manner will either be terminated by the
server because of an entropy bit mismatch or be timed out by the client after 10
seconds.
Note that an attacker requires very little information to launch this attack. No
information is needed from the client’s c hello message, QUIC packet sequence numbers always start from 1, and the cid can be omitted from any packet other than the
client’s c hello. As a result, all an attacker needs to launch this attack is knowledge of when a connection attempt will occur and the 4-tuple (server IP, client IP,
server port, client port) involved. Of this 4-tuple, three items are already known: the
server’s IP, the client’s IP, and the server’s UDP port. If an attacker can guess the
client’s UDP port and when it will make a connection attempt, he can launch this
attack completely blind.
In our tests, the ephemeral UDP port range was still too large to brute force within
an RTT, at least with our python attacker. However, if the attacker can narrow the
port range suﬃciently, then an optimized C implementation could probably conduct
this attack completely blind.

6.4 Attack Discussion
In this section we discuss how some of the attacks we found against QUIC relate
to prior attacks on TCP and TLS. We ﬁnd that attacking QUIC is not easier than
attacking TLS over TCP.
Source-Address Token Replay Attack. This QUIC attack is similar to the
TCP SYN Flood attack [116] where the attacker sends numerous spoofed TCP SYN
packets to a server to overwhelm it and cause DoS. The QUIC attack does almost
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the same thing, but the attacker is limited in the IP addresses he can use for spoofed
packets. However, the impact of each spoofed packet is larger because QUIC needs
to create encryption keys after receiving the initial packet.
The classic mitigation to SYN Flood is SYN Cookies, opaque tokens passed to the
client by the server in the SYN-ACK and returned by the client on the ﬁnal handshake
ACK [116]. A SYN-Cookie encodes enough information so that the server does not
need to keep state between the SYN and the ﬁnal ACK and can serve as a proof that
the client resides at its claimed IP address. The server creates the connection state
structures only after the cookie is returned by the client, making it more diﬃcult to
overwhelm the server with spoofed connection requests.
An stk serves a similar purpose in preventing spoofed packets. However, SYN
Cookies are single use, limiting their time and IP address validity [116]. This prevents
an attacker from using a SYN Cookie to spoof multiple TCP connections. While the
stk could be made single use, this would severely limit the cases where QUIC could
successfully establish a 0-RTT connection.
QUIC Manipulation Attacks. These QUIC attacks are similar to the SSL
Downgrade attack [117] against a modern TLS implementation. In both cases, an
on-path, man-in-the-middle attacker modiﬁes packet ﬁelds and the attack is not discovered until the end of the handshake, after key generation and multiple RTTs.
SSL Downgrade works against SSL connections where both endpoints have SSL
versions less than SSL 3.0 enabled. The goal is to downgrade the connection to an
older, less secure version of SSL [117]. Basically, the attacker rewrites the connection
request to indicate that the client only supports an older version of SSL, often version
2.0. The server and client then establish an SSL 2.0 connection, which the attacker
can presumably compromise.
SSL 3.0 adds protection against this attack by adding a keyed hash of all the
handshake messages to the Finished message and requiring the receiver to verify this
hash [117]. This defense is eﬀective, but the attack will only be detected at the end
of the handshake.
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Our QUIC Manipulation Attacks have a similar outcome where the attack only
becomes apparent at the end of the handshake, when the keys generated by the client
and server do not match. Thus, the connection fails after a timeout, and the client
may fall back to TCP/TLS. Since QUIC is designed to provide much lower latency for
connection initiation than TCP/TLS, this compromises one of QUIC’s main goals.
As discussed in section 6.2.2, one simple mitigation would be to sign all modiﬁable ﬁelds in the server’s s reject and s hello messages. However, this introduces
signature computation overhead and a possible denial of service attack.
QUIC Crypto Stream Oﬀset Attack. This attack is similar to the TCP ACK
Storm Attack [100] in that both result in the inability to transfer any more data
over the target byte-stream and are caused by an attacker inserting data into the
byte-stream.
The TCP ACK Storm Attack requires an oﬀ-path attacker who can observe a TCP
ACK packet of the target connection and then spoof data-bearing packets to both
the client and the server. This data will be received and processed by the client and
server and both will increase their ACK numbers as a result. Unfortunately, when an
ACK is eventually sent by either client or server, it will appear to acknowledge data
that the other side has not yet sent. TCP will drop such packets and send a duplicate
ACK. At this point, the TCP byte-stream is eﬀectively broken; no more data can be
transferred because all packets will have invalid ACK numbers.
In much the same way, injection of data into a QUIC handshake stream disrupts
the stream oﬀsets and prevents any further handshake negotiation. This eventually
results in connection timeout. Although a byte-stream is a convenient abstraction, it
does not appear to be a good ﬁt for handshake data. A message stream, or sequence
of messages, would be less prone to disruption in this manner.
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6.5 Summary
QUIC is a new, next generation transport protocol that has seen signiﬁcant adoption and now makes up about 7% of Internet traﬃc. Unlike other transport protocols,
it encrypts user data and most protocol state and oﬀers 0-RTT connection establishment for improved performance. We investigate performance and availability attacks
against QUIC, focusing on QUIC’s use of caching to achieve 0-RTT and the impact of unprotected packet ﬁelds. Our analysis identiﬁes two classes of attacks on
QUIC’s availability, based on replaying cacheable information or modifying unprotected packet ﬁelds. These attack classes appear to be general to 0-RTT protocols
relying on caching and unprotected packet ﬁelds. We further identify and demonstrate 5 attacks on QUIC within these classes. Four of these attacks prevent a client
from establishing a connection with a server, compromising availability, while the
ﬁfth is a resource exhaustion denial of service attack against QUIC servers. Note
that these attacks only compromise the availability, and not the security, of QUIC;
however, they signiﬁcantly impact QUIC’s goal of low latency connections and deny
access to resources available over QUIC.
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7 RELATED WORK
In this section, we present related work organized by topic.

7.1 Automated Attack Detection
Prior work has looked at automatically ﬁnding attacks on network protocols.
Fuzzing has been the predominant approach in this research direction. While random
fuzz testing [118] is often eﬀective in ﬁnding interesting corner case errors, the probability of “hitting the jackpot” is low because it typically mutates well-formed inputs
and tests the program on the resulting inputs. To overcome this inherent challenge
of fuzzing, a set of works like SNOOZE [14], KiF [15], and EXT-NSFM [16] leverage
the protocol state machine to cover deeper portions of the search space. KiF uses
the state machine to bias fuzzing towards unexplored search space while SNOOZE
uses it to reach deeper locations before beginning fuzzing, and EXT-NSFM uses it
to determine what part of the protocol to fuzz without unnecessarily restarting the
application. These and similar fuzzing tools primarily search for crashes or other fatal
errors.
Several other research eﬀorts [5, 18, 19, 119–121] leverage program analysis, for
example, symbolic execution, to ﬁnd vulnerabilities in protocol implementations.
MAX [5] focuses on ﬁnding performance attacks mounted by a compromised participant in two-party protocols. However, MAX relies on user speciﬁed information
about interesting lines of code to limit the search space during symbolic execution.
Similarly, SymbexNet [119] tests two-party protocols by executing one party symbolically to operate on symbolically marked input packets. Thus it can generate
high-coverage test input packets for the implementation, whose responses are veriﬁed
against manually derived rules from the speciﬁcation. Many of these techniques re-
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quire access to the protocol implementation source code in a speciﬁc language and
most do not consider malicious parties.
MACE [18] combines symbolic execution with concrete execution to infer the protocol state machine and use it as a search space map to allow deep exploration for
bugs. The inferred state machine represents the external interactions of the protocol
(e.g., the sequence of exchanged messages). While this state machine captures transitions caused by distinct messages types, it is unable to identify transitions caused
by other characteristics of the exchanged messages. MACE searches only for crashes
or other fatal errors in protocol implementations and does not consider malicious
parties.
Turret [6] provides a platform for ﬁnding performance attacks against intrusion
tolerant distributed systems. Turret inserts a malicious proxy in front of an unmodiﬁed implementation to simulate a malicious attacker and uses a greedy search strategy
to look for the malicious actions that cause the largest impact in system performance.
While parts of our approach are similar, transport protocols require a very diﬀerent
set of malicious actions than the multi-party, attack-resistant, application-layer protocols that Turret targets. Additionally, since intrusion tolerant distributed systems
are designed to be attack resistant, Turret is able to use a greedy search strategy
that looks for actions that cause performance impacts and then combines them. In
contrast, transport protocols are not designed with intrusion tolerance in mind, which
causes a greedy search strategy to fail completely. Instead we have to develop search
strategies based on models of the protocol’s behavior.

7.2 Transport Protocol Attacks
There has been signiﬁcant prior work on ﬁnding attacks on transport protocols.
One of the earliest works in this area is [10] which identiﬁed the problems with predictable initial sequence numbers in TCP. The authors demonstrated that predictable
initial sequence numbers enable a blind attacker to spoof TCP connections.
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Another early work in this area was [99] which identiﬁed the Desynchronization
Attack against TCP. This attack, identiﬁed by manual analysis of TCP, causes the
sender and receiver to become desynchronized with respect to the location of the
cumulative acknowledgement, resulting in a connection stall.
Another important work in this area is [11] which considered the ways that a
malicious receiver could cheat TCP’s congestion control. An expert analysis of the
protocol identiﬁed and demonstrated three attacks that such a receiver could launch:
Optimistic Ack, Ack Division, and Dup Ack Spooﬁng. These attacks allow an endpoint or on-path attacker to increase the throughput of a target connection by modifying how it acknowledges data, either acknowledging more data than it should,
acknowledging it in many little pieces, or repeatedly acknowledging the same data.
Ack Division and Dup Ack Spooﬁng has since been widely mitigated by applying
Appropriate Byte Counting [122] and similar implementation-level mitigations.
Another well known set of attacks are the SYN-ﬂood [116], Reset [13], and SYNReset [3] TCP attacks. The SYN ﬂood attack operates by overwhelming the target
with a huge number of SYN packets, preventing legitimate connections from being
established, while the Reset and SYN-Reset attacks allow a blind attacker to abruptly
terminate a target connection. They operate by brute forcing the sequence and acknowledgement numbers, which is practical due to large receive window sizes.
The work in [9] and [8] introduced another pair of attacks (the Shrew and Induced
Shrew attacks) against TCP’s congestion control. These attacks oﬀer a blind attacker
with a means to degrade the throughput of TCP connections along some target link
while expending minimal bandwidth in an attempt to avoid detection. Both of these
attacks were again identiﬁed manually by protocol experts.
A security analysis of TCP commissioned by the British Government [3] identiﬁed
two additional attacks available to a blind attacker. These are the Blind Flooding Attack and the Blind Throughput Reduction Attack. Both operate by sending spoofed
acknowledgements which will cause the receiver to send a duplicate acknowledgment
if the packet is out of the acceptable sequence window.
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The work in [100] identiﬁed the Ack Storm Attack where the injection of data into
a target TCP connection prevents further data transfer and generates an inﬁnite series
of acknowledgements, as both parties respond to what they consider to be an invalid
acknowledgement with an acknowledgement. This attack was similarly identiﬁed by
expert protocol analysis.
More recently, a number of works [95–98] have demonstrated that inferring TCP
sequence numbers is feasible under certain circumstances. These works leverage some
form of side channel to enable a blind attacker to determine the sequence and acknowledgement numbers needed to inject data into some target TCP connection.
They were identiﬁed by expert analysis.

7.3 NLP for Technical Domains
A variety of works have looked at applying NLP to extract information from
technical domains. DASE [69] applies NLP techniques to identify input constraints
from code comments describing ﬁle formats; regular expressions are also used to
extract command line arguments from man pages. These constraints are used to
improve test case generation for symbolic execution. Input constraints are identiﬁed
using a simple rule-based system applied to a typed dependency parse of each code
comment.
The work in [123] also applies NLP to code comments, but with the intention
of creating simpliﬁed versions of highly optimized library functions to ease static
and dynamic analyses. It attempts to extract input and output conditions from
semi-structured JavaDoc comments. The system constructs a parse tree and then
uses pattern matching to generate possible function implementations. The authors
ﬁnd it necessary to process the output at several points in the process to deal with
inaccuracies introduced by NLP techniques trained on newswire.
ARSENAL [124] is designed to take requirements documents for safety-critical
systems and turn them into Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas that can be auto-
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matically analyzed to ensure that desired properties hold. Again, a rule-based system
is applied to a typed dependency parse of each sentence to create a corresponding
LTL formula. A complex pre-processor, based on regular expressions, is required to
ensure that domain speciﬁc terminology is handled correctly.
Other works have looked at mobile application permissions and privacy [68, 125,
126], enhanced source code search and cross-linking [70, 127], requirements document
and API checking [128–131], and trouble ticket classiﬁcation [132]. For mobile applications, WHYPER [68] applied NLP to extract required permissions from descriptions
of mobile applications while [125] examined application privacy policies to extract
what the policy allows applications to do with the data they collect.
SWordNet [127] seeks to improve software code search by identifying semantically
related words, which may be domain speciﬁc. This is done by extracting semantic
pairs of words from code comments and function names. Similarly, [70] used documentation and source code to create an ontology allowing the cross-linking of software
artifacts represented in code and natural language on a semantic level.
ACRE [128] leverages NLP to extract access control rules from design documents
written in natural language. This is done using a type dependency parse tree and a
set of pattern-based rules. Pandita, et al.’s work in [129] creates formal API speciﬁcations from natural language, often fragmentary, API descriptions. Here, available
structured information, like parameter and method names can be leveraged. Similarly, Doc2Spec [130] extracts formal speciﬁcation rules from API speciﬁcations to
search for bugs in application code. NLP is used to identify resources used by APIs
based on an ontology.
NetSieve [132] analyzes free-form text in trouble tickets to identify problem symptoms and suggest resolutions. It identiﬁes domain-speciﬁc phrases based on text
statistics and maps them into an ontology. A rule-based system then extracts
(problem, action, resolution) tuples which can be applied to new tickets.
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8 CONCLUSION
Given the importance of transport protocols, it is crucial to insure that implementations of these protocols operate securely and reliably and that we understand the
types of attacks to which these protocols are exposed. This has previously been done
via painstaking manual analysis of individual protocol implementations by networking experts, which is extremely time consuming and ineﬃcient. As a result, there
has been a steady steam of attacks against transport protocols in the literature. This
dissertation addresses this situation by providing novel techniques for automatically
searching for attacks in real, unmodiﬁed implementations of transport protocols and
by providing a better understanding of the types of attacks that are faced by next
generation transport protocols.
As a ﬁrst step towards automated testing of real transport protocol implementations, we presented SNAKE, a system to automatically and broadly search for attacks
on the performance or availability of arbitrary transport protocol implementations.
SNAKE uses a novel attack injection technique to generate test cases by leveraging
the protocol’s connection state machine to focus testing on key protocol locations as
well as a new attack detection technique based on expected competition and fairness,
to detect attacks that are not as obvious as implementation crashes. To provide
completely automated testing, we also developed an NLP framework to extract a description of a protocol’s grammar automatically from a natural language speciﬁcation
document. To do this we use a zero-shot learning approach that learns a similarity
function between textual phrases and protocol ﬁelds and relations, enabling adaptation to new protocols, and rely on the structure and linguistic regularities of the
protocol speciﬁcation documents in our domain to minimize the amount of training
required.
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We have provided a concrete implementation of SNAKE and demonstrated its
eﬀectiveness using ﬁve implementations of two transport protocols in four diﬀerent
operating systems, ﬁnding 9 classes of attacks. While skilled researchers manually
analyzing implementations have previously discovered some of these attacks, SNAKE
was able to ﬁnd all of these attacks automatically and without human intervention.
Additionally, we used our NLP-pipeline to automatically extract grammars from 7
protocols and found that our pipeline was capable of extracting protocol packet ﬁelds
with an F-score of 0.74 and ﬁnding and linking properties with a success rate of 66%.
We further demonstrated the value of automatic grammar extraction by applying
our pipeline to SNAKE and comparing it to using a manual grammar. We ﬁnd a
reduction in the testing eﬀort (from 901 to 819 test cases) while identifying the same
set of attacks and doing so in a fully automated manner. We, therefore, conclude that
SNAKE can signiﬁcantly improve the process of testing and securing implementations
of transport protocols.
Although SNAKE ﬁnds many types of attacks, it is ineﬀective at ﬁnding attacks
on congestion control due to the highly complex and dynamic nature of the congestion
control algorithms. Therefore, we proposed TCPwn, a system to automatically search
for attacks on implementations of TCP congestion control. TCPwn models congestion
control as a ﬁnite state machine and uses a model-based attack strategy generation
algorithm that generates possible congestion control attacks by identifying their key
characteristics. This algorithm ﬁrst generates abstract attack strategies which are
then converted into concrete attack strategies by identifying attacker actions that
cause the desired state machine transitions. These strategies are then applied to real
implementations of TCP with the help of an algorithm to infer the current congestion
control state of a sender from network traﬃc.
We have provided a concrete implementation of TCPwn and demonstrate its eﬀectiveness using ﬁve TCP implementations from diﬀerent operating systems, ﬁnding 11
classes of attacks. Again, some of these classes of attacks have been previously discovered by skilled researchers manually inspecting implementations. However, TCPwn
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ﬁnds all these attack classes automatically and without human intervention. We,
therefore, conclude that TCPwn can be applied to signiﬁcantly improve the security
of TCP congestion control implementations.
Next generation transport protocols like QUIC present distinctly diﬀerent attack
surfaces compared to traditional transport protocols like TCP. This stems from the
heavy use of encryption to protect user data as well as most protocol headers, rendering third-party attacks on congestion control and connection tear down ineﬀective.
Additionally, QUIC has been optimized for low latency thanks to 0-RTT connections,
which make signiﬁcant use of caching. This exposes a host of new information to the
attacker. We have, therefore, studied QUIC, looking for attacks on its availability
and performance with the goal of understanding the types of attacks that impact
next generation transport protocols. Our manual investigation revealed two classes
of attacks against the availability of QUIC, both of which result from design choices
made to allow enhanced performance. We futher identiﬁed and demonstrated 5 attacks within these classes compromising the availability of QUIC clients or servers
running the Chromium QUIC implementation.
Future Work. There are several compelling directions to pursue for future work.
First, automated testing is limited by the amount of information about the protocol that is available. Increasing this to include further information about expected
protocol behavior, the meanings of particular ﬁelds, or protocol algorithms can help
to improve testing. While we have made progress on using NLP to tackle this problem, we have made no more than an initial attempt. We would like to be able to
extract not only protocol grammars, but also state machines and algorithms as well
as to parse other sources, like blog-posts, for protocol information and possible bugs.
Second, the ability to automatically search for attacks on congestion control using
TCPwn raises interesting questions about the security of alternative congestion control algorithms like BBR [104] and TFRC [32]. In particular, we hope that these
algorithms are less susceptible to manipulation, but certainly no more so, than classic New Reno. While TCPwn provides a good basis for such a comparison, these new
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congestion control algorithms will require new, currently unknown, state inference algorithms due to their signiﬁcantly diﬀerent state machines. Finally, the development
of automated testing for QUIC implementations seems particularly valuable given the
interest in the protocol. Our evaluation clearly identiﬁes several classes of attacks to
which QUIC is vulnerable as well as some of the challenges to automated testing. In
particular, methods to search for attacks leveraging cached information would need
to be developed.
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